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Many survey questions ask respondents to provide responses that contain
quantitative information. These questions are often asked requiring open ended numeric
responses, while others have been asked using vague quantifier scales. How these
questions are asked, particularly in terms of the response format, can have an important
impact on the data. Therefore, the response format is of particular importance for
ensuring that any use of the data contains the best possible information. Generally, survey
researchers have argued against the use of vague quantifier scales. This dissertation
compares various measurement properties between numeric open ended and vague
quantifier responses, using three studies containing questions with both formats. The first
study examines uses new experimental data to compare accuracy between the measures;
the second and third use existing data to compare predictive validity of the two formats,
with one examining behavioral reports, the other examining subjective probabilities. All
three studies examine the logical consistency between measures, and the potential
correlates related to improved measurement properties. Importantly, these studies
examine the influence of numeracy, a potentially important but rarely examined variable.
The results of the three studies indicate that vague quantifiers may have better

measurement properties than numeric open ended responses, contrary to many
researchers’ arguments. Studies 2 and 3 are most clear about this increased strength; in
both of the studies, using a number of tests, the predictive validity of vague quantifiers
was consistently greater than that of numeric open ended responses, regardless of
numeracy level. Study 1 shows that at that generally, vague quantifiers result in more
accurate data than numeric, but this finding depends on other factors, such as numeracy.
Therefore, numeracy was infrequently found to be important, but at times did have an
impact on accuracy. Further, in the three studies, it was found that the two formats were
logically consistent when translations between the questions were directly asked for, but
inconsistency occurred when there was not a direct translation.
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1
Introduction
Surveys collect data on a wide range of information that is important for not only
academic research but a range of other areas, such as marketing and policy decisions. For
example, questions about television use may affect the decisions a business makes and
how to invest money. Asking about how many times a person takes pain medication may
affect drug policy. Questions about subjective beliefs, such as the risks of smoking can be
used to make decisions about public health campaigns. Importantly, all of these questions
ask respondents to provide responses that contain numeric information. Responses to
these queries can be affected by the way the question design allows an answer. How these
questions are asked, particularly in terms of the response format, can have an important
impact on the data, including the response distribution and the overall quality of the
responses. This quality can be expressed in different ways, most importantly as the level
of measurement error in each response format (Biemer and Lyberg 2003, Groves 1989,
Lessler and Kalsbeek 1992). As such, the response format is of particular importance for
ensuring that any use of the data contains the best possible information on which to make
decisions.
Survey questions provide methods for respondents to give their answers, either in
their own words (open ended questions) or through response alternatives provided by the
researcher (closed ended questions) (Converse and Presser 1986). The choice between
open and closed ended and the choice of which alternatives to offer in a closed ended
question can have distinct effects on the response distributions (Schuman and Presser
1981). That there is an impact of question format on response distributions is likely true
for all survey questions and question types, including questions about quantities
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regardless of whether the questions ask about frequencies, such as for behaviors, or for
expressions of subjective probabilities, such as those for level of perceived risk.
Three main response options have been developed and used in requesting
quantitative information from respondents: open ended, numeric scales, or vague
quantifier scales (Tourangeau et al. 2000). The open ended approach, which has been
used most frequently by survey designers, leaves the response formulation and reporting
to the respondent, whereby, for numeric questions, the respondent generally responds
with one number. For scale responses, respondents choose a scale point most closely
associated with their formulated answer. For objective measures, such as frequencies, the
response options can include scale points for distinct, individual values, (e.g. 1 time) or
for ranges of values (e.g. 1 to 5 times). Subjective probabilities may also be elicited using
open ended questions, in which the expected probability is directly asked for (e.g. Viscusi
1990). Both open ended and numeric scale options presume that the respondent has some
numeric understanding and representations of the requested information in numeric form
in order to respond (Schwarz et al. 1985). However, some have argued against the use of
numeric scales, as it may bias respondent answers as the scale provides not only a
measurement device but also an informative component as well (Schwarz et al. 1985).
The last response format frequently used is vague quantifier scales. These scales
use no numeric values directly, but rather use verbal phrases frequently used in natural
language to describe numeric data (Sanford et al. 1994, 1996). These scales provide
options that are, as the name suggests, inherently vague. For example, scale options may
include words and phrases such as very often, somewhat often, and not very often. As
such, there is often a large variation in the numeric meaning assigned to vague quantifiers
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(e.g. Wallsten et al. 1985). The scales also have relative meaning, such as where on the
scale a respondent believes they are in comparison to similar others (Schaeffer 1991). As
such, it has been argued against the usage of such scales when it is possible to use
numeric response options (especially open ended) instead (Beyth-Marom 1982, Schaeffer
1991, Tourangeau et al. 2000).
In considering the formatting of questions that ask for numeric information, an
issue that deserves additional research is to better determine how quantitative information
is represented cognitively. Matching response options to cognitive structure appears to be
a possible best practice in survey methodology (Tourangeau et al. 2000). Included in this
cognitive structure is the way that quantitative information is used when judging the
frequency of the occurrence of events and in providing subjective probabilities such as
assessing risks. Hence, if people think about quantitative information in vague ways,
asking them to quantify using vague quantifier scales may be more appropriate in
comparison to other formats. For example, given that the risk of death for a surgery is 1
in 1000, what may matter more than the numeric representation is the vague
representation of whether this risk is “a little” or “a lot”. Similar vague representations
may also underlie judgments of behavioral frequencies.
As presented in the literature review below, there are reasons to believe that vague
quantifiers are indeed better measures than numeric indicators. First, it is not clear that
people are able to think numerically in a range of instances. In general, there is a lack of
numeracy (numeric literacy) in the population (e.g. Galesic and Garcia-Retamero 2010).
Theories such as “fuzzy-trace” and other dual-process theories suggest that people
frequently rely on vague, intuitive representations of numeric information rather than on
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the verbatim representation of the numbers (Reyna and Brainerd 2008). Correlations
between subjective beliefs and behaviors have been found to be higher when using vague
quantifier scales than numeric responses (Windschitl and Wells 1996). Further, it has
been noted it is more cognitively burdensome to ask about numeric information than
vague quantifiers (Bradburn and Miles 1979).
Still, there is a dearth of research on whether vague quantifiers or numeric
responses perform better in regards to validity. Studies examining frequencies have
focused on the meanings and variations in these meanings people have placed on vague
quantifiers, rather than which format performs better in predicting accuracy. Further,
these studies have not examined which format is more strongly related to other variables
of interest, i.e. predictive validity. In regards to subjective probabilities, there has been
some work on the predictive validity of the different measures, but these studies have
been limited to bivariate measures of association, and have been conducted on
nonrandom and small samples (i.e. college students in a class).
The goal of the research described in this dissertation is directed to filling some of
these gaps in the research on vague quantifiers and numeric responses. In particular, the
ultimate goal is to provide evidence as to which format of response to quantitative
queries, numeric open-ended versus vague quantifier, provides better data and in which
circumstances. I will use three different data sets, all of which contain responses to
similar questions using both response formats, numeric open ended responses and vague
quantifier responses. Two of these data sets are related to frequencies; one is related to
subjective probabilities. Two of the data sets come from national samples, while one is an
experiment that has been designed specifically for this dissertation.
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Dissertation Structure
This dissertation is organized into six sections. The first section briefly lists the
four major research objectives of this investigation. The objectives are followed by the
problem statement and significance of the research, including a brief overview of the
gaps in the literature, and a brief description of problems and significance of each of the
four objectives. The second section is a review of the existing literature regarding the
areas of numeracy, frequency estimation, and the subjective probability estimation,
concluding with a summary and a more extended discussion of the gaps in the literature
in regards to the current research. Following the review, there are three separate sections
outlining three studies. Three data sets are needed to look at the various aspects of
numeric estimation and facets of data quality, and each section describes the data and
methods, the hypotheses, the results from the analyses, and the discussion and conclusion
for the respective study. The first two data sets examine frequency estimation and
response formats, while the third data set examines subjective probability estimation. The
final section presents a summary of the research including recommendations for survey
research.
Research Objective
The main objective of this research is to examine which type of response formats,
numeric open ended or vague quantifier scales, have better measurement properties for
questions requesting numeric data, that is, which has the least measurement error.
Numeric scales are not examined by the three studies for several reasons. First, both
numeric scales and numeric open ended responses require some numeric understanding
and cognitive representation of the information requested by the survey question.
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However, only one of these response forms is needed to compare responses requiring a
numeric representation versus those that do not. Second, previous research has found
numeric scales to introduce systematic biases in respondents’ behavioral reports.
Specifically, Schwarz et al. (1985) suggest that numeric open ended response formats are
preferable to numeric scales, as numeric scales “may introduce systematic bias in
respondents' behavioral reports and related judgments, because response scales are not
only measurement devices but serve informative functions as well” (Schwarz et al. 1985
p. 394). Third, of practical importance, much of the data available that allow comparisons
to be made only have data on numeric open ended responses and vague quantifier
responses, barring comparison with numeric scales. For these reasons, all of the data
examined will compare only numeric open ended and vague quantifier responses.
This main objective entails first, which format, numeric open ended or vague
quantifier scales, is more accurate, and second, which has higher predictive validity. A
third objective is to see if the semantic representations of numbers and the actual numeric
translation of these are logically consistent. Finally, these objectives include an
examination of generalizability, that is, in which circumstances these findings hold.
These objectives are divided across frequency and subjective probability data. The
research objectives are presented more expressly below:
Objective 1: Accuracy of Different Response Formats
The aim of objective 1 is to examine whether one response format, numeric open
ended or vague quantifier scales, is more accurate than the other in relation to verifiable
data. Since by definition vague quantifiers do not convey an exact meaning, numeric
values must be assigned to gauge accuracy, as in Lu et al. (2008). If one is more accurate
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than the other this possibly suggests the cognitive structure of quantitative data and
measurement properties of the different response formats. That is, more accurate data
may suggest that the quantitative information is stored in a way more closely resembling
one response format (numeric versus vague), and in addition, accuracy is suggestive of
which response format has better measurement properties. Since accuracy needs factual
supportive data, accuracy data relies on frequency data.
Objective 2: Predictive Validity of Different Response Formats
The aim of objective 2 is to determine which response format, numeric open
ended or vague quantifier scales, if either, is stronger in terms of predictive validity, i.e.
the relationship of the target response to other theoretically related variables. In many
instances it is the relationships between variables that may be of interest rather than the
simple univariate statistics, and different question formulations have found differential
predictive validity (e.g. Chang and Krosnick 2003). In comparison to accuracy measures,
assigning numeric values when examining predictive validity is less necessary, and
predictive validity can be tested using both frequency and subjective probability data.
Objective 3: Logical Consistency Between Measures
The aim of objective 3 is to inspect the numeric translations of vague quantifiers
and identify whether the numeric responses and vague quantifiers given are consistent. It
may be that there is a logical incoherence in the translated numeric meaning and the
vague quantifier given. In such cases it is necessary to posit whether one measure rather
than the other is more likely to be more consistent with cognitive-semantic processes.
The examination of logical consistency is closely related to determining face validity.
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Objective 4: Circumstances of Differential Performance of Different Response
Formats
The aim of objective 4 is to investigate in what cases the accuracy and predictive
validity differs for the varying response formats, and in which direction. It is likely that in
some cases the accuracy and/or predictive validity is stronger for one measure, but that
the other response format has better measurement properties for a different measure.
Problem Statement and Significance
The reporting of a response to a survey question, given different response formats,
is an issue mainly of measurement. As such, in the Total Survey Error paradigm, the
source of error mainly of interest when dealing with response formats is measurement
error (Biemer and Lyberg 2003, Groves 1989, Lessler and Kalsbeek 1992). Measurement
error refers to the difference between the true value and the survey estimate (Lessler and
Kalsbeek 1992). This measurement error can arise from a number of sources, including
the interviewer, the questionnaire mode, the questionnaire, and the respondent. Although
all may interact with response formats, only the questionnaire and the respondent are of
interest in the current dissertation (although it will be noted when other sources may be a
cause of error).
Measurement error due to the questionnaire in this case would be due to the
provision of inadequate or difficult response options, in which the response options do
not match the information stored in memory or is difficult for the respondents to match to
the information requested. This measurement error can occur due to a mismatch in the
format and the natural way that respondents’ store information, or if asking a question in
one form or the other increases cognitive difficulty. From the respondent side of the
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equation, the error occurs due to several different sources, which arise from the response
process taken during survey response. The response process includes the steps of
encoding of the requested information, comprehension of the question, retrieval of the
requested information, judgment of the relevance and completeness of memories, and
giving a response, which may require editing (Biemer and Lyberg 2003, Tourangeau et
al. 2000).
The first step of the response process is how the respondent initially encodes the
information that will be requested by the questionnaire. For quantitative information,
initially the information may not be encoded at all, only some of the information is
encoded, some estimate is used, all information is encoded, or only vague notions are
stored (see below in literature review). At the second stage, respondents need to
understand the question and how to respond given the response format, but may not,
including the meaning of vague terms (Groves 1989). At the third stage, numeric
information must be recalled in some format, generally based on the way the information
was encoded. However, it may not be the case that information is recalled as it was
initially stored, as information may be forgotten or only vague representations remain
(see literature review). The fourth stage, judgment, requires assessment of the recalled
information for completeness. An error can occur, for example, when the recalled
information is judged complete when it is not. The response step requires that the
numeric information recalled and judged complete is reported given the response format.
However, if the response format is not matched to how the information is encoded or
recalled, then the mismatch can create error. Finally, respondents may skip some of these
steps entirely (i.e. satisficing), which can increase error as well (Krosnick 1991).
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Given all of these potential sources of error, it is important to identify response
formats that lead to the least amount of error as possible. Numeric open ended responses
or vague quantifiers are two alternatives which are often used in measuring information.
As noted above and more fully below in the literature review, both response formats have
theory and findings suggesting one may be preferable, and are important in the
measurement properties the question, especially in terms of validity. Further, although
there is evidence people may naturally store quantitative information as vague
quantifiers, practitioners at times recommend against using vague quantifier response
options in questions. This avoidance may be in part due to a lack of research showing the
comparative measurement properties of the numeric and vague quantifier response
formats. As of now, there are few, if any, studies that examine the comparative
measurement properties of the two response formats. The goal of this dissertation is to fill
this gap in the literature, and assess the validity of the different response formats via
accuracy and predictive validity, and the instances that the different response formats
perform better on these assessments. By examining different forms of validity and the
contexts in which the measures display better or worse measurement properties, the
results are hoped to triangulate to some conclusions about which measures should be
used and when.
Logical consistency of responses to the different formats has been studied more
than other aspects of the measurement properties of response formats, such as accuracy
and predictive validity; however, some important gaps still exist in the literature,
particularly in the survey methodology literature. First, is the examination of whether
numeric translations of vague quantifier are linguistically logical. For example, it should
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be examined if the response to the vague quantifier response option “never” is always
equal to zero. In addition, it follows that respondents should always give a translation for
quantifiers at higher points on the scales significantly greater than points lower on the
scale. However, this logical ordering has not been studied completely, and is another gap
in the literature that this research proposes to address.
There are a number of other gaps in the literature that exist, in particular regarding
the respondent and other characteristics that may interact with response formats to affect
the differences in measurement properties. Most prominently is a lack of the examination
of numeracy on responses to questions about quantitative information, and how numeracy
interacts with the different response formats to affect measurement properties, including
accuracy, predictive validity, and logical consistency of responses. Another gap in the
literature is the examination of how aspects of memory for frequency interact with the
response formats used in the question. These aspects of memory include the actual
frequency of the event, and the context memory. For subjective probability estimation in
particular, there has been a lack of studies examining diverse and representative
populations, which limit examination of some important contrasts, in particular the
possible effect of maturity (age) on estimation in terms of its predictive validity. Adults
and youths may perceive risks in different ways, such that adults use vague, intuitive
information, while youths rely more on numeric, objective data (Reyna and Farley 2006).
The difference in what information is used in risk perceptions in turn may affect the
measurement properties of the different response formats. However, the difference
between ages has not been examined systematically, and is another gap in the literature
the research discussed in this dissertation attempts to address.
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Objective 1: Accuracy of Different Response Formats
Accuracy is an aspect of validity in that both are concerned with the differences
between the true value and the estimated value (although validity entails other aspects as
well) (Groves 1989, Lessler and Kalsbeek 1992). It is also one of the main components of
the quality of a survey (Biemer and Lyberg 2003). The expected value of the survey
estimate can be put into equation format as follows:

y   
where y is the survey estimate,  is the true value, and  is the error. Accuracy can be
defined most simply where   0 , and the survey estimate is equal to the true value. More
broadly, it can be defined as to where the value of  is minimized. Therefore the goal is
to choose measures, including response formats, in which the value of  is minimized. As
of now, few studies have examined accuracy in this way.
Objective 2: Predictive Validity of Different Response Formats
Predictive validity, as the name suggests, is another form of validity on which to
assess the different measurement formats. Unlike accuracy, which compares the measure
to the true value, i.e. a gold standard, predictive validity is concerned with the
relationship of the target measure with some other variable it should theoretically be
related to, a criterion (Kumar 2005). A high level of relationship (e.g. correlation)
between the target and the criterion suggests a higher level of validity, as the variable is
able to predict what it should theoretically predict. As such, the stronger the relationship
between one target and the criterion compared to other target variables suggests better
measurement properties for the target with the higher relationship. Predictive validity
tests have been used to examine measurement properties of competing question formats
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(Chang and Krosnick 2003). However, few studies have made comparisons between
numeric measures and vague quantifiers in terms of predictive validity, and in most
studies in which predictive validity has been examined, the sample is small and not
randomly selected from the wider population.
Objective 3: Logical Consistency Between Measures
If one is asked similar questions with different response formats that map onto the
same underlying dimension, it should follow that there is a natural consistency between
the two responses. That is, higher responses on one response scale should be related to
higher responses on the other; similarly, lower responses on one should relate to lower
response on the other response scale. Thus the numeric open-ended response should be
greater for responses in which the highest point on the vague quantifier scale was given
than all other numeric open ended responses in which lower vague quantifier scale points
were selected.
Further, responses should be related in a semantic-logical format. Vague
quantifiers are natural part of everyday language (Sanford et al. 1996). Conversely, a
large number of people have problems with numeric responses (Galesic and GarciaRetamero 2010, Reyna and Brainerd 2008). As such, it may be that numeric answers are
not consistent with the natural language usage of quantifiers. For example, if the response
“never” is given on a vague quantifier scale and the answer “5” given on the numeric
open ended response, there is an apparent inconsistency on the common understanding of
what “never” means. A lack of consistency suggests that it is possible that one measure
has better measurement properties than the other.
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Objective 4: Circumstances of Differential Performance of Different Response
Formats
It may be that either numeric open ended measures or vague quantifiers have
better measurement properties overall, or that there are different circumstances when one
performs better than the other. First, one measure may be more accurate, but, however
unlikely, have lower predictive validity. Second, it may be the case that one measure has
better measurement properties for frequency data than subjective probabilities. Third, it
may depend on the actual level of frequency that affects cognition of the numeric
information and hence the measurement properties of the two response formats. For
example, greater frequencies may be more likely to be stored as vague quantifiers relative
to smaller frequencies (Conrad et al. 1998).
Fourth, greater context of encoding and memory may lead respondents to be more
likely to have numeric information stored in one format versus another. For instance,
Brown (1997) found that those with greater context memory (i.e., memory based on
greater distinctiveness among target events) were more likely to use a strategy of
enumeration to answer numeric open ended questions than when context memory was
low (i.e., memory based on greater similarity among target events). Fifth, the way
information is stored and preferred to be recalled and reported may depend on the level of
the individual’s numeracy. More numerate individuals may be more likely to have
numeric information stored as numbers, and more comfortable recalling and reporting
numbers, which may lead to differential measurement properties for the different
response formats across numeracy levels. Similarly, characteristics that may be related to
numeracy or other individuating factors may lead to different outcomes of the response
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formats. These characteristics include demographic variables such as age, gender, race,
and education. Further, it is possible that the adults are more likely to rely on the vague,
gist-based information compared to adolescents, who rely more on verbatim information
(Reyna and Farley 2006). As such, there may be even greater differential functioning of
the response formats across age, and when possible, will also be examined.
Literature Review
Outline of the Literature Review
As noted, responses to queries can be affected by the response formats that are
given as answer choices. Most studies of frequencies use numeric responses as the
outcome, as do many studies of subjective probabilities. The literature review examines
the pertinent areas related to the way people think about quantitative information (in both
numeric and vague terms), how this information is recalled, and how response formats
can affect responses. As such, the literature review is divided into three main sections:
numeracy, frequency estimation, and subjective probability estimation (risk perceptions).
Within each, the topics are divided according to different aspects of the literature. Each of
these three sections begins with a short introduction on the topic. Numeracy, underlying
the way people understand numbers, and hence both frequency estimation and subjective
probabilities begins, followed by the literature review on frequency estimation and
concluding with the literature on subjective probabilities. Studies 1 and 2 (see below)
deal with frequency estimation and more related to the frequency estimation literature,
while Study 3 deals with subjective probabilities, and is linked more closely to the
subjective probability literature. All three studies examine numeracy’s impact on
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response validity. The literature review concludes with a summary and a discussion of the
current gaps in the literature as it relates to these topics.
Numeracy Introduction
People use and encounter numbers on a regular basis. Numbers are part of our
general information environment, that they include such aspects as prices for goods,
speed limits, and instructions (e.g. for baking, construction), to name just a few instances.
This numeric information is important for understanding the environment and in decision
making. The decisions made using numeric information can be of paramount importance,
including financial management and health care. Researchers studying these and other
areas, including most, if not all, social sciences, often ask subjects for numeric
information on a variety of topics, including frequency estimation, risk estimation, and
monetary decisions and information. Even the response scales respondents are required to
respond to are often anchored and labeled using numeric information, e.g. 0 to 10, -5 to
+5.
People’s ability to think numerically is assumed when such data is requested and
frequently when decision making is involved. Data from surveys can impact important
policy decisions (e.g. public education initiatives), marketing strategies, or social
research. Similarly, numeric information is frequently presented for people to make
financial, public policy, and health care decisions. As such, it is important to examine the
basic assumption of capability for numerical thinking, and if this assumption does not
hold, then the decisions made and data from surveys will be suboptimal at best.
Understanding how numerical data is understood, produced and reported is needed to
potentially increase the efficacy of decision-making and data coming from surveys.
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Generally, numerical thinking is related to both cognitive understanding and
memory (Brown and Siegler 1993). Numbers must be understood in the proper metric
and meaning for useful processing of the information. Memory is important in both
understanding the numbers presented, as it often provides the metric needed, but also
frequently in recall of personal numeric data. How such data is encoded, stored, and its
accessibility and availability at later points are important issues in understanding memory
broadly. Further, when the data requested from subjects is numeric (e.g. behavior
frequency), the tabulation of the memories is also of interest. As such, the focus of this
work is the cognition and memory aspects of numeric information. Although previous
research on cognition of numeric information is expansive, a basic summary of major
points can be suggestive of numeric thinking.
Cognition of numeric information
fMRI studies have shown a link between exact arithmetic to language centers of
the brain (Dehaene et al. 1999). As such, it is necessarily a human-based structure,
incompatible with infants and not completely compatible for youths, who have less
language (and memory) ability. Conversely, this same study found that approximate
mathematics shows language independence, relying more on numerical magnitudes and
spatial processes. The authors suggest that mathematical intuition may rely on an
interaction of these cognitive systems.
Once a basic understanding of numbers is obtained, it is reasonable to question
how these numbers are mentally represented. It has been posited that numbers are
represented on a mental number line (Dehaene 1997, Nuerk et al. 2004). Differentiation
of numbers on this line can be made using several identified processes. The first is
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magnitude differences (Moyer and Landauer 1967, Nuerk et al. 2004, Turconi et al.
2006). As such, as the magnitude of the difference between the compared numbers
increases, the ease of differentiation increases. An additional differentiation process is
that of serial-search, in which serial position is accessed in judgments (Turconi et al.
2006).
In processing and producing numeric information, additional information is also
used. Estimation of numeric information first requires knowledge of the metric and
information about the distribution of the domain of interest (Brown and Siegler 1993).
For example, estimating driving speed requires information of both the metric (e.g. miles
per hour) and the distribution of normal speeds (e.g. 35 M.P.H. in cities, 70 on
highways). These sources of information are obviously related, but are conceptually
distinct. Further, error can arise from either one source of information separately, or from
both. In addition, lacking information from either necessary source increases the reliance
on heuristics in judgments; when greater domain-specific information is available from
both sources, such information is emphasized over heuristics in making judgments
(Brown and Siegler 1993).
Understanding of numeric information
The above research only indicates that people do in fact have some cognitive
processes for numbers. This research, however, does not indicate that people in general
are able to understand numbers is a meaningful way. Indeed, much research suggests that
people do not fully understand numeric information. The National Literacy Survey
indicates that children lack minimum math skills needed to use numbers in printed
materials (Kirsch et al. 2002). Even among highly educated samples, only 32% correctly

19
answered eight numeracy skill questions (Lipkus et al. 2001). Nearly 20% of these
samples answered the most direct risk question incorrectly (i.e. “Which represents the
largest risk? 1%, 5% or 10%?”). Studies using similar numeracy scales have found
similar results (Schwartz et al. 1997, Peters et al. 2006, Galesic et al. 2009). In the largest
identified study of numeracy, Galesic and Garcia-Retamero (2010) conducted surveys
using nine questions for objective numeracy (also used in this dissertation in Study 1).
This research found that people could answer only about two-thirds of the questions
correctly. Importantly, the findings also show a strong correlation with education, with
more educated people being more highly numerate.
Studies in survey research also indicate the inability of people to use numbers as
expected. A number of respondents do not answer with logically consistent responses to
subjective probability measures using numeric scales, particularly among those with
lower cognitive abilities (Belli et al. 1999). People have also been found to incorrectly
select greater magnitude probabilities when frequency and base rates differed (e.g. 24.14
out of 100 versus 2414 out of 10000) by choosing cases where the higher total frequency
was greater, neglecting the base rate (Yamagishi 1997). Similarly, when asking about
equivalent risks, but in a different manner (e.g. frequencies vs. percentages), people have
been found to give different answers (Windschitl 2002).
Another finding in the survey literature is the influence that numeric labels placed
on scales has on response (e.g. varying levels of number of hours of television watched at
the end points of the scale). Studies have found that using different values produces
differing estimates of frequency or duration (Schwarz et al. 1985; Wright et al. 1994).
People use the information conveyed in the numeric scale points to infer an “average” for
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the population, and to place themselves on the scale accordingly. The authors of these
studies suggest that numeric scales possibly be avoided; instead, numeric open ended
responses should be used.
In addition, asking a belief question using differing end points of the scale
produces different results. For example, asking the same attitude question using a 1 - 7
scale consistently produces different results when using a -3 to 3 scale (Tourangeau et al.
2000). The difference in results is evidently due to people’s aversion to negative
numbers. Further, Schwarz et al (1991) found that the choice of numeric labels can
facilitate or dilute polarity implications of endpoints provided to respondents. For
example, negative values may emphasize the differences more on a bipolar scale,
whereas the lack of negative numbers provides the impression that the underlying scale is
unipolar. The authors examined the polarity issue in a number of studies in which
respondents were randomly assigned to different conditions; both were asked the same
questions, but one group was asked to respond on a 0-10 scale while the other was asked
to answer on a -5 to +5 scale. Since each scale contained the same number of points, the
differences suggest that people infer scale polarity based on the numeric end-points added
to the scale.
If people do not understand numbers, how then do they understand the numeric
information that they consistently encounter? It appears that individuals understand, and
prefer to communicate, numeric information in vague and intuitive ways, rather than the
concrete manner numbers entail (Peters et al. 2006, Reyna and Brainerd 2008). This
understanding and preference does not mean that people do not use rational (i.e. numeric)
reasoning when making decisions; rather these are made using dual-processes, relying on
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both intuitive and/or rational processes. One prominent dual-process model is fuzzy-trace
theory (Reyna and Brainerd 1991). This theory assumes that people rely on their
memories for the vague “gist” of information they have stored in making decisions, even
when they can recall verbatim (e.g. numeric) information. Unlike similar dual-process
theories (e.g. Peters et al. 2006), use of vague gist information is a more advanced form
of information processing, rather than inferior to relying on verbatim information (Reyna
and Brainerd 2008). Given that the theory argues gist processing is an advanced process,
fuzzy trace theory suggests that gist processing develops into adulthood, whereas youth
attempt to rely more on numeric information (Reyna and Farley 2006).
Frequency Estimation Introduction
Survey researchers are frequently interested in asking questions about behavioral
frequencies, such as how many times someone went to the doctor or how many hours of
television has been watched. These questions require that respondents not only access
autobiographical memory but also to make decisions on how to process these memories
and how to report them. The outcomes of these responses can have impact on important
policy decisions (e.g. public education initiatives), marketing strategies, or social
research. Understanding how this information is produced and reported is needed to
potentially increase accuracy.
More generally, estimating frequencies of any kind, including those for behavior,
is partly an issue of memory. How such data is encoded, stored, and this information’s
accessibility and availability at later points are important issues in understanding memory
broadly. Further, since the data requested is numeric, the tabulation of the memories is
also of interest. At issue is whether people recall and count individual episodes of the
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event of interest, keep a running tally of events as they occur, or some other process is
involved in memory recall. An additional issue is the impact that the requested memory
task has on processes and outcomes. This request includes a number of factors, including
how the question is asked as well as the frequency to be recalled. In some cases accuracy
of the report can be assessed, giving a measure to the strength of such memories.
Strategies for Recall of Frequencies
Until relatively recently, frequency estimation was conceptualized by researchers
as the respondent recalling and enumerating individual events of the target (Blair and
Burton 1987, Bradburn et al. 1987). Enumeration strategies potentially led to errors of
two kinds only – omission and commission (Bradburn et al. 1987). However, later studies
examined different strategies that may be used. In one of the earliest works on the topic,
Blair and Burton (1987) found a more diverse set of strategies than originally proposed.
Although some use of episodic enumeration did occur, the most frequently used strategy
was that of rate estimations. People would recall some rate of occurrence (e.g. “I
purchase gasoline twice a week”) and then convert it into a frequency for the time frame
requested (e.g. “so I purchased gasoline 8 times this month”). They also found a
substantial number of uses of what they termed “other processes”. These other processes
included combinations of both rates and enumerations and adjustments to
rates/enumerations. For example, some people used enumeration within subdomains,
such as rate of going out for lunch or dinner in estimating the frequency that one ate at a
restaurant.
Others may have used a rate and adjusted using an enumeration. Thus, someone
may have enumerated for a shorter time frame, e.g. a week, and then created a rate for a
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longer, inclusive, time frame, e.g. a month. The opposite, using a rate and then adjusting
with enumeration also occurs. Finally, several people reported using direct estimates of
frequencies, i.e. guesses or statements with no knowledge how they arrived at such a
number. Interestingly, Blair and Burton (1987) found no evidence that people used an
availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), whereby the ease that events could
be recalled would be the basis for frequency estimation.
Following this early work, additional research refined the understanding of the
strategies used by individuals in frequency estimation. Enumeration of events continued
to be found as an often used strategy, as did rate-based estimation (Brown 1995, 2008,
Brown and Sinclair 1998, Burton and Blair 1991, Conrad et al. 1993, 1998, Menon 1993,
Tourangeau et al. 2000). Episode enumeration generally was used about one-quarter to
less than one-half of the time, with other strategies being used the majority of the time
(Blair and Burton 1987, Brown and Sinclair 1998, Burton and Blair 1991, Conrad et al.
1993, 1998, Tourangeau et al. 2000). Greater understanding of potential strategies was
also gained with these studies, including differences in types and in information used for
these.
Conrad et al. (1998) provide a taxonomy of strategies which encompass the
majority and most used strategies identified to date.1 In this study, respondents were
asked about ten behavioral frequencies occurring in daily life, and were told to think
about it quietly until an answer was decided upon. Then respondents were asked to
explain how they came up with the answer, i.e. a retrospective recall. Responses to the

1

See Conrad et al. (1998) Fig 3 p. 361 for a diagram of the taxonomy
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survey were tape-recorded. The retrospectively recalled strategies were categorized into a
taxonomy developed on the different techniques described, and recalled strategies coded
by two groups of two coders.
Based on the findings, a number of strategies were identified. First, strategies are
divided along enumeration and non-enumeration lines. Enumeration strategies entail
either the recall of individual episodes (episodic enumeration) or the use of a few recalled
events to estimate a rate for rate-based frequencies (rate estimation). Enumeration
strategies are cognitively more difficult, as individual episodes are recalled. This
increased difficulty is evidenced by the greater time required to respond using an
enumeration strategy (Brown 1995, Conrad et al. 1998). Consistent with the finding that
enumeration strategies were used less often than others, in part due to the increased
cognitive burden, there are more different types of non-enumeration strategies in the
taxonomy than enumeration strategies.
Within non-enumeration strategies, an individual could use either memory
assessment or a form of direct retrieval. Memory assessment is essentially usage of the
availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). The ease that events are recalled
would be the basis for frequency estimation. Direct retrieval relies on either quantitative
or qualitative information. Using quantitative information, a respondent can either
retrieve a stored rate or retrieve the stored rate and adjust it based on some additional
understandings (e.g. “I go to the store every week, plus twice more this month for
extras”). Finally, using qualitative information, what the authors termed a “general
impression” could be formed. These general impressions are mostly conversions of
information stored as vague quantities into acceptable numeric reports.
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These vague quantities are interesting in that they are not numeric and must be
converted into a numeric response. Questioning about activities done in the past month,
18% of responses were formed based on strategies relying on vague quantities to infer a
specific frequency report (Conrad et al. 1993, 1998). This percentage is also likely low
compared to the actual percentage of those relying on vague quantifiers for several
reasons. First, the coding strategy used in the study contributed to an undercount. For
example, “filling my gas tank several times a week” is coded as rate retrieval in the study,
although “several” is a vague quantity.
Second, some respondents may also have inferred what would be an “optimal”
strategy according to the researcher, and reported on more quantitative processes to come
to a response. While providing a retrospective justification for their response, individuals
may have wanted to appear as though they made a high level of effort, rather than just
relying on some vague quantity. Even so, 18% is a substantial percent, and was the
second largest category coded, indicating that at least some information is naturally
stored as vague quantities.
If numeric data is stored as vague quantifiers, as suggested by Conrad et al.
(1998), differences found in response distribution to response scales with different values
attached to the end points of the scales would be explained. A respondent would map
their vague quantity data on to the scale provided. The necessary conversion from the
general impression to an acceptable numeric response is aided by the response options.
For example, someone who has the information requested stored as “a lot” may select the
highest scale point, regardless of its value, which is also consistent with the theory put
forth that the middle option being the typical population value (Schwarz and Bienias

26
1990). Although response scales may be mainly a task related variable (see below), one
could conceptualize reliance on the form of the question itself as a strategy, and is
evidence that strategies and tasks are closely interrelated.
A recent theory that has been put forth is that people at times use a metastrategy
in frequency estimation (Brown 2008). A metastrategy is where a set of strategies is
selected prior to the set of tasks and employed throughout the entire set. Therefore, a
respondent may use non-enumeration strategies on some questions even when
enumeration is possible on them all. Enumeration strategies are more concrete and
deliver numeric responses consistent with the task. However, they are more cognitively
taxing than non-enumeration strategies, and so a mixed strategy may be possible. People
will try to balance accuracy and ease at the aggregate level, rather than considering each
individual information request.
Impact of Task on Strategy Selection and Frequency Estimation
There are two classes of task related variables to be considered. The first is related
to the content of the task. That is, variables relating to the frequency itself. A second is
related to issues of the structure of the request. Generally this structure involves how a
question is asked or other manipulations in data collection. Although largely based on
memory, frequency requests are also based on other important methodological
considerations. Studies examining these facets have used differing methodologies,
including laboratory and survey research. Still, the findings provide generally consistent
results indicating the impacts these task variables have on strategy selection and
frequency estimation.
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Content of the Frequency
Given the limitations of memory, it may not be surprising to find that the
accessibility of episodic details impact strategy selection. Several studies have found that
increases in frequency (number of episodes) reduce the likelihood one uses episodic
enumeration (Blair and Burton 1987, Brown 1995, Burton and Blair 1991, Conrad et al.
1993, 1998, Means and Loftus 1991). Brown (1995) conducted an experiment in which
respondents were given lists of target words to study. The number of times each target
word appeared on the word list was varied, appearing 2, 4, 8, 12 or 16 times, and was a
within subjects factor. In addition, each target word was coupled with a “context” word,
an event instance for each of the target word. For example, Chicago would be an event
instance, i.e. context word, for the target word City. Since the experiment was in part to
examine the effect of context memory, two experimental groups of respondents were
created. In one, each target word was paired with the same context word at every
presentation (e.g. City-Chicago, City-Chicago, etc.). In the other, each presentation of the
target word was coupled with a different context word (e.g. City-Chicago, City-Paris,
City-London, etc.). The different context word was assigned randomly to each
presentation of the target word. The presentation of same or different context words was
a between subjects factor. During the frequency test, which asked about how frequently
each target word occurred (using an open ended numeric response option), respondents
described their process concurrently about how they came to their answer about the
frequency. Brown (1995) found that enumeration decreased when the actual frequency
increased, and was near non-existent when the context word was the same for each target
word. In addition, general impressions, similar to Conrad et al.’s (1998) finding,
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increased as the actual frequency increased. When the context word was always the same,
Brown (1995) found that most responses among those in the same context condition were
made using uninformative strategies, that is, no rationale could be given.
In addition, the reference period (although partly under the control of the
researcher) also has been found to impact strategy selection, with longer periods leading
to less enumeration strategies (Blair and Burton 1987, Burton and Blair 1991). Although
number of events and time frame will be related, Blair and Burton (1987) found
independent effects for each. As the number of events moves to the highest levels of
frequency within a sample, or the time of an event increases in duration, this data is more
likely to be stored as vague quantities. In the Conrad et al. (1998) study, the highest
behavioral frequency responses were reported to be inferred from these vague quantities,
which were labeled as “general impressions”. Similarly, Brown (1995) found in a
laboratory study of word frequencies that higher frequencies led subjects to select general
impressions as their strategy of choice. Although not coded in the exact same manner,
two studies by Blair and Burton (1987, Burton and Blair 1991) found that the greatest
reported frequencies corresponded to strategies they labeled as “other”. This other
category included several strategies, including what other studies have labeled as general
impressions.
One final noteworthy aspect regarding the frequency itself that affects strategy
and estimating is whether the event relates to oneself or to another person (or group). An
individual should have more information about events that they are personally involved
in, including greater episodic detail. Therefore, when the requested frequency relates to
the individual, enumeration will be used more than when requesting information about
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some other person (Bickart et al. 1990, Menon et al. 1995, Schwarz and Bienias 1990).
Further, these studies show that when answering as a proxy for other people, individuals
first estimate the frequency for themselves, and then adjust their responses based on
additional knowledge of the other person. The information provided by their personal
frequency estimates are also weighted more heavily when making estimates about
another who is more similar than more personally distant (Menon et al. 1995).
Content of the Request
The manner in which information is requested frequently affects the cognitive
processes that produce a response to this request (Tourangeau et al. 2000). One type of
request that is also not immune to the influence of the presentation and content of the
request are those for frequency estimates. As noted earlier, closed-ended responses with
frequency categories can impact the frequency estimate provided by the respondent
(Gaskell et al. 1994, Schwarz et al. 1985).
Theoretically, if respondents gave their actual frequency accurately, then no
difference should occur between low and high frequency conditions. The percentage
saying “more than two and one half hours” in the low frequency condition should equal
those saying any amount more than the smallest option in the high frequency condition.
Similarly, the percentage responding “up to two and one half hours” in the high
frequency condition should equal that of those choosing any except the greatest option in
the low frequency condition. This expected equality is far from the case, however.
Although no one selected “more than two and one half hours” in the low frequency
condition, nearly thirty-percent chose some value greater than this in the high frequency
condition. Clearly, the high frequency condition led people to state higher frequency
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estimates, and the low frequency condition led to lower frequency estimates.
Interestingly, the open ended responses led to a distribution that fell between these two.
If frequencies are recalled using vague quantifiers or other general impressions,
the recollection as vague quantities also helps explain differences in numeric response
scales with different values attached to the points of the scales. A respondent would map
their vague quantity data on to the scale provided. If people do select scale points based
on this stored vague quantity, it is also consistent with the theory put forth that the
respondents infer the average population frequency (Schwarz et al. 1985, Schwarz and
Bienias 1990). Using the middle response option as an anchor of the average, people can
then say they are comparatively more or less than average, consistent with
understandings of how people use vague quantifiers (Schaeffer 1991).
Measurement of Frequencies
The measurement of numeric responses has been generally done by asking for
some numerical answer, in one of two ways. First, the request is made by a question with
an open-ended response in which a numeric answer is provided (e.g. Blair and Burton
1989, Brown 1995, 1997, 2008, Burton and Blair 1991 Conrad et al. 1997, Hasher and
Zacks 1984). The second way has been to ask for frequencies using a scale labeled with
numeric quantities, generally involving ranges (e.g. Knauper et al. 2004, Menon et al.
1995, Schwarz et al. 1985, Schwarz and Bienas 1990). However, it has been noted there
are difficulties with using a numeric scale, with suggestions for avoidance in favor of
using numeric open ended responses (Schwarz et al. 1985). In addition, some have
instead used vague quantifiers, which place verbal labels onto scale points meant to
represent some number (Bradburn and Miles 1979, Lu et al. 2008, Schaeffer 1991,

31
Wanke 2002). The general lack of use of vague quantifiers may be due in part to the
complexities of their use and the potential problems associated with vague quantifier
response scales, as identified in research on the topic.
For example, vague quantifiers have linguistic meaning beyond simply the
numeric quantity these are conveying. First, as the name suggests, the quantity expressed
is done so in a vague manner, which may lead to a range of numeric values that is
possibly expressed by the verbal label (Budescu and Wallsten 1985). Indeed, a number of
studies examining the numeric translation of vague quantifiers find large between-subject
variation (Beyth-Marom 1982, Biehl and Halpern-Felsher 2001, Budescu and Wallsten
1985, Clarke et al. 1992, Lichtenstein and Newman 1967). Biehl and HalpernFelsher(2001) find that this variability tends to be greater among younger respondents
compared to older respondents. Although many studies suggest strong internal
consistency of vague quantifier use within individuals (e.g. Budescu and Wallsten 1985,
Lichtenstein and Newman 1967), one study suggests that there is also possible withinsubject variation, with people giving inconsistent numeric translations of vague quantities
(Clarke et al 1992). However, it should be noted that many of these translations were
context independent, and that vague quantifiers are naturally used in context (Windschitl
and Wells 1996). Still, at least in one case, when the vague quantifiers are placed in
context, there is greater between subject variation (Beyth-Marom 1982). It should be
noted however, that in this instance, the context was asking about subjective probabilities
rather than behavioral frequencies.
Further, quantifiers focus attention on the reference set or complement set of the
quantity (e.g. the subject vs. other) (Sanford et al. 1994, 1996, Teigen and Brun 2003).
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The reference set is focused on by positive quantifiers (e.g. a few, some), while the
complement set is focused by negative quantifiers (e.g. few, not many) (Sanford et al.
1996). This attention focusing of vague quantifiers occurs in both understanding and
production of sentences. Similarly, optimism for an outcome is greater when the vague
quantifier used is positive and there is greater surprise when the outcome occurred (did
not occur) when a negative (positive) quantifier is used to described the chance of
outcome, even when numeric translations of the quantifier are the same (Teigen and Brun
2003).
Studies examining the use of vague quantifiers in survey questions regarding
behavioral frequencies have also identified several potential issues. One is the differential
use of the vague quantifier scale, i.e. different interpretation of meanings (Bradburn and
Miles 1979). This different interpretation of meanings is consistent with the large
between-subject variation that has been noted previously. The Bradburn and Miles (1979)
study first asked respondents about the frequency that they felt excited and bored using a
vague quantifier scale, and then later asked how many times the respondent meant by the
vague quantifier they responded with. For example, if the respondents said they were
excited about things “very often”, they were asked how many times “very often” meant.
This study also found that the differences in numeric translation between scale points are
not equidistant, as would be expected (e.g. very often vs. not very often were not
equidistant). Recent research, however, has shown that differences between subjects
(students) in numeric translation are relatively small (Nelson-Laird et al. 2008).
Reanalyzing this same data as Bradburn and Miles (1979), Schaeffer (1991)
argues that use of vague quantifiers is based on not only actual frequency but the relative
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frequency of similar people, such as those with similar demographics. That is, when
responding that a behavior occurred “often”, this response is based not only on whether
the event occurred often, but also if it did so compared to what is expected of similar
individuals. For example, more educated respondents gave higher value meanings for
“pretty often” and “very often” than did those with less education (Schaeffer 1991).
Additional studies further show the importance of referent groups (Wanke 2002).In
addition, the type of behavior asked about is also compared to similar behaviors, such as
to other leisure or cultural activities (Wanke 2002). This comparison may be in large part
due to the respondent following conversational norms and being a cooperative
communicator, altering responses based on information provided by the survey (Wanke
2002).
An additional finding suggests that the context of the vague quantifier matters;
what “often” means for one behavior is different than another behavior (Bradburn and
Miles 1979, Nelson-Laird et al. 2008). For example, Bradburn and Miles (1979) find that
being bored receives a lower numeric meaning of “not too often” compared to that of
being excited. It should be pointed out that the Bradburn and Miles (1979) data, also used
by Schaeffer (1991), asks about emotional states, which may be different in terms of
recall strategies (Brown et al. 2007). As such, this differential use of recall strategies may
also affect the numeric translations of the vague quantifiers. However, studies examining
vague quantifier responses to questions about other activities produce findings consistent
with these (e.g. Nelson-Laird et al. 2008, Wanke 2002), suggesting that asking questions
using vague quantifiers may be found in both emotional state and activity frequency
settings.
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Based on such results, it is often suggested to avoid vague quantifiers when
possible (Beyth-Marom 1982, Schaeffer 1991, Tourangeau et al. 2000). Tourangeau et al.
(2000) suggest that the only meaning that may be derived from vague quantifiers, given
these issues, is the ordinal position of the response, i.e. sometimes is more than never and
less than always. However, the potential difficulty in answering numerically is also
recognized. Numeric data are affected by ease the events are remembered, how often
people think of it, how well instances are imagined, the spacing of events, recall
techniques used, the feelings at time of occurrence, response scale used, and true
frequency (Schaeffer 1991). Bradburn and Miles (1979) suggest that it may not always
be possible to ask for exact estimates of many behaviors and subjective states due to the
cognitive burden. Indeed, in the Bradburn and Miles (1979) study, interviewers said that
many respondents had difficulty translating vague quantifiers into numeric values.
Further, numeric information may be more difficult to think about and recall, and
possibly stored inaccurately, although vague quantifiers may entail more error due to its
comparative nature (Schaeffer 1991). In a study using behavior coding, numeric
responses produced significantly more problems than did vague quantifiers (Johnson et
al. 2006). It is also possible that people use vague notions plus some set of heuristics to
compute numeric data, which is consistent with more missing data for numeric
frequencies (Schaeffer 1991). In addition, studies on subjective probabilities suggest that
like vague quantifiers, numeric data may be affected by the context of the question,
contrary to general understandings (Windschitl and Weber 1999).
In a recent dissertation, Marincic (2011) examined vague quantifiers and numeric
open ended responses (translations) using the National Survey of Student Engagement
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(NSSE) (see Study 2). She examined how vague quantifiers were quantified and whether
there were differences in interpretation; whether any individual differences in
interpretation was due to individual characteristics; and whether latent models used for
numeric data also fit for those when vague quantifiers are used. The author used a
number of multilevel and latent variable models to assess these questions. Using a
reduced set of the items available, significant differences in regards to interpretation were
found at the individual level, and some evidence of differences in items (when items were
analyzed simultaneously). Additionally, the analysis found that unit of time for the vague
quantifier (e.g. daily, weekly, etc.) significantly influenced interpretation.
In terms of what caused the differences in interpretation, the largest contributing
factor was that of respondent level engagement in a behavior, with more engaged
respondents giving larger estimates for higher frequency vague quantifiers than less
engaged respondents. Other variable had an effect, such gender, race, and school size, but
all of these led to much smaller differences. Further, using numeric responses as the
“gold standard” model, Marincic (2011) found some support (depending on the scenario
used) that latent factors extracted from the different measures were different models.
Finally, the author applied a number of factor mixture models, with the hypothesis that
that model would best reflect the numeric data. However, limitations in the data did not
allow for full examination of this hypothesis.
Accuracy
Of course, much of the research on frequency estimation is conducted by
behavioral researchers who are interested in the accuracy of frequency estimates,
especially given the implications noted in the introduction. Assessing the accuracy of
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such frequency estimates, however, is quite difficult. There must be some knowledge of
what the actual frequency is, which limits studies of accuracy to laboratory settings,
where the researcher controls the actual frequency, or in instances where other sources
are available to obtain actual frequency.
In terms of strategy selection, in experiments examining frequency estimates of
words presented, individuals tended to overestimate frequencies when using a rate-based
strategy and underestimate when enumerating (Brown 1995). Absolute error tended to be
smaller in this study for those using enumeration. This difference was more pronounced
as actual frequency increased. The finding that enumeration led to smaller error is
consistent with findings of a study regarding frequency using bank services, which was
confirmed through bank records (Burton and Blair 1991). However, several other studies
have found that rate-based strategies have led to more accurate frequency estimates
(Menon 1993, 1997).
These differences can be explained by the type of frequency requested. When the
event is regular and similar, then accuracy is increased by using rate-based strategies
(Menon 1993, 1997). When the event is irregular and dissimilar, then enumeration will
likely lead to greater accuracy compared to rate-based strategies. Still, the errors are
greater than when rate-based strategies are used for regular and similar behaviors. When
events are regular or similar (but not both), respondents at times try to enumerate, leading
to increased errors.
How the question is asked may also affect accuracy. Asking about the behavior
during the typical week led to higher predictive validity for theoretically related
constructs than did asking about behaviors during the past week (Chang and Krosnick
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2003). Recent research indicates that eliciting vague quantities or general impressions
may be at least as accurate as asking for numeric scale responses (Lu et al. 2008). The
authors obtained data on medication adherence through an electronic system that
monitored the number of times the medication bottle was opened, using this opening as
an indicator that the medication was taken. They then asked those using this system about
their medication adherence over three days, seven days, and one month. For the one
month time frame, they asked respondents about adherence using three different scales, a
six-point vague quantifier scale (from “none of the time” to “all of the time”, an elevenpoint percent scale (0, 10, 20 …100), and a six-point scale rating adherence (from “very
poor” to “excellent”). The authors then assigned values to the six-point rating and vague
quantifier scales based on a percentage scale, i.e. 0, 20, 40, 60, 80, and 100.
They found that self-reported adherence to HIV medication treatment conformed
to actual adherence when general impressions were obtained on a vague quantifier and a
rating scale. The vague quantifier scale performed as well compared to recorded data as
did the numeric percentage scale response, with the rating scale performing better than
the numeric scale. These findings conform to the finding that larger frequencies are
estimated from general impressions (Conrad et al. 1998). The better performance of the
rating scale and similar performance of the vague quantifier scale with the numeric
response options may also be due to the respondents’ limited numeric capabilities (Lu et
al. 2008). Further, this study examined the predictive validity of the different response
scales, by correlating the responses to the observed HIV RNA in the respondent. The
results show that there are no significant differences between response scales in terms of
predictive validity.
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Psychology of Subjective Probabilities and Risk Perception Introduction
People are confronted with subjective probabilities on a regular basis. These
probabilities are most often conceptualized as the risk an event will (or will not) occur
(Tversky and Kahneman 1981, Tourangeau et al. 2000). How people perceive and
understand this risk has been studied in various ways, with varying conclusions. Studies
have concluded that experts in the topical areas understand risk differently than lay
people (Slovic 1987). Unlike experts of risk, who base risk levels on actual probabilities
of occurrence or annual fatalities (when dealing with health risks), lay people base their
risk perceptions not only on actual risk but also on the catastrophic potential (i.e. the
possible outcomes) and the future threat (Slovic 1987, 1998). Further, some studies
suggest that people are accurate about some risks while quite wrong about others
(Dominitz and Manski 1997, Benjamin et al. 1997). Importantly, several theories have
developed on the ways people perceive risks and make decisions about these risks.
Early in the study of risks it was noted that people did not always make rational or
error free decisions regarding risks (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Three heuristics were
identified that made complex numeric problems, such as those dealing with risks, easier
but that often led to these irrational and erroneous decisions. These heuristics are that of
representativeness, in which probabilities are evaluated by the degree which the recalled
information is representative of the target outcome; availability, in which judgments are
made on the ease of recall; and anchor and adjust, by which an initial value (which may
come from suggestion or recall) is anchored upon and adjusted this initial value for
judgment (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Kahneman and Tversky later also posited that
decisions diverge from expected utility due to both the weighting of prospects and frames

39
(whether decisions framed as gains or losses, or status quo) (Kahneman and Tversky
1979, Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Called Prospect Theory, the theory states that there
are decision weights which are combined with values (utilities) to judge between
decisions.
As noted by this research, at some level, people rely on their intuitions when
making decisions. Later theories of processing risk also reflect the notion that people rely
on intuition, with a number of theories positing dual processes to understand and make
decisions on risk (e.g. Peters et al. 2006, Reyna 2004, Reyna and Farley 2006, Reyna and
Brainerd 2008, Windschitl and Weber 1999). Although these theories differ slightly, all
suggest that one of the processes relies more on numeric, rational and rule based thinking,
while the other relies on affective, experiential, associative and intuitive based thinking.
Much research suggests people rely on intuitive decision processes in regards to risk
(Reyna and Brainerd 2008, Slovic 1987, Yamagishi 1997). Even so, some of this research
suggests that flawed and incorrect decisions are made when the relying on the affectiveexperiential (intuitive) based process rather than the rational and rule based process (e.g.
Peters et al. 2006). Still, it is also noted that the individual, in order to make sound
decisions on numeric information, must have accurate information, then make
calculations and inferences, remember the information, and finally be able to weigh
factors to make a decision (Peters et al. 2007).
Rule based reasoning, however, depends on retrieval cues that elicit principals
stored in long term memory. Fuzzy trace theory also suggests that in addition to verbatim
and gist based memories (encoded and processed in parallel), people retrieve what they
know about ratios when the knowledge is cued, but applying that knowledge is interfered
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with when classes of objects/events overlap or are nested in one another (Reyna and
Brainerd 2008). As a result of this confusion, people often focus on salient gist, i.e.
comparisons between numerators at expense of denominators. Denominator neglect
explains overestimation of some risks and underestimation of others, because people
neglect the base rates, focusing only on numerator (Reyna 2004). Generally, intuition has
important place in fuzzy trace theory, and is considered an advanced form of reasoning
because of developmental evidence. As such, adults, who are more likely to rely on gist
based information, are better prepared to make decisions about risks compared to
adolescents, who rely more on verbatim information (Reyna and Farley 2006).
Another, although not necessarily contradictory process, that has been suggested is
that people process risk through a Bayesian updating process (Viscusi 1990, 1992, 2002).
As such, people have preconceived stored beliefs about a perceived risk. New
information about the risk is often encountered, such as through personal experience or
through coverage in the media or informational environment. This new information is
used to update the individuals’ risk beliefs, weighting the new information and stored
beliefs according to the strength of each. Thus, beliefs that have long been held and have
been developed on a large number of information points are less likely to be shifted much
in the face of new information. In comparison, newly formed beliefs based on a small
number of information points are more likely to be altered by new information obtained.
These different theories suggest potential ways to measure risk, either through
numeric or vague quantifier measures. Indeed, some of the theorists have argued for use
of one measure over the other. Specifically, Viscusi (2002) argues for the use of numeric
measures instead of vague quantifier measures. However, if risk is represented in gist
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manner, then risk may be better measured using vague quantifier scales. A number of
studies have examined risk numerically and through vague quantifier measures, and are
described in more detail in the following sections.
Numeric Estimates of Risk Perception
Much of the work on numeric estimates of subjective probabilities, i.e. risk
perceptions, has been conducted on health issues, and in particular the risks of smoking.
Due to the focus on health issues, and the fact that the data to be used in the current
research focuses on smoking risk beliefs, much of the focus of this section will focus on
smoking risk perceptions. However, it is important to note several other studies that have
used numeric estimation of risk perceptions. Among the earliest was the seminal work by
Lichtenstein and colleagues. Importantly, the authors find evidence that estimation of
subjective probabilities relies on somewhat different processes than frequency estimation
(Lichtenstein et al. 1978). Also, they found that respondents tended to overestimate small
risks and underestimate large risks, a finding that has been found similarly in other
studies (Slovic 1987). These findings suggest the possible use of the availability heuristic
for subjective risks (e.g. direct experience, news), that people avoid extremity in
response, or the anchoring and adjusting of answers (e.g. on low/high anchors). These
biases possibly are due to a number of sources, including disproportionate media
exposure, memorability, or imaginability (Lichtenstein et al. 1978).
Much of the early research on smoking focused on people’s knowledge and
beliefs about smoking as harmful to health rather than subjective estimation of the risks
(e.g. Salber et al. 1963, Kelson et al. 1975). National polls focused on whether people
were aware of and believed smoking was harmful rather than asking the amount of risk
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perceived. For example, in a 1949 Gallup poll, 60% said that they believed that smoking
was harmful to health (questions used in this section can be found in Appendix 1). In
1954, Gallup asked questions in January and June national surveys about the awareness
of the link between cancer and smoking. In the January and June surveys, 83% and 90%,
respectively, said they had recently heard or read smoking had been linked to lung
cancer. Beliefs about smoking causing cancer in those surveys were significantly lower.
In January, 41% said they believed smoking causes lung cancer, with 42% agreeing to the
same in June. This number grew steadily, with 83% expressing the belief that smoking
causes lung cancer in a 1981 Gallup survey.
The first published work including data on numeric subjective probability
estimates appears in Lee (1989).2 Australian respondents gave the chances of an average
smoker developing lung cancer (along with other questions about other diseases) on an
11-point scale, with each point numbered between 0 and 100 in intervals of 10.
Respondents were also asked about their own chances using the same scale. Although the
purpose of the paper is not to present subjective probability estimates, it is clear that both
smokers and non-smokers gave high chances for lung cancer, with smokers giving an
average response of about 50 and non-smokers a response of about 60. Chances for
personal risk for both smokers and non-smokers were significantly less than population
risks. However, smokers’ perceived personal chances were higher than that of nonsmokers indicating smokers understand they have a higher risk (Lee 1989).

2

Kristiansen et al. (1983) implement magnitude estimation using line drawing, but is not considered here
to be the same as asking directly for an X out of 100 (or other base) subjective probability
estimate.
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The shift of focus to numeric risk estimates of smoking was mainly precipitated
by the work of Viscusi (1990). Data collected in 1985 through a survey funded by the
tobacco industry allowed individuals’ numeric estimates of subjective risk from smoking
to be analyzable. The target question asked, “Among 100 smokers, how many of them do
you think will get lung cancer because they smoke?” Variations of this question have
been asked repeatedly over time and are now the standard measures in numeric subjective
risk estimates for smoking. The mean response to this question in 1985 was 42.6,
significantly greater than the expected lung cancer rate among smokers of 6 - 13 out of
100.3 This finding has been consistently found in other research (Krosnick 2001; Romer
and Jamieson 2001; Viscusi 1992, 2002; Viscusi and Hakes 2008). Table 1 presents the
mean number of smokers expected to get lung cancer based on similar absolute risk
questions over time, denoting the source of the data. The youth and adult 1999 data are
those employed in this study, and will be discussed further.

3

The estimate of 6 – 13 out of 100 comes from Viscusi (2002), derived from data contained in scientific
reports in various Surgeon General Reports. Earlier estimates of this number were 5-10 out of 100
(Viscusi 1991).
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Table 1
Mean Absolute Risk Estimates of Lung Cancer Risk for Smokers
Year

Source

Mean

1964

Industry

16.4*

1977

Industry

45.6

1980

Industry

26.3*

1985

Viscusi 1990

42.6

1991

Viscusi 1992

38.0

19954

Sutton 1998

19.0*

1997

Viscusi & Hakes 2008

47.2

1998

Viscusi & Hakes 2008

47.6

1999

Annenberg 2 Youth

60.4

1999

Annenberg 2 Adult

48.5

2000

Krosnick 2001

43.4

*denotes data collected via face-to-face personal interview

Although these data first appeared in published accounts beginning with Viscusi
(1990), similar data has been of interest to the tobacco industry for some time. The
tobacco industry regularly hired polling companies such as Gallup and Roper to collect
data on various topics of interest. These data were found in the various online tobacco
document databases. A question on subjective smoking risk measured numerically was
first asked in 1964, shortly after the seminal first United States’ Surgeon General’s report
on smoking and health. Although the wording was slightly different from the standard
measures used in later research, the item asked about the same construct requesting a

4

This study was conducted in the United Kingdom.
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numeric subjective probability. Unlike the later published data, the mean was
significantly lower, estimated at 16.4 out of 100 smokers.5
Later industry-funded surveys switched to wording consistent with the above
standard absolute risk question. The next instance not in the published literature came
from data collected in 1977. The mean for this year was more in line with later findings at
45.6 out of 100. In 1980, the next time the question was asked, the mean was 26.3. This
decrease is an unexpected shift downward in the mean, especially given that the next time
the question was asked, in 1985, the mean was the 42.6 reported by Viscusi (1990). There
is no reason to expect that risk perceptions should have fluctuated in such a manner; the
only major change from one survey to another was the data collection methodology. Both
the 1977 and 1985 surveys were collected by telephone surveys, while the 1980 survey
was collected using face-to-face personal interviews. Strikingly, the lowest means in
Table 1 come from data collected using face-to-face personal interview surveys.
Although other differences exist among the surveys, the only difference consistent for all
three (Roper 1964, 1977, Sutton 1998) was that they were face-to-face surveys. In spite
of other differences, such as denominator (e.g. Krosnick (2001) uses a denominator of
1000 smokers instead of the usual 100), the means for all the telephone surveys are
similarly high from 1977 through the present day.
As alternatives to the standard absolute risk measures, other numeric measures
have been suggested to better capture risk perception. These arise from the possibility
that numeric estimates to the standard absolute risk question are feasible measures, but

5

The mean was not presented directly in the report, but was estimated using the midpoint of the ranges for
the frequency estimates weighted by the proportion of respondents in that range.
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that individuals perceive risk in a more comparable rather than absolute manner.
Specifically, it is not the risk of a smoker alone that matters; rather it is the risk of
smoking compared to not smoking. Krosnick (2001) explores this idea and suggests two
additional measures: the risk difference and the relative risk. The risk difference is the
difference between the absolute risk of the smoker and the absolute risk of the nonsmoker. That is, the risk to smokers above and beyond the risk of lung cancer to nonsmokers. Relative risk compares the magnitude of the difference between these two
absolute risk measures as the ratio of the two estimates. Comparing the measure of
absolute risk to smokers to these two new measures, Krosnick (2001) finds that the
relative risk measure predicts smoking status best, while the absolute risk to smokers
predicts the worst. Further, although the mean of absolute risk to smokers, like prior
studies, indicates an overestimate of risk, the measure for relative risk indicates people
underestimate the risk of smoking.
Vague Quantifier Measures of Risk Perceptions
Another possibility is that numeric responses used in any manner are suboptimal
in measuring risk perceptions. An alternative way to measure risk perceptions is by a
more qualitative scale, providing vaguely quantified risk options, similar to a study on
smoking risk perceptions conducted by Slovic (1998). Numeric responses require that
individuals understand and estimate numeric responses properly given the scale.
Although some have argued that people can use numbers to make subjective probabilities
(Krosnick 2001), this assumption seems to be tenuous. First, numeric literacy among the
general public is quite low (Peters et al. 2007). Studies have also shown that a number of
respondents do not answer with logically consistent responses to subjective probability
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measures using numeric scales, particularly among those with lower cognitive abilities
(Belli et al. 1999). Further, the use of numeric scales led to a number of respondents
satisficing, again particularly among those with low cognitive abilities. People have also
been found to incorrectly select greater magnitude probabilities when frequency and
denominators differed (e.g. 24.14 out of 100 versus 2414 out of 10000) by choosing cases
where the higher total frequency was greater, neglecting the denominator (Yamagishi
1997).
Other findings in the survey literature concern the impact of numeric labels placed
on scales (e.g. varying levels of number of hours of television watched at the end points
of the scale). Studies have found that using different values produces differing estimates
of frequency or duration (Schwarz et al. 1985; Wright et al. 1994). This result has also
been found in measures of smoking risk perceptions (Borland 1997). Differing scale
anchors and response options led to differing percentages of the population over- and
underestimating the risk of smoking, contrary to expectations. Assuming respondents are
cognitively able to assess risk numerically, one should expect similar responses
regardless of the scale values. Borland (1997) suggests that in the case of the standard
absolute risk measure used for smoking, some respondents may perceive the response
scale as a danger analogue scale. That is, given inability to process the task as
constructed, the interpretation is for a scale indicating levels of danger, possibly 0 for “no
danger” to 100 for “great danger”.
However, Viscusi (2002) argues that vague quantifiers are not suited for
measuring smoking risk perceptions because these cannot be compared to an objective
estimate, and there is not a “correct answer”. It is not possible to know what “a little bit
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risky” means in objective terms and thus not ascertainable if smoking risk is over- or
underestimated. Still, there are number of reasons why the survey designer should not
rule out the use of vague quantifiers completely, as suggested by many practitioners,
especially for measurement of subjective probabilities. The most important and
overriding factor is whether the respondents naturally think about and encode numeric
information as vague quantifiers. Respondents must map their answers to survey
questions onto the response options given (Tourangeau et al. 2000). Survey designers
must provide response options that best represent the respondent’s answer; not doing so
produces error-prone data, even if respondents did provide an “acceptable” answer.
Studies suggest that subjective probabilities are internally represented as verbal
information (Zimmer 1984). Supporting this view, several studies have found most
people prefer to convey probability information as vague quantities (Olson and Budescu
1997, Wallsten et al. 1993). In a study of students, 65% preferred to convey uncertainty
information through vague quantities (Wallsten et al. 1993). This number is likely low
compared to the general public as half of the sample studied were MBA students who
took the survey in a statistics class. Similarly, American college students rated scales
with vague quantifiers as easier to use and more representative of their feelings towards
risk assessment than numeric-based scales (Diefenbach et al. 1993). These studies have
also found that subjective probabilities measured by vague quantifiers predicted
respondents’ behaviors and preferences at least as well, and frequently better than,
numeric scales (Diefenbach et al. 1993, Windschitl and Wells 1996; Weinstein and
Diefenbach 1997). These findings may be stronger in the general population, as it seems
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reasonable to assume that a college student may be more proficient and comfortable with
numeric scales.
The increased validity vague quantifier scales (e.g. Windschitl and Wells 1996)
exhibit in these studies is likely due in part to the processes involved. Numeric responses
to subjective probability estimates elicit more rule-based thinking, whereas vague
quantifier scales result in more associative processing (Windschitl and Wells 1996,
Windschitl and Weber 1999). Many human behaviors are not dictated by rule-based
processes but are related to associative processes, resulting in the better prediction of
behavioral outcomes. Vague quantifiers may therefore also be better measures of risk
perceptions, particularly when relationships between behaviors and other variables are of
interest. An additional benefit is that since vague quantifiers are simpler to use and map
responses to, the cognitive effort required is reduced. Although not possible to test here,
this reduction in cognitive effort needed indicates that responses may be less affected by
mode of data collection, which apparently influences numeric estimates.
Summary and Gaps in the Literature
Based on the above literature review, a number of factors are important in the
measurement properties of questions about quantitative information, as well as a number
of important gaps in the literature that should be filled to better understand these factors.
Of most importance for this dissertation is the response format used. As the literature
shows, quantitative information may naturally be stored as vague quantities, for both
frequency information and subjective probabilities (Conrad et al. 1998, Reyna and
Brainerd 2008, Windschitl and Wells 1996). However, some of the literature in survey
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research and risk perceptions suggests that vague quantifiers are to be avoided
(Tourangeau et al. 2000, Schaeffer 1991, Viscusi 2002).
Not recognizing that people may more naturally think about quantitative
information in vague terms, it has been suggested that recommendations to avoid vague
quantifiers may in part be due to researcher bias (Windschitl and Wells 1996). In
addition, there have been relatively few studies that have been published on vague
quantifiers in survey research, and fewer yet that have examined the measurement error
properties of these measures. Findings do show vague quantifiers mean different things to
different respondents (Bradburn and Miles 1979, Schaeffer 1991). However, none of
these studies examine the accuracy of vague quantifier responses. This lack of accuracy
measures is due in part to the lack of verifiable information available in most survey
situations.
One survey that had such verifiable information was Lu et al. (2008), which found
that vague quantifiers performed as well as numeric response scales. However, these
researchers set the questions up such that the response was about the percentage of time
completing an activity, and numeric translations were based on percentages, rather than
the more standard way to ask about frequency in surveys, i.e. the number of times an
activity was conducted (Tourangeau et al. 2000). That is, the one study that has
examined the accuracy of vague quantifiers did so for a question format that is not
commonly used in survey research in the collection of behavioral frequency data. Further,
the numeric response format was an eleven point scale, rather than the open ended
response formats often used for frequency estimation. Overall, this research leaves a
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significant gap in the literature as to which, if any, response format is more accurate for
standard frequency-type questions.
For similar reasons, there is a gap in the literature examining the predictive
validity of vague quantifier and numeric response options for frequency questions.
Predictive validity has been shown to be important in understanding measurement
properties for other question formats for frequency questions (Chang and Krosnick 2003).
For response options for questions about frequency information, the only study that
examined this issue is Lu et al. (2008), who found no differences between response scales
in terms of their predictive validity. Again, the results of Lu et al. are based on
percentage-completed scales, with transformations of the vague quantifier scale based on
a percentage, rather than on the frequency an event occurred or numeric open ended
responses. Additionally, for both the accuracy and predictive validity of response scales,
the results of Lu et al. (2008) are the only available evidence, and thus, even absent the
problems with using a percentage scale, more studies are need to provide converging
evidence about the comparative measurement properties of the response formats.
For subjective probabilities, accuracy is not necessarily appropriate for assessing
measurement properties, given the subjective nature. However, some researchers have
examined subjective probabilities compared to actual risk estimates to ascertain over or
underestimation of risks (e.g. Viscusi 1990, 2002, Krosnick 2002, Benjamin et al. 1997).
Instead, in order to assess the measurement properties of subjective probabilities using
different response formats, predictive validity has been used between responses and
theoretically related variables (Krosnick 2002, Windschitl and Wells 1996, Diefenbach et
al. 1993). However, several gaps exist in these studies. First, these studies have not
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examined all of the numeric responses and vague quantifier scales simultaneously.
Krosnick (2002) examined absolute risk, relative risk, and risk difference measures, but
not vague quantifier measures. Other studies (e.g. Windschitl and Wells 1996,
Diefenbach et al. 1993) included vague quantifier and absolute risk responses, but not
relative risk or risk difference measures. Second, all of these studies except Krosnick
(2002) were conducted using small, non-representative samples, and Krosnick did not
include the vague quantifier response option for comparison. Taken together, this
research does not allow for important comparisons in respondent characteristics that
possibly differentially affect the measurement properties of the different response
formats.
Indeed, as the above literature review suggests, there are possible respondent
characteristics that may affect the accuracy and predictive validity for different frequency
and subjective probability response formats. First are the numeric capabilities (numeracy)
of respondents. As noted, many people in the population have low levels of numeracy
(Peters et al. 2007, Galesic and Garcia-Retamero 2010). Numeric ability has also been
found to affect understanding of new quantitative information (Schwartz et al. 1997) and
the ability to make decisions regarding quantitative information (Peters et al. 2006).
However, there has been no examination of the effect of numeracy on the measurement
error of quantitative information requested by questions like those in surveys, such as
frequency and subjective probability estimation. This measurement error includes both
the accuracy and predictive validity discussed above.
If respondents lack basic numeracy it follows that the ability to carry out the steps
needed to answer a question about quantitative information is also likely lacking. Most
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pertinent, they may be less likely to encode quantitative information as actual numbers,
and/or unable to recall numeric information sufficiently, in part because the information
is stored as different format, such as vague quantities. Indeed, it is suggested that many
people store numeric information in a vague, “fuzzy” way rather than verbatim numeric
information (Reyna and Brainerd 1991, Reyna and Brainerd 2008). Therefore, it may be
that for many respondents, especially those with low numeracy, asking questions with
vague quantifier response options are more in line with the natural way they think about
quantitative information. As such, providing vague quantifier response options may
improve the measurement properties of questions about quantitative information,
especially among those with the lowest numeracy. Indeed, Lu et al. (2008) suggest, but
do not test, that the similar results between numeric and vague scales, with rating scales
more accurate than either of vague or numeric scales, may be due to the low numeracy of
their sample. However, there is a significant gap in the literature examining the
relationship between numeracy and the response formats. As of this dissertation, no such
research has been found examining these two factors.
Similarly, as the literature has shown, at least in the frequency domain, actual
frequency is related to accuracy, in that lower actual frequency tends to be reported more
accurately than when the actual frequency is greater (Brown 1995, 1997). However, in
Brown’s (1995, 1997) research all responses were collected via open-ended numeric
responses. Further, it has been suggested that as actual frequency increases, it is more
likely that the quantitative information is stored as vague quantities (Conrad et al. 1998).
It follows from this finding, then, that as actual frequency increases, if these are more
likely stored as vague quantities, the accuracy may be increased by asking for responses
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using vague quantifier responses. No research that has been identified has examined the
relationship between actual frequency, response formats, and accuracy.
In addition, the numeracy of the individual may also affect the relationship
between actual frequency, response formats, and accuracy. The threshold of when
quantitative information becomes stored naturally as vague quantifiers may differ based
on numeric ability, such that those with lower numeracy are more likely to store
quantitative information as vague quantifiers at lowers levels of actual frequency. Thus,
for those with lower numeric ability, it may be that vague quantifier response options
provide greater accuracy even at lower levels of actual frequency, while for those with
higher numeracy, the improvement in accuracy with vague quantifier response formats
are only at higher levels of actual frequency. At lower levels of actual frequency, those
with higher numeracy may provide more accurate answers with numeric response
formats. As of now, however, no study has examined these possible interactions.
An additional possible interaction with the response format provided (the main
concern of the study) is the strength of the context memory for the target of the frequency
estimation question. That is, how varied instances of the target event are, whether the
target events are all the same or are different and unique in some way. Brown (1995) has
shown the importance of different context memory in terms of accuracy and recall
strategy, with more varied context memory leading to greater accuracy and more use of
enumeration strategies. This increased accuracy is largely due to the increased ability to
discriminate target instances with increased variation in context memory. It may then be
that decreased variability in context memory leads to storage in more vague and “fuzzy”
ways as suggested by Reyna and Brainerd (1991). If this vague storage is the case, then
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there is an interaction between response format and context memory, where increased
context memory (more variable) lends itself to greater accuracy with numeric response
formats, while decreased context variability leads to greater accuracy when asked using
vague quantifier response formats. As of now, there is no study found that examines this
possible interaction.
As noted, numeracy also likely affects subjective probability estimation in ways
similar to that of frequency estimation relating to response formats. That is, people with
lower numeracy ability may be less likely to encode quantitative information as numbers,
or they are unable to recall numbers correctly, in part because the information is stored as
different format, such as vague quantifiers. However, as with frequency estimation, there
has been no research on the effect of numeracy on the predictive validity of different
response formats, either numeric open ended responses or vague quantifiers. This lack of
research on numeracy, especially in regards to response formats, is considered another
significant gap in the literature.
Beyond numeracy, there are also other possible factors that affect subjective
probability estimation in regards to response formats, which have not yet been examined
in the literature in a systematic fashion. Specifically, the potential impact of age has not
been researched in terms of the measurement properties of different response formats in
regards to subjective probabilities. The need for the research on age difference is
important because it has been suggested that youth perceive risks in a different way than
adults (Reyna and Farley 2006). Specifically, youth may perceive risks more through
numeric, objective information when deciding on whether to partake in a risky behavior.
Conversely, adults rely more on vague, “fuzzy” notions of risks in making risk behavior
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decisions. However, these potential differences have not been studied empirically, and
are a source of further research that will be examined, as discussed below.
In addition to accuracy and predictive validity, another potentially important
source for the measurement properties of the different response formats is the logical
consistency between numeric and vague quantifier responses. As the above literature
review notes, several studies have examined the consistency of numeric translation of
vague quantifiers. A number of studies have shown that there is large between-subject
variation in the meaning of vague quantifiers, as defined by numeric translations (BeythMarom 1982, Biehl and Halpern-Felsher 2001, Budescu and Wallsten 1985, Clarke et al.
1992, Lichtenstein and Newman 1967). Age has also been shown to be an important
factor in this variability (Biehl and Halpern-Felsher 2001). Within-subject variation may
also exist (Clarke et al. 1992). Further, numeric meanings of vague quantifiers also seem
to be partly defined by group comparisons (Schaeffer 1991).
Although logical consistency of response formats has been studied more than
other sources of measurement properties of response formats (accuracy, predictive
validity), there are some aspects that have not been completely examined. First, is the
importance of whether vague quantifier translations are logical, for example, that the
response “never” is equal to zero. Further, it should also follow that respondents, for
example, should always give a translation for the quantifier “very risky” that is
significantly greater than “somewhat risky”. However, this logical ordering has not been
studied in an adequate manner.
Similarly, the effect of numeracy has not been examined in regards to the logical
consistency between numeric and vague quantifier response options. Given the effect of
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numeracy on other areas of cognition, it follows that this logical consistency may be
affected as well. For example, Schwartz et al. (1997) found that more numerate
individuals were able to understand changes in risk information, while Peters et al (2006)
found numeracy generally improved decision making. It may be that these are due to the
ability of more numerate individuals to manipulate as well as understand numbers. Given
this increased ability, it follows that more numerate individuals are more able to
understand the logical relation between numeric and vague quantifier response options,
and are better able to have logically consistent translation between the two. Although the
non-numerate may be able to think in vague ways, it may be numerate individuals are
better at the translation of vague quantifiers into numeric terms. However, as of this
dissertation, no research has examined the effect of numeracy on logical consistency of
translation between these response formats.
This dissertation presents several studies to examine the important factors and
gaps, based on the above literature review and the identified gaps in the literature
provided in this summary. Most important, and of central concern, is the measurement
properties of the different response formats of numeric and vague quantifier response
options for both frequency and subjective probability estimation. In addition, there are
several other effects, which may interact with response formats, which are of importance.
First is the impact of numeracy, for both frequency and subjective probability estimation.
For frequency estimation, context memory is another potentially important factor which
may interact with response format as well. For subjective probability estimation, age may
also have an important interactive effect. Finally, it is important to look at the logical
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consistency between the two response formats, and as well as examine the effect of
numeracy on logical consistency of translation.
Study 1
Data and Methods
The first data set comes from an experiment conducted at the University of
Nebraska-Lincoln. The experiment is a factorial design, with two between-subjects
factors and one within subjects. The purpose of the experiment is to determine which
factors are related to accuracy of response, in particular the effects of those with the
different response formats of vague quantifiers and numeric open ended responses. Each
of the factors is related to the encoding, recalling, and reporting of frequency data. All
124 participants studied word lists, with word pairings of a target word and a context
word. Subjects studied these words lists in groups, ranging from 5-20, in a classroom on
a screen at the front of the room. All participants were given the instructions that word
pairs would be shown, which word was to be recalled, and that a memory test for the
frequency of some of the words would be given after the presentation of the list.6 The
instructions were similar to those used in Brown’s (1995) Experiment 1, in which
respondents were also told that a memory test would be given after a being presented a
set of word pairs. However, the instruction differed from Brown (1995) in that the nature

6

The exact instructions given were “This experiment is about memory, and will ask you to recall a number
of words that will be presented to you on the screen at the front of the room. A pair of words will be
presented. The first word is in all capital letters and is the words you will be asked to recall at the end of the
experiment. The second word is to provide an example of the word you are to recall, in order to help your
memory. You will be asked to recall how many times the capital words occurred in the list. If there are no
questions, I will begin the word list presentation, which will take about 10 minutes. Afterward, I will give
you a set of questions to answer.”
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of the memory test was not specified, whereas in this study the nature of the test was
specified. After the presentation of the word list, there was a task to test numeracy, which
completes the purpose of a filler task as well as collect numeracy information, prior to the
asking about word frequencies. The numeracy test and word frequency test were
conducted on paper forms. The main outcome variable is the accuracy of the response to
the question how many times a target word was presented in the list.
The experiment employed a 2 (context: same; different) x 6 (frequency: 0, 2, 4, 8,
12, 16) x 2 (response form: open-ended numeric; vague scale) factorial design, with the
context and form factors manipulated between subjects, and the frequency factor
manipulated within subjects. The within subjects factor is the number of times the target
word is presented in a list, i.e. the actual frequency. Target words were presented 2, 4, 8,
12, or 16 times, for six seconds each as was done in Brown (1995). Further, respondents
were asked about target words that have not been presented, i.e. have a zero actual
frequency. Studies have shown that different levels of the actual frequency lead to
different recall strategies (Brown 1995, 1997, Conrad et al. 1998). At times, some
strategies appear to require numeric translation to answer the given numeric open ended
response option. As such, these strategies may not only directly affect the accuracy of the
answer, but also may interact with other question format options, such as the response
option given.
One between-subject factor manipulated the type of context word used along with
the target word. There are two conditions for this factor: same-context condition and
different-context condition. This format follows the conditions used in Brown (1995)
which has been shown to affect recall strategy selection. In the same-context condition,
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the target word is presented with the same context word at every presentation. This
context word is an exemplar for the target word. For example, for the target word CITY,
it would be presented with the only one context word, such as the exemplar Miami at
every presentation of the word CITY. Conversely, for the different-context condition, the
target word is presented in combination with a different context word at every
presentation, again with each context word an exemplar of the target word. For example,
for the target word CITY, for one presentation the exemplar Miami would be presented,
for the next, New York, for the third, Chicago, etc. (i.e. CITY-Miami, CITY-New York,
CITY-Chicago, etc.).
Target words and exemplars come from Van Overschelde et al. (2004) and
McEvoy and Nelson (1982), studies of categories (targets) and category instances/norms
(exemplars). A total of fifteen target words are used, and are selected based on similar
criteria as in Brown (1995): first, the target word had to be clearly identified by a single
noun, and second, each target word had to have a substantial number of category
instances (norms). Specifically, each word had to have at least sixteen category instances
so that each could be presented to have any actual frequency in the different context
condition. Target words and exemplars selected for use are located in Appendix 2. In
each list, all fifteen target words will be presented according to one of the five actual
presentation frequencies, i.e. 2, 4, 8, 12, or 16 times.
Given the five levels of actual frequency and the fifteen words, three words are
presented at each of the five actual frequencies. This presentation strategy leads to 126
presentations of target words in the study list. In order to create lists where each word is
presented at each level of frequency, groups of three target words (from the fifteen) were
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created, and these groups were varied at the five levels of frequency. This grouping leads
to five groups of three words, requiring five lists to ensure that each target word would be
presented at each level of actual frequency (i.e. CITY presented twice on one list, four
times on another, and so on through CITY being presented 16 times on one list). There
were five lists for the same context condition and five lists for the different context
condition.
Target words were randomized in presentation throughout the lists. A random
number was generated and assigned to each target word in each of the ten lists (five for
each of the context conditions). The lists were then sorted by the random number, with
the word with the smallest random number assigned appearing first, and the largest
random number appearing last. Thus, the position of any given word was completely
random. For the same-context condition, each target word in this list was paired with the
selected context word. The same exemplar word was randomly selected and used for
every presentation of the target word across all presentations of the target word in the
same-context condition. For the different-context condition, the same lists were used with
the difference being in that for each target word, a different exemplar is used. The
exemplars for each target were selected at random, without replacement. Again, this
randomization technique is the same as used in Brown (1995).
The second between subject factor, and of focal interest, is the different response
options offered, focusing on numeric open response and vague quantifier response
options, for reasons noted above. In one condition, respondents responded to the query
for the frequency of a given target word, which has been presented 0, 2, 4, 8, 12, or 16
times, using an numeric open ended response. The question asked, “How often did
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WORD appear in the presented list? ______times”, where the blank was filled in by the
respondent using any number. In the vague quantifier condition, respondents were asked
the same question, but instead of a blank to fill in a number, they were presented vague
quantifier response options. The vague quantifier options chosen come from Pohl (1981),
with a desire to find words thought to be naturally ordered and creating a balanced scale.
These options are “Never, Not Often, Somewhat Often, Fairly Often, Quite Often, Very
Often”. Six vague quantifier scale points were chosen in order to match the number of
actual values used. The test for both conditions included questions about the fifteen
presented words as well three additional words that were not presented at all, for a test of
zero presented frequencies. For this test phase of the experiment, target words questioned
about were randomized, with the targets asked about in a random order.
Following answering all of the questions about frequency of the target words,
respondents in the vague quantifier condition were asked for a numeric translation of the
response options. Specifically, participants were asked to give a numeric translation to
each of the six vague quantifiers used in the above question. They were asked to translate
each of the six vague quantifiers answering the question, “In the past test, how many
times did you think the word WORD meant?”, where WORD replaced each of the six
vague quantifiers.
All respondents were also asked to complete a numeracy questionnaire in between
presentation of the word lists and frequency questions. This questionnaire served both as
a filler task between the presentation and testing of word lists and as an instrument to
collect participants’ level of numeracy information. The numeracy questionnaire consists
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of nine test questions that had been earlier administered by Galesic and Garcia-Retamero
(2010), and is presented in Appendix 3.
Subjects were selected from the University of Nebraska – Lincoln experimental
subject pool, through the university’s psychology department. An advertisement was
placed to obtain participation in exchange for completion of course requirements. The
total number of respondents selected is based in part on findings in a study of somewhat
similar design, Brown (1995), which also used the variation of actual frequency and the
same-different context factor (see below). In a test of the difference of absolute error
between respondents in the same and different context (discussed above in the literature
review), the statistical tests based on and an analysis of variance (ANOVA) included
F(1,38) = 14.0, indicating greater absolute error for the same context condition (Brown
1995, p. 1543). When the degrees of the numerator for the F-score is one, as it is in this
test, this F-score can be translated to an effect size (i.e. correlation, r) using the formula,
/

where F is the value of the statistical test (in this case, 14.0) and

is the degrees of the freedom from the denominator of the test, in this case, 38 (Friedman
1982). The F-score from Brown (1995) (F(1,38) = 14.0) translates to an effect size of r =
0.5188. Another test of mean difference between rank-order correlations between
estimated and actual frequency for the same and different context conditions led to the
test results of t(38) = 3.8, indicating a larger mean correlation for different conditions,
suggesting greater relative accuracy in the different context condition (Brown 1995, p.
1543). A t-score, like an F-score, can be translated into an effect size, in a similar
manner. In this case, the r is calculated using the equation

/

, where t equals
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the test score and df is the degrees of freedom of the test. The equation for the t-score
translation to effect size is essentially the same equation as the translation of the F-score
into effect size, since

. Using the test t(38) = 3.8 translates to an effect size of r =

0.5247.
Using these effect sizes as a basis for the expected effect sizes to be found in this
study, based on the table in Friedman (1982), the sample size needed for each
combination of the between subjects factors is between 20 and 26, for r = .55 and r = .50,
respectively. Since the effect sizes found in Brown (1995) fall between these values, the
sample size selected for each combination of the between-subject factors is the midpoint
is sample size values, 23. For a 2 x 2 between subjects design, 23 subjects per each factor
combination leads to a total sample size required of 92. Using a simpler design, with only
one between subjects factor, Brown (1995) used 40 respondents, so this increase of more
than double the subjects appears reasonable with the addition of the additional two-level
between-subjects factor.
Using this power analysis as a guideline, 124 subjects participated. These subjects
were randomly assigned to one of the four between-subjects combinations. More subjects
were tested to ensure greater power than was required as indicated by the power analysis.
Of these 124, 63 completed the numeric open ended response form and 61 completed the
vague quantifier response form. For the presentation context manipulation, 67 were
presented the different context, with different context words presented with each target
word. The remaining 57 were presented the same presentation context condition.
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Hypotheses
H1:

People, in general, will be more accurate when responding to frequency questions
when using vague quantifiers rather than numeric open ended responses

H2:

When asked for a direct numeric translation of vague quantifiers, there should be
a logical consistency between numeric and vague quantifier measures.

H3:

As actual frequency increases, accuracy will decrease

H4:

Greater context memory will improve accuracy

H5:

In general, more numerate individuals will provide more accurate responses

H6:

More numerate individuals will show greater logical consistency in numeric open
ended and vague quantifier responses than less numerate individuals

H7:

More numerate individuals will be more accurate using numeric open ended
responses than less numerate individuals

H8:

More numerate individuals will be more accurate using numeric open ended
responses than when using vague quantifiers

H9:

As the actual frequency increases, vague quantifier responses will become more
accurate.

H10:

As the actual frequency decreases, the accuracy of numeric open ended responses
will increase.

H11:

At lower levels of actual frequency, numeric open ended responses will be more
accurate than vague quantifier responses.

H12:

There will be no discernible effect of context memory on the accuracy of vague
quantifier responses.
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H13:

There will be an interaction effect between context memory and actual frequency
in regards to accuracy, whereby greater context memory will lead to better
accuracy at higher levels of actual frequency, but not at lower levels of actual
frequency.

H14:

There will be an interaction between numeracy and actual frequency in regards to
accuracy, whereby greater numeracy increases accuracy at higher levels of actual
frequency but not at lower levels.

H15:

A three way interaction will arise between response format, actual frequency and
numeracy, whereby the most numerate will show higher accuracy at higher levels
of actual frequency using numeric open ended responses, but no effect at lower
levels of actual frequency.

Results
Numeracy
Overall, the 124 respondents displayed a high level of numeracy. Out of the nine
numeracy questions used from Galesic and Garcia-Retamero (2010), the mean number of
correct responses is 7.27 (S.E. = 0.14). The median number of correct responses was 8
out of 9. Thirty respondents (24.2% of the total) answered all nine correctly, another 37
(29.84%) answered eight correctly, and 26 (20.97%) got seven correct. The minimum
number correct was 3, accomplished by 3 respondents (2.42%). Since there were none
that scored zero, giving no true zero point for use in interpretation in analysis, all further
analyses using numeracy uses a grand-mean centered measure of numeracy. That is, the
mean (7.27) was subtracted from each respondent’s numeracy score in order to have a
numeracy measure with mean zero.
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Logical Consistency
Of the 61 respondents that answered the frequency questions using the vague
quantifier scales, and thus provided numeric translations for each of the vague terms used
in the scales, 58 provided whole number translations, as intended. The remaining three
respondents gave translations in terms of percentiles. Since percentiles are not the correct
metric, these responses were not used in the logical consistency assessment. These three
respondents, however, all gave the translation of “never” as meaning zero, and so this
value was used for their numeric translation for this term. For the other five vague terms,
for use in assessing accuracy, the mean translated value of the total sample was imputed
for these three respondents for the value their numeric translations of these terms.
The means for all six vague terms, as well as the standard error, and the minimum
and maximum for each are presented in Table 1.1. All respondents except one translated
“never” as meaning zero, with this one respondent translating “never” as meaning three
times. In all cases, there was complete consistency within respondents. That is, each
respondent gave larger numeric translations along each point of the vague quantifier scale
such that all translations followed the pattern: never < not often < somewhat often <
fairly often < quite often < very often. This is mirrored by the means of the total sample
in the below table. This same ordering of the vague quantifier scale translation occurs at
the aggregate level as well, with never being the smallest and very often the largest. This
may be in part due to the way that the questions were asked. All respondents in the vague
quantifier condition were asked at the end of the frequency estimation task to translate
each of the scale points, in the same order they appeared in the frequency estimation task.
As such, the practice of responding to each of the frequency estimations questions and
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the ordering of the translation questions may have indicated to the respondent that there
was a correct ordering, with each ascending point meaning a larger value.

Table 1.1
Numeric Translations for Vague Quantifier Scale
Mean

(S.E.)

Minimum

Maximum

Never

0.05

(0.05)

0

3

Not Often

2.67

(0.16)

1

5

Somewhat Often

5.57

(0.30)

3

13

Fairly Often

8.74

(0.44)

4

15

Quite Often

12.10

(0.64)

5

25

Very Often

15.48

(0.87)

7

37

All of the differences between the mean translations seen in the above table are
significant at the p<0.01 level, further suggesting the logical consistency within the
sample for the translation of vague quantifiers. Given the strong level of logical
consistency, there does not appear to be any discordance between numeric and vague
quantifier responses. As such, Hypothesis 2 appears to be supported. Since all
respondents were completely logically consistent, with everyone giving the same
ordering of vague quantifier numeric translations, it is clear that numeracy did not have
an impact on logical consistency. Therefore, there is no support for Hypothesis 6.7

7

As an alternative test, actual differences between estimated values of each vague quantifier and the
intended value were examined for each individual. For example, the difference between the assigned value
for “very often” and 16, the intended value for that quantifier, was estimated for each individual. These
differences were then summed and correlated with numeracy score, which was found to not be significantly
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Finally, it is worth noting that the mean values in Table 1.1 fall remarkably close
to the six possible values for the actual values of the words presented in the word lists.
There is still a significant amount of variation, in part indicated by the minimum and
maximum values given for each translation, with greater dispersion at the higher end of
the vague quantifier scale. Even with this variation, though, the mean values of the
translations for the sample are similar to the actual values of 0, 2, 4, 8, 12, and 16 used.
The reason that six vague quantifier scale points were chosen was in order to match the
number of actual values used, and this shows the similarity between the two, possibly
indicating an overall high level of accuracy (see below).
Accuracy
Accuracy may be measured in a number of ways, but it is first necessary to place
numeric values onto the vague quantifiers, that in essence conform to the distribution of
the actual frequency. It is necessary to assume some distribution of values to be assigned
to the vague quantifiers, or else accuracy cannot be tested with these values. Standard
assignment of values to such scales where there is only a unit difference between scale
points, such as 1, 2, 3, 4, for a four point scale, will obviously be unsatisfactory for
assessing many measures of accuracy, which is usually defined as the difference between
the estimated value (the response) and the actual value (the actual frequency). Assigning
values to vague quantifier scales has been used in past research to assess accuracy based
on percentage of time a behavior was completed (Lu et al. 2008).

different from zero (r = -0.17, p = 0.19). This finding further suggests there was no effect on numeracy on
logical consistency.
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In this analysis, following the suggestion of Bradburn and Miles (1979) values are
assigned to vague quantifier responses based on the individual respondents’ translation of
these quantifiers to numeric values. As part of the experimental procedure used, subjects
gave one translation of what the vague quantifiers meant at the end of the frequency
recall test, and the values are used for each instance that quantifier was used. For
example, a respondent who said that “very often” translated to 17 times, has the value 17
used for each time they selected that a word had occurred very often. For three
respondents, as noted above, the translations given were in the form of percentiles rather
than in terms of whole numbers, except for the translation of “never”, which was given
for all three as zero. For these respondents, the mean translations of the sample are used
as their values for the remaining five vague quantifiers (zero is used for never
translation).
Accuracy can be measured several different ways. Four are used in this analysis.
First, the absolute difference between the reported frequency and the actual frequency
can be used (i.e. |actual frequency – estimated frequency|). This difference estimates the
total accuracy (error) in the measure, but fails to capture whether a measure is more or
less error-prone in a particular direction, such as over- or underestimation of actual
frequency. As such, another measure of accuracy is the signed difference (i.e. actual
frequency – estimated frequency).
Two additional previously used measures that are to be used here include the
rank-order correlations between the actual frequency and the estimated frequency, and
the regression slope fitting estimated frequency to actual frequency (Brown 1995). The
correlation tests the relative accuracy of a participant, while the regression slope tests the
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degree to which there is a bias overestimating or underestimating actual frequency. These
two measures have to be estimated over all responses that a respondent gives, whereas
the absolute and signed differences are calculated at the response level, with each
response having a particular level of error. Therefore, the effect of actual frequency is
only examinable when looking at absolute and signed differences.
Examining the regression slopes, overall, respondents underestimated actual
frequencies, as indicated by the overall mean of 0.72 (S.E. = 0.03). The mean did not
differ significantly for those responding using vague quantifier (M = 0.71) or numeric
open ended responses (M = 0.73) as tested by a pairwise t-test t(122) = 0.32, p = 0.75.
Similarly, contrary to Brown’s (1995) findings, there was no difference between those in
the same context (M = 0.73) and different context (M = 0.71), t(122) = 0.23, p = 0.81
conditions. Finally, the correlation between the slopes and numeracy (mean centered)
was -0.05, and not significantly different from zero, p = 0.55.
To control for all of these effects simultaneously, and to test for possible
interactions between these potentially important variables, a linear regression model was
estimated, with slope of the participants as the dependent variable. The independent
variables are the response form used (vague quantifier form = 1, numeric open ended
form = 0), the context words used with the target words (same context = 1, different
context = 0), numeracy (mean centered), and all of the possible interactions between
these three variables. Results are presented in Table 1.2. None of the independent
variables are estimated to be significantly different from zero. Mirroring this fact is that
the omnibus F-test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the addition of any of the
independent variables has an effect over the intercept. In other words, the expected value
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of the dependent variables, the slopes, is constant over all independent variables,
including all of the interactions.

Table 1.2
Regression on Respondents’ Slopes
Variable

Coefficient

Same Context

0.002

(s.e.)
(0.10)

Vague Quantifier Form

-0.03

(0.09)

Numeracy

-0.00005

(0.04)

Context*Numeracy

0.05

(0.06)

Context*Form

0.04

(0.14)

Numeracy*Form

-0.05

(0.06)

Context*Form*Numeracy

-0.05

(0.09)

Intercept

0.73*

(0.07)

n = 124, F = 0.46, p = 0.86, R2 = 0.03, *p < 0.05

The results examining the rank-order correlations are the nearly the same as that
for the slopes. Overall, there tends to be a high correlation between estimated frequency
and actual frequency, r = 0.75. This suggests that overall, there was a high level of
relative accuracy. For analysis of correlations, such as differences in means and
regressions, correlations were transformed to Fisher z-scores. Using these, it is found that
there is no difference between vague quantifier (M = 1.06) or numeric open ended
responses (M = 1.08) as tested by a pairwise t-test t(122) = 0.46, p = 0.64. There is also
no difference between same and different context in terms of the correlations, t(122) =
0.42, p = 0.68 (same context M = 1.06, different context M = 1.09). There was also not a

73
significant correlation between numeracy and the Fisher z-score transformations, r =
0.09, p = 0.35.
Again, to control for all of the effects and all of the possible interactions
simultaneously, linear regression was employed. The dependent variable is the
transformed correlations to Fisher’s z-scores, with the independent variables again being
the response form, context words used, numeracy, and all of the interactions of these
three. Results are presented in Table 1.3. As with the regression on the slopes, none of the
coefficients for any of the independent variables reached the standard level of
significance of p<0.05. The main effect of numeracy, however, did reach significance at
p<0.10. If the higher level of alpha is accepted, this suggests that those with higher levels
of numeracy also display somewhat higher correlations, and thus higher relative
accuracy, in the cases when the response form and context used both equal zero. That is,
numeracy increases correlations when numeric open ended responses are used in the
different context condition. However, it is again noted that this coefficient is not
significant at the standard p<0.05 level. Further, the omnibus F-test fails to reject the null
hypothesis that the addition of any of the independent variables has an effect over the
intercept. In other words, the expected value of the dependent variables, the slopes, is
constant over all independent variables, including the main effect for numeracy.
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Table 1.3
Regression on Respondents’ Correlations
Variable

Coefficient

(s.e.)

Same Context

-0.004

(0.09)

Vague Quantifier Form

-0.009

(0.09)

0.06

(0.04)

Context*Numeracy

-0.06

(0.06)

Context*Form

-0.06

(0.13)

Numeracy*Form

-0.08

(0.05)

Context*Form*Numeracy

0.09

(0.09)

Intercept

1.10*

(0.06)

Numeracy

n = 124, F = 0.55, p = 0.80, R2 = 0.03, *p < 0.05

Given the lack of identified effects from the previous analyses on the two forms
of accuracy, regression slopes and rank-order correlations, there appears to be little to no
support for many of the hypotheses that can be tested using these measures. The only
possible exception is that there is a marginal significance for the main effect of numeracy
in the regression on respondents’ correlation coefficients. This marginal significance
suggests, possibly, that numeracy leads to higher level of (relative) accuracy, giving some
support to Hypothesis 5, that more numerate individuals will provide more accurate
responses.
The only remaining hypothesis that is supported is Hypothesis 13, which
predicted a null result in terms of no interaction between context memory and vague
quantifier response in regards to accuracy. Indeed, this null result was found. Otherwise,
none of the potentially testable hypotheses were supported. Hypotheses 1, 4, and 8 all
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were not supported. The remaining hypotheses include some discussion of actual
frequency, which neither of these measures of accuracy can address.
Therefore, to examine the effect of actual frequency and the effect of context,
response form, and numeracy on different forms of accuracy, the absolute and signed
differences are analyzed. These can be analyzed at the true frequency count levels; that is,
it is possible to examine the effect of increasing the actual count on these differences.
Examining signed differences first, Table 1.4 presents the mean signed difference at each
level of actual frequency, i.e. 0, 2, 4, 8, 12, and 16, for each version of the response form
and context condition combination that respondents fell under. For example, Vague-Same
means respondents who were responded using vague quantifier responses and were
presented the same context condition.

Table 1.4
Signed Differences at Levels of Actual Frequency, by Form and Context
Actual Frequency

Vague-Same

Vague-Different

Numeric-Same

Numeric-Different

0

0.34*

0.39*

0.92*

0.73*

2

1.25*

0.76*

2.67*

1.55*

4

0.85

0.53

2.88*

2.73*

8

0.80*

-0.94

1.36*

1.50*

12

-1.52*

-3.26*

0.05

-1.43*

16

-3.80*

-3.49*

-3.14*

-2.69*

Overall

-0.34

-1.08*

0.79*

0.34

*p < 0.05
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As can be seen, generally across all conditions, it appears that at lower levels of
actual frequency there are more overestimation errors, and at higher levels of actual
frequency, there is greater underestimation. Across all levels of actual frequency, it
appears that there is slight underestimation for vague quantifiers and slight
overestimation for numeric open ended responses, however, the overall signed
differences are not significantly different from zero for the vague quantifier-same context
combination and numeric open ended-different context response combination. Both
response forms show a similar pattern in the direction of errors at each level of actual
frequency, except in the middle, where actual frequency equals eight. Here, numeric open
ended responses still are overestimated, while for vague quantifier responses in the
different context condition the shift to underestimation has already happened. For both
sets of numeric open ended responses, this shift to underestimation occurs at the next
highest level of actual frequency. Also, at lower levels of actual frequency, the size of the
error is smaller for vague quantifier responses, but at the two highest levels of actual
frequency, numeric open ended responses show somewhat smaller error sizes.
To further examine the effect of actual frequency, as well the effect of response
form, word context, and numeracy, a multivariate model should be used. Given the
structure of the data, hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), is most appropriate (Luke
2004, Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). The respondents each gave a total of eighteen
frequency estimation responses, three for each level of actual frequency. Thus for each
response, there is a different actual frequency value associated with the response. These
responses are nested within each respondent, each of whom has respondent level
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characteristics of interest. Specifically, numeracy, response form, and presentation
context vary at the respondent level, not at the response level.
The model is therefore a two-level model, modeling response accuracy for each
response, with the level-1 independent variable being actual frequency. The second level
of the model includes random effects at the respondent level (j). The level two, i.e.
respondent level, covariates are the aforementioned numeracy (mean centered), response
form, and presentation context. To ensure all interactions of the effects are accounted for,
as well as main effects, both intercepts and slopes are modeled as random and used as
outcomes (Luke 2004). For the signed differences form of the model, the model can be
written using the following equations. First, using the HLM notation, the model is
presented in the following three equations:
Level-1 Model:
(1)
Level-2 Model:

∗

∗
∗

∗

∗

∗
(2)

∗
∗

∗

∗
(3)

Where i represent the individual level and j represents the respondent level,

and

parameter coefficients, and r and u are error terms for the various portions of the
equation. Rewriting these equations in the mixed model format makes clear the full

are
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model and how all of the interactions are modeled, as well as the fixed and random
portions of the model. This is done in the following equation:
∗

∗
∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗
∗

∗

∗

∗

∗
∗

∗

∗
(4)

The

portion of equation 4 is the random

portion of the model; the remainder is the fixed part of the model. Before running this
model, a random-intercept only model is run with signed differences as the dependent
variable, in order to calculate the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC). The ICC
measures the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable (signed differences in
this case) accounted for by the level 2 units, i.e. respondents (Luke 2004). Formally, this
model is written, in HLM terms, by the following equations:
(5)
(6)
In mixed model terms the equation is as follows, which can be seen to be the same as a
one-way random effects ANOVA model (Luke 2004):
(7)
All models are calculated using HLM 7 (Raudenbush et al. 2011).The calculated
ICC is 0.33, suggesting that respondents account for about 33% of the variability in the
observed signed differences. This ICC is moderately high, suggesting the potential
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usefulness of multilevel models (Luke 2004). Given that, the full model is presented in
Table 1.5. Robust standard errors are used, that is, standard errors that are consistent even
when HLM assumptions are not (Raudenbush et al. 2011). Only the full model is
presented, as it alone allows for an examination of all hypotheses simultaneously. Thus,
no reduced models are examined.
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Table 1.5
Hierarchical Linear Model of Signed Differences on Response and Respondent
Characteristics
Variable

Coefficient

(s.e.)

For Intercept1, β0
Intercept2, γ00

2.22*

(0.37)

Same Context, γ01

0.59

(0.63)

Form, γ02

-1.15*

(0.44)

Numeracy, γ03

-0.60*

(0.25)

0.88*

(0.43)

Context*Numeracy, γ04
Context*Form, γ05
Form*Numeracy, γ06

-0.07

(0.72)

0.61*

(0.29)

-0.99*

(0.47)

Actual Frequency, γ10

-0.28*

(0.06)

Context*Frequency, γ11

-0.01

(0.09)

Form*Frequency, γ12

-0.02

(0.08)

Context*Form*Numeracy,γ07
For Actual Frequency slope, β1

Numeracy*Frequency, γ13

0.003

(0.04)

Context*Numeracy*Frequency, γ14

0.05

(0.05)

Context*Form*Frequency, γ15

0.05

(0.14)

Form*Numeracy*Frequency, γ16

-0.05

(0.05)

Context*Form*Numeracy*Frequency, γ17

-0.05

(0.09)

n = 124, *p < 0.05
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The results indicate a number of interesting findings. First, in regards to the
overall mean (i.e. intercepts as the outcome) of the signed differences Table 1.6 gives
predicted values of the mean. Given the more difficult nature of interpreting signed
differences from a regression model, predicted values of the mean (i.e. intercept) allow
for increased ability to interpret results. The first noticeable result from the model is that
presentation context on its own does not appear to have an effect. However, the main
effect of response form suggests that, when mean centered numeracy is at its mean (i.e.
numeracy = 0) and when different presentation context is used, vague quantifiers lower
the signed mean difference. Since the overall mean is positive, suggesting overestimation
(intercept = 2.22), and the reduction caused by vague quantifier response is not greater
than the mean (thus causing the mean to become negative), this reduction can be viewed
as an overall reduction in error, with lower overestimation. When numeracy is equal to
zero, and same context is used, the reduction in the mean error is somewhat greater, but is
not statistically different from that of the different context condition. These findings
suggest that, at mean levels of numeracy, vague quantifier responses reduce error by
reducing overestimation error.

Table 1.6
Predicted Mean Signed Error by Context, Form, and Numeracy
Numeracy

Vague-Same

Vague-Different

Numeric-Same

Numeric-Different

0 (Mean)

1.59

1.08

2.81

2.22

1.73 (High)

1.41

1.09

3.29

1.18

-4.27 (Low)

2.05

1.05

1.65

4.80
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When numeracy deviates from the mean of zero, the picture becomes more
complicated. Since the maximum value of mean centered numeracy is 1.73 (minimum 4.27), several conclusions can be drawn. First, for the numeric open ended response form
and given the different context presentation, greater numeracy leads error to be reduced,
while lower than average numeracy increases overestimation error (see Table 1.6). As
also seen in Tables 1.5 and 1.6, at higher levels of numeracy, vague quantifier response
forms decrease overestimation error overall for both presentation contexts, although there
is a bit more of a reduction in the different context condition. Similarly, for the different
context condition, greater numeracy leads to less overestimation when using a numeric
open ended response form. However, for the same context condition and numeric open
ended response form, overestimation is increased at the highest levels of numeracy.
Compared to the mean numeracy, overestimation error is decreased or within rounding
error of three of the four instances, the lone outlier being the same context, numeric open
ended form where higher numeracy led to greater overestimation error.
Subjects with lower numeracy, interestingly, show higher overestimation errors
than respondents with higher numeracy in two cases, but lower overestimation errors in
the other two cases (see Table 1.6) Specifically, those with the lowest numeracy given the
same context presentation and vague quantifier form had somewhat higher levels of
overestimation error (though still smaller than the overall mean) than those with higher
levels of numeracy. Similarly, those with the lowest numeracy given different context
and numeric open ended response had the highest overestimation error of all
categorizations. However, consistent with other levels of numeracy, different context and
vague quantifier response led to the lowest levels of overestimation error. What is
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somewhat different is that for the same context condition and use of the numeric open
ended form, there was reduced overestimation error compared to the overall mean of
numeracy and higher levels of numeracy. Therefore, although it appears that in most
cases numeracy decreases overestimation error, there are a few cases where unexpectedly
this does not occur.
Greater clarity is at hand when examining the effect of actual frequency and the
interactions between the respondent characteristics and actual frequency (slopes as the
outcome). First, it is evident increases in actual frequency lead to increasing likelihood
that there will be underestimation. This underestimation with increasing actual frequency
is evident in Table 1.4 as well. However, none of the interactions with actual frequency
are statistically significant. This lack of significance suggests that there is no relationship
between respondent level and response level variables. Thus, although the effect of actual
frequency is evident, actual frequency does not interact with any other variables to affect
the signed differences.
The results of this hierarchical model provide support to some of the hypotheses
proposed and lack of support to others. First, there is support for Hypothesis 1, in that
generally, people were more accurate (i.e. overestimation error was reduced) when using
vague quantifier responses rather than numeric open ended responses. In examination of
Table 1.6, comparing response forms across similar context conditions, vague quantifier
responses produced less overestimation error in all but one instance. Further, vague
quantifier responses reduced error from the overall mean in every case.
Hypothesis 3 is also somewhat supported, in that increases in actual frequency
altered the level of accuracy such that at the highest levels of actual frequency, there was

84
greater underestimation. However, it is not as clear that at all increasing levels of actual
frequency there are decreases in accuracy, which are due to the nature of signed
differences (see Table 1.4). At mid-levels of actual frequency (i.e. actual frequency = 8),
it appears that lower levels of error may be occurring than at points lower and higher than
8 on the actual frequency scale. This effect may be simply due to the shifting of some
respondents to begin underestimating, as is clearer at higher levels of actual frequency,
while others respondents are still overestimating, as with lower levels of actual
frequency. If some are overestimating and others underestimating, the average effect may
make it appear that there are lower levels of error. Given this shifting from over- to
underestimating, it is not always clear that increasing the actual frequency will lead to
reduced errors overall when examining signed differences. This issue of signed
differences is resolved when examining absolute differences below.
Still, other hypotheses are more clearly supported or not supported using the
signed differences model. Hypothesis 4, that greater context memory (i.e. different
context presentation) on its own reduces error is not supported. The main effect for
context memory is not significant, and given that all interactions equal zero when context
presentation is set to different context (i.e. different context memory = 0), the main effect
is the effect of interest. Hypothesis 5 is also not clearly supported, since although greater
numeracy does at times appear to decrease errors, at times it appears it can increase error,
depending on the context memory and response form. Similarly, Hypothesis 7 is not
clearly supported, since it depends on context memory whether more numerate
individuals are more accurate than less numerate respondents using numeric open ended
responses. When more numerate individuals responded on the numeric open ended form,
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this decreased error generally for different context presentation, but increased
overestimation for same context presentation. The reverse pattern was true for lower
numeracy respondents when using numeric open ended response forms.
Hypothesis 8 is somewhat supported, as more numerate individuals are more
accurate when using numeric open ended responses, but only when given the different
context condition. In the same context condition, higher numeracy leads to a reduction in
overestimation error when responding to vague quantifier response form. Hypothesis 12
is not supported, however, as there is some evidence that context memory does have an
effect on vague quantifier response accuracy, as seen by the three way interaction
between context, response form, and numeracy. More numerate individuals responding in
the same condition shows less overestimation error when using vague quantifier response
forms.
None of the hypotheses regarding interaction with actual frequency are supported.
This lack of support for all of these hypotheses is evidenced by the lack of statistically
significant interaction between actual frequency and any other effects. Therefore,
Hypotheses 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, and 15 are not supported.
Signed differences detect the direction of error, but are less easily interpreted in
terms of overall error. Absolute error detects total error more clearly, and is analyzed in a
similar manner to that of the signed differences. First, Table 1.7 presents the mean signed
difference at each level of actual frequency, i.e. 0, 2, 4, 8, 12, and 16, for each version of
the response form and context condition combination that respondents fell under.
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Table 1.7
Absolute Differences at Levels of Actual Frequency, by Form and Context
Actual Frequency

Vague-Same

Vague-Different

Numeric-Same

Numeric-Different

0

0.34*

0.39*

0.92*

0.73*

2

1.99*

1.96*

3.05*

2.36*

4

3.15*

2.61*

4.05*

3.97*

8

4.55*

4.46*

4.23*

4.34*

12

5.52*

5.77*

5.02*

5.75*

16

7.02*

6.03*

6.52*

5.73*

Overall

3.76*

3.61*

3.96*

3.88*

*p < 0.05

Across all conditions, as actual frequency increases error also tends to increase,
with all absolute differences significantly greater than zero. Across all levels of actual
frequency, it appears that there is slightly less error for vague quantifiers than numeric
open ended responses, and slightly less error for the different context condition. Vague
quantifiers appear to have less error at lower levels of actual frequency than numeric
open ended responses, but a slight reversal occurs at higher levels of actual frequency,
with numeric responses showing somewhat smaller errors.
In order to examine absolute differences more completely, as was done with
signed differences, a hierarchical linear model is used. The model used is identical to that
described in equations 1-4, with the exception of using absolute differences as the
dependent variable instead of signed differences. Similarly, the intraclass correlation is
calculated using the same equations as 5-7, again substituting only absolute differences
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for signed differences. The ICC is estimated as 0.15, suggesting that respondents account
for about 15% of the variability in the observed absolute differences. The full model is
presented in Table 1.8, with robust standard errors, and again, only the full model is used
in order to test all of the hypotheses simultaneously.
As can be seen in Table 1.8, first examining the mean (intercepts as outcome), the
main effects for different context condition, response form, and the interaction between
these two are not found to be statistically significant. This indicates a lack of effect for
these variables. However, the interaction of these variables with numeracy and the
numeracy main effect are all statistically significant, indicating the importance of
numeracy on absolute error. The coefficients suggest that for the different context
condition when answering via numeric open ended responses, greater numeracy reduces
error.
It is important to note, that even though the error is larger, it does not increase the
overall amount of error from the grand mean. Further, greater numeracy actually
increases error in the same context condition compared to those with lower numeracy
presented in the same context condition, when responding using numeric open ended
responses. However, when responding on the vague quantifier form in the same context
condition, greater numeracy reduces error and less numeracy increases error. Even with
the increase by responding to vague quantifier forms with the same context memory, the
less numerate still overall have lower than the mean error. That is, overall, vague
quantifier responses tend to either reduce the level of error or maintain the level of error
at all levels of numeracy and context memory.

88
Table 1.8
Hierarchical Linear Model of Absolute Differences on Response and Respondent
Characteristics
Variable

Coefficient

(s.e.)

For Intercept1, β0
Intercept2, γ00

1.69*

(0.41)

Same Context, γ01

0.27

(0.67)

Form, γ02

-0.64

(0.47)

Numeracy, γ03

-0.58*

(0.27)

1.03*

(0.44)

Context*Numeracy, γ04
Context*Form, γ05
Form*Numeracy, γ06
Context*Form*Numeracy,γ07

-0.28

(0.75)

0.58*

(0.30)

-0.97*

(0.48)

0.29*

(0.04)

For Actual Frequency slope, β1
Actual Frequency, γ10
Context*Frequency, γ11

-0.01

(0.06)

Form*Frequency, γ12

-0.06

(0.05)

0.02

(0.02)

-0.02

(0.03)

0.05

(0.08)

Form*Numeracy*Frequency, γ16

-0.03

(0.03)

Context*Form*Numeracy*Frequency, γ17

-0.01

(0.06)

Numeracy*Frequency, γ13
Context*Numeracy*Frequency, γ14
Context*Form*Frequency, γ15

n = 124, *p < 0.05

Table 1.9 displays these effects, presenting predicted means (intercepts) for
various combinations of the three way interactions between different conditions and
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levels of numeracy, as in Table 1.6 for signed differences. As indicated by the
Context*Numeracy coefficient in Table 1.8, those with lower numeracy have smaller
error in the same context condition. Indeed, the lowest error predicted is for those with
the lowest numeracy in the same condition, using numeric open ended responses.
Similarly, those with the highest levels of numeracy have higher levels of error in the
same context condition compared to those with similarly high numeracy using the
different context condition (within the same response form). The highest level of
predicted error is for those with the lowest numeracy, when given the different
presentation context and responding to the numeric open ended response form. Although
generally it appears that vague quantifier response form leads to lower error, which is
indeed the direction the model coefficients indicate, it is important to note that the some
of the model coefficients are not statistically significant. Rather, taking that into
consideration, it shows that error is reduced or maintained at about the mean level of
estimated error when using vague quantifier responses.

Table 1.9
Predicted Mean Absolute Error by Context, Form, and Numeracy
Numeracy

Vague-Same

Vague-Different

Numeric-Same

Numeric-Different

0 (Mean)

1.04

1.05

1.96

1.69

1.73 (High)

1.14

1.04

2.73

0.68

-4.27 (Low)

0.79

1.06

0.05

4.17

Examining the slopes coefficients in Table 1.8, it is evident that actual frequency
increases error. This increase in error is also reflected in Table 1.7. However, as with the
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model for signed differences, none of the interactions with actual frequency is
statistically significant. This lack of significance suggests that there is no relationship
between respondent level (context, response form, and numeracy) and response level
(actual frequency) variables. Thus, although the effect of actual frequency is evident,
actual frequency does not interact with any other variables to affect absolute error.
These results inform whether the proposed hypotheses are supported or not. In
regards to absolute differences error, Hypothesis 1 is only partially supported, as in
general, people were not more accurate using vague quantifier responses than when using
numeric open ended responses. Rather, it appears that after controlling other factors,
there is no difference between the two response forms. This similarity is evident by the
lack of significance of the main effect of the response form. Further, the vague quantifier
response form only significantly affects error at different levels of numeracy, which at
times also depends on the context condition. However, when vague quantifiers did have
an impact on responses through these interactions, it was in the direction of reducing
error, thus the partial support for the hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 is clearly supported, as increases in actual frequency increases error,
i.e. decreases accuracy. However, like Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 4 is not supported. The
main effect for context is not significant, and the effect of context is only apparent at
different levels of numeracy, and depending on the person’s numeracy, the effect of
context differs. That is, sometimes greater context memory (i.e. different context
condition) improves accuracy and sometimes the opposite occurs. For similar reasons,
Hypothesis 5 is not strongly supported. Although at times greater numeracy does lead to
lower error (e.g. under different context and numeric open ended response format
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conditions), at other times, higher numeracy leads to greater error (e.g. under same
context and numeric open ended response format conditions).
Hypothesis 7 is only partially supported, as evidenced by the coefficients in Table
1.8. When the numeric open ended form is used, more numerate individuals display less
error, but only under the different context condition. Under the same context condition,
vague quantifier responses reduce error for those with higher numeracy. Hypothesis 8 is
also partially supported, as seen by the Form*Numeracy interaction, with more numerate
individuals having more error using the vague quantifier form, but only under the
different context condition. For the same context condition, more numerate individuals
display less error using the vague quantifier form. Hypothesis 12 is not supported, as
some effect is found, as seen in the three way interaction Context*Form*Numeracy. This
interaction suggests that context does affect error on the vague forms, at either higher or
lower numeracy (in opposite directions).
Like the signed differences model, for the absolute error model, none of the
hypotheses regarding the interactions with actual frequency are supported. The absence
of support for all of these hypotheses is seen by the lack of statistically significant
interactions between actual frequency and the other effects. Thus, Hypotheses 9, 10, 11,
13, 14, and 15 are not supported.
Discussions and Conclusions
This study is the first that has compared the accuracy between vague quantifier
and numeric open ended responses, as well as examining logical consistency between the
two response forms. The examination of logical consistency and accuracy was
accomplished by using an experimental design in which actual frequencies were known.
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Included in this experiment was the important factor of context memory, which has been
shown to affect accuracy (Brown 1995). Two conditions were used, the same and
different context conditions, as was also done in Brown (1995). Further, the effect of
numeracy was examined on validity, as has been done in Studies 2 and 3 in this
dissertation. However, unlike those other studies, which relied on proxy measures of
numeracy available in the data sets obtained, this study generated numeracy scores based
on a previously used scale (Galesic and Garcia-Retamero 2010). Thus, it was possible to
examine the interaction between context memory and response form, along with
numeracy and the actual frequency of the event.
The results of this experiment provide several findings. First, individuals in this
study are highly numerate. This high numeracy is likely due to the population selected
from: students enrolled at a university in a psychology course. The numeracy of the
student sample here is significantly higher than that of the national samples used by
Galesic and Garcia-Retamero (2010). However, although there is a high level of
numeracy overall in the sample used here, there is variation. Some respondents display
significantly lower levels of numeracy, with as low as 3 out of 9 questions correct.
Further, this variation allowed for detection of differences in numeracy in regards to
accuracy (discussed below).
The second finding of note is that of the strong logical consistency between vague
quantifiers and numeric translations. All respondents ordered the translations of the vague
quantifiers in a consistent manner, with “never” consistently being the smallest value and
“very often” consistently being the largest, with intermediate values for the other scale
points. This ordering is also observed at the aggregate level, with each increasing scale
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point statistically significantly larger from never to very often. Further, all but one
participant gave “never” a translation of zero, showing strong sematic logical consistency
as well. Given the logical consistency shown by all respondents, numeracy does not have
an impact on this consistency, contrary to expectations.
Numeracy does have an impact on accuracy, however. In fact, of all of the
possible variables affecting accuracy, numeracy consistently has the most impact.
Numeracy, in some form, affects the relative accuracy (correlation coefficients), signed
error, and absolute error. It only does not appear to have an effect on the size of
individual regression slopes. How this effect occurs, however, is not consistently in one
direction or the other. In some situations, greater numeracy is associated with decreased
error, in others increased error. For example, for numeric open ended responses in the
different context condition, greater numeracy is associated with a reduction in error.
However, in the same context condition and with numeric open ended responses, greater
numeracy is associated with greater error.
Regardless, results support the view that numeracy is a potentially important
variable in survey research that to this point has not been fully explored. There have been
no studies, except those in this dissertation, that have attempted to relate the effect of
numeracy to validity in a survey. This study found that there is indeed an impact, albeit
one that is not consistently in one direction. What this suggests is that survey researchers
should account for the potential impact of numeracy in survey response, taking a measure
of numeracy and including it as a covariate, at least when the response at issue is
quantitative in nature.
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What appears to have less of an impact than numeracy is that of the level of
context memory, as measured by the presentation context, either the same context or
different context. Unlike Brown (1995), who found a clear effect for context in the
direction that greater context memory (i.e. different context presentation) led to greater
accuracy, this is not case in this experiment. Indeed, for regression slopes (bias) and
correlation coefficients (relative accuracy) context has no apparent effect. For signed and
absolute differences, context memory interacts mainly with numeracy (and sometimes
response form) to have an effect. Like numeracy, however, the effect was not always in a
consistent direction. For example, for both signed and absolute error greater numeracy is
associated with greater error under the same context condition (using numeric open ended
responses). However, like Brown (1995), there is a clear effect for the actual frequency of
presentation, with greater frequency leading to increased error.
Although context memory is found to be important at times, depending on other
respondent conditions, the differences between these findings and Brown (1995) may
need to be reconciled. One potential important difference related to power is the number
of words used in each study. Brown (1995) used twice the words used in this study, (126
vs. 252); as such, it may be that the importance of context memory occurs at a certain
threshold, not reached in this study. Similarly, it may also be that the lack of effect is due
to when given fewer words to study, participants were able to estimate the frequency
better than when more items are presented, and context memory loses its importance, as
the participants can rely on other strategies for recall.
Participants in Brown (1995) also were required to “think aloud” during the
response process, explaining their thought process, in order to ascertain what recall
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strategies were used. The current study did not require “think aloud” responses. It may
also be that “thinking aloud” may affect recall in some way that affected the results.
Finally, it should be noted that the instructions regarding the memory test seems to differ
slightly between the two studies. Although both studies informed participants a memory
test would follow the presentation of a set of words, Brown (1995) states that the type of
memory test was not specified, whereas in this study participants were informed about
which words they would be tested on. The difference in instructions could affect
differences in encoding and recall. Studies have indeed found that differences in
instruction affect these aspects of memory (Brown 1997). Still, there is lack of evidence
of an impact of context memory in this study suggests that perhaps context memory
should be studied further, to see if the results of Study 1 are anomalous, or to determine if
context memory is important only in certain conditions, such as those administered by
Brown (1995).
Finally, of particular importance for this research is the effect of response form,
either vague quantifier or numeric open ended response form. For bias (regression slopes)
and relative accuracy (correlation coefficients), the response forms do not appear to have
any effect on error. That is, one response form did not prove to be more effective than the
other on accuracy. For signed error and absolute error, response form appears to have a
more immediate impact. Vague quantifier response form generally reduces the error in
signed differences, but has a less clear impact on absolute differences. Although the
coefficient for the main effect of vague quantifiers was in the expected direction of
reducing absolute error, this coefficient was not significant. Still, based on the effect of
the interactions, vague quantifier responses either maintained or reduced absolute error
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from the overall mean error. Thus, this study suggests that vague quantifiers are overall at
least equally as accurate as numeric open ended responses, and at times provide more
accurate data, with some exceptions.
In situations in which exceptions are observed, vague quantifiers still reduce error
from the overall mean, but perhaps not to the same extent as numeric open ended
responses. These exceptions occur due to interactions with numeracy and context
memory. However, the reverse is not true; numeric open ended responses do not always
tend to reduce or maintain error. Rather, at times, numeric open ended responses clearly
increase overall error, as seen above.
Based on these findings, few of the hypotheses posited are consistently supported.
The only hypothesis clearly supported is that of Hypothesis 3, which states that as actual
frequency increases, accuracy will decrease. Many of the other hypotheses receive partial
support, due to the interactive nature of the model. At times error is increased in one
condition or level of numeracy, but is decreased in a different combination that renders
support for the hypothesis incomplete at best. Other hypotheses receive no support at all.
Of particular importance, Hypothesis 1, that in general, vague quantifiers would be more
accurate than numeric open ended responses received some support in two of the
measures of accuracy, and is not contradicted.
Although this is the first study to examine accuracy differences between response
formats, and how this is impacted by context memory and numeracy, there are some
limitations to this study that warrant discussion. First, is the way that logical consistency
is measured. Logical consistency was measured by the numeric translations at the end of
the questionnaire by all respondents using the vague quantifier scale. For each translation
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section, the scale points were ordered from top to bottom in order from never to very
often. Since the order was given to the respondents in this way, as well as having
experience with the scale from answering all the frequency questions, this could
influence responses to ensure that there was greater logical consistency than might have
otherwise been.
Second, although this study used a more complete measure of numeracy than
have other studies, the responses to the numeracy scale led to a high skew, toward the
upper end of numeracy. The overall mean was 7.27 out of 9, suggesting a highly
numerate sample, compared to other samples (Galesic and Garcia-Retamero 2010). In
part due to this, numeracy scores were mean centered. Even so, there is a ceiling effect in
that numeracy scores can only reach so high (1.73) but can reach significantly lower (4.27). Further, given the skew in the data to the upper end, there is not a large amount of
variation in the data. Still, even though this may seem like a limitation, numeracy effects
are still estimable.
Related to this skew in the numeracy are the population studied and the
generalizability of results. Specifically, participants used in this study were selected from
a subject pool drawn from university students taking a psychology course. As indicated
by the numeracy scores, this population and sample is likely to be more cognitively able
than an average person in the wider population. Given the nature of the population,
generalizability of the results is in question. That is, it may not be possible to infer that
the results found here would also be found in the general population.
However, it is worth noting that vague quantifiers are thought to be cognitively
less demanding than numeric open ended responses (Bradburn and Miles 1979). If this is
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indeed the case, as it is also argued here that it is, then the findings in this study suggest
that it may be vague quantifiers will perform even better in the general public. In this
study, vague quantifiers tended to perform at least as well as numeric open ended
responses, and at times, better. If this is true among more a cognitively able sample, then
for a less cognitively able sample, likely to come from a general population, then the
cognitively easier vague quantifiers could perform even better.
This proposition has not been tested, however, and suggests an avenue for future
research. That is, a similar kind of study should be conducted on a sample from the
general population, where cognitive ability and numeracy would theoretically be lower
and more similar to those samples used in other surveys. A further study could also
restrict the population to those with the lowest cognitive ability and/or lowest numeracy
to see what effect of the different response forms arise.
Additionally, different areas of frequency estimation could be studied for
differences between vague quantifier and numeric open ended responses. This study
examined only recall of word lists. However, it may be that other kinds of recall, for
example, number of times a doctor was visited, may lead to different results. Beyond that,
asking about word lists is not a frequent survey question; rather survey questions are
often about behaviors or other numeric information. This study suggests recall of numeric
information is sometimes affected by response form, as well as context memory and
numeracy, but whether this holds for actual behaviors is an empirical question that can be
answered.
Another aspect that could be studied further is the effect of context memory.
According to Brown (1995), greater context memory increases accuracy. This study did
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not find that the effect of context memory was so clear or evident. Additional studies
could examine the role of context memory to further the knowledge of its effects, and to
examine under what conditions context memory is important and how. For example, it
may be that context memory may only be important as the number of items to be
remembered increases, or is differentially affected by numeracy, as it appeared to be in
this study.
Study 2
Data and Methods
The second data set comes from the National Survey of Student Engagement
(NSSE). The NSSE is an annual survey that has collected data from college students from
hundreds of participating institutions, with several thousand surveys collected annually
(NSSE 2011).The survey collects data from randomly selected college freshman and
seniors at the participating institutions. Although freshman and seniors were the target
population, some respondents came from other classes. The primary purpose of the
survey is twofold: 1) assessing the time and effort undergraduate degree-seeking students
spend on educational activities, and 2) assessing what schools are doing to focus student
efforts to these activities (NSSE 2011). Data from these surveys are collected via one of
two survey modes, either by a paper or Web survey.
The particular NSSE data for use in this research comes from 2006, when
additional data were collected on questions using vague quantifier response options.
Twelve questions, regarding active and collaborative learning and student-faculty
interaction, were first asked about using vague quantifier response options. Then, at the
end of the Web survey (these questions were repeated at the end of the Web survey only)
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students were reminded of their earlier answers. The respondents were asked to quantify
their response for each question by filling in a number into an open ended response space
to indicate the number of times intended by the vague term, and to select the time frame
thought of and that the number of times occurred in. For example, a person saying an
event occurred “very often” was asked how many times this event occurred and if this
number occurred either per day, week, month, academic term, or academic year. Thus,
students entered a numeric response and selected an appropriate time frame. Figure 1
displays an example from the Web survey showing the way this question was asked to
respondents (from Nelson-Laird et al. 2008).
Given the differences in the rate of occurrence selected by the respondent in the
numeric translation of the vague quantifier response, that is, whether the number of times
occurred per day, week, month, academic term or academic year (see Figure 1), it is
necessary to transform numeric open ended responses to a constant time frame, such as is
done in Nelson-Laird et al. (2008). In this case, all numeric answers were transformed to be
on a per week time frame, through either multiplying answers by five (for those that said
number per day) or dividing by the appropriate number for those saying per month,
academic term or year. Specifically, time frames were adjusted by using the following
multipliers: day = 5, week = 1, month = 0.231, academic term = 0.067, and academic year
= 0.033. The twelve questions asked about in this manner are presented in Appendix 4.
The twelve questions used have been used grouped together in two scales, one for
active and collaborative learning and one for student-faculty interaction. Of the twelve
items, seven are for the active-collaborative learning scale, with the remaining five
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Figure 1. Example question for absolute frequency intended by vague quantifier.

belonging to the student-faculty interaction scale (see Appendix 4). The responses for
both the vague quantifier and numeric response translation response options have both
been used for the scales (Nelson-Laird et al. 2008). For both response formats, the
responses to each question are summated to create the scale value for each respondent.
For the numeric translation scale, responses to each question were first transformed to a
z-score (by taking the difference from the overall mean and dividing by the standard
deviation). The z-scores for each question were then summed up to form the numeric
scale.8 Unlike Study 1, which used translated numeric equivalents, for the vague
quantifier scale, scales are summated for the vague quantifier questions by placing values
on each of the response options, from 0 through 3 for the options ascending from 0 for

8

For the numeric translation scale, a simple addition of the numeric responses given was also examined in
forming the scales. The results in terms of directionality and significance were near identical to the z-score
transformed scales.
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“never” to 3 for “very often”. This assignment was used for two reasons; first because
others have summed the scale in this way (i.e. Carini et al (2006)) and second, because
numeric translation were needed for accuracy assessments but is not needed for
predictive validity assessments. Responses are then summed up based on the questions
for each of the two scales for each respondent.
Carini et al (2006) examined both the active and collaborative learning and
student-faculty interaction for outcomes using the 2002 NSSE. Unlike the data used here,
the 2002 NSSE data only had the vague quantifier questions available for scale
construction and not the numeric responses as well. Using the vague quantifier version of
these scales, Carini et al. (2006) examine the predictive validity of the scales for
important theoretically related outcomes. Specifically the authors examine education
outcomes, including self-reported grades in college, as “student engagement is generally
considered among the better predictors of learning and personal achievement” (Carini et
al 2006, p. 2). The results show small but significant positive correlations for both active
and collaborative learning and for student-faculty interaction with grades, suggesting the
important theoretically related relationship. However, there is no comparison, as it was
not possible at the time, to examine the numeric scale format and which response format
(numeric or vague) has higher levels of predictive validity.
The authors also note the potential importance of satisfaction with the educational
experience as an important educational outcome and construct (Carini et al. 2006). The
authors measure satisfaction using two questions from the NSSE. The first asks, “How
would you evaluate your entire educational experience at this institution? Poor, Fair,
Good, Excellent”. The second satisfaction question asks, “If you could start over again,
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would you go to the same institution you are now attending? Definitely no, Probably no,
Probably yes, Definitely yes” (also available in Appendix 4). Given the important nature
of satisfaction as an educational factor, as noted by Carini et al (2006), satisfaction
measures were considered outcomes to relate the vague quantifier and numeric response
options to the various questions regarding active and collaborative learning and for
student-faculty interaction.
The survey also asked about a number of details regarding student engagement as
well as student characteristics. Importantly, data about the student’s Scholastic Aptitude
Test (SAT) is included. Numeracy may potentially be indicated by the student’s SAT
math score. Initially, this score was divided into quartiles of the distribution, i.e. four
levels of numeracy, low to high. However, additional collapsing showed that no
differences in results, first by dividing the respondents into three divisions of numeracy,
and then dividing students into simple low-high numeracy dichotomies. Given the lack of
differences and large number of missing cases on the SAT math score variable (discussed
below), the dichotomy of high-low numeracy was chosen to examine differences on this
variable, using the split at the median level. .
The data available for this survey is a twenty percent random subsample of the
respondents, due to licensing restrictions. The data comes from the available student
respondents to the Web survey, which represent 26,204 first-year and 36,263 senior
students who were randomly selected from 149 institutions (Nelson-Laird et al. 2008). A
twenty percent random subsample leads to a sample size of 10,767. Analyses of these
respondents’ answers focus on the logical consistency between vague quantifiers and the
associated numeric open ended responses and on the predictive validity of the different
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responses, in regards to variables relating to the academic outcomes and perception of
education.
It is important to note that the data from the NSSE may be similar to a cluster
sample for surveys (Kish 1965). This clustering would arise from the fact that
respondents are selected within participating institutions (the clusters). Responses are
therefore not completely independent. Lack of independence of response could occur
because the similar environment or the underlying causes in selecting the same university
leads to more similar responses than would be expected if the response were independent
(Kish 1965). This potentially leads to more homogenous responses than if a simple
random sample (SRS) was taken in conducting the same survey. Hence, each
observation provides less information than an observation in a simple random sample.
As such, estimating the variance of point estimates using SRS assumptions and
techniques may be incorrect (Kish 1965, Lohr 2010). Special techniques should be used
that incorporate the clustering effects. In this case, that would entail controlling for the
potential clustering of responses within universities. Failure to do so would lead to
incorrect variance estimates; however, point estimates remain unbiased. Using the
incorrect variance would lead to incorrect hypothesis testing and estimation of confidence
intervals, which are based on the standard error resulting from the biased variance
estimates using SRS assumptions.
In order to do so, it is first necessary to examine whether there is indeed a
clustering effect or not. To test for clustering effects, it is necessary to calculate the
design effect (Kish 1965). The design effect (deff) is an inflationary factor of the variance
for the cluster sample, where the cluster variance is inflated over that the variance
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assuming SRS by the formula variance(cluster) = variance(SRS)*deff. If the design
effects are large, then appropriate methods must be used to compensate for the clustered
design of the data. Specifically, it is necessary to use an alternative variance estimation
process, such as Taylor series approximation (Kish 1965), which is employed here.
Hypotheses
Given that Studies 2 and 3 both are similar, with Study 2 examining frequency
estimation and Study 3 examining subjective probabilities, hypotheses 1 through 4 are the
same for both, with the remaining hypotheses being study specific.
H1:

In general, vague quantifiers will show higher levels of predictive validity with
theoretically related variables compared to numeric responses.

H1a:

There will be higher correlations and better model fit for variables measured by
vague quantifiers compared to numeric open ended responses.

H2:

When asked for a direct numeric translation of vague quantifiers, there should be a
logical consistency between numeric and vague quantifier measures.

H3:

In general, more numerate individuals will provide responses showing greater
predictive validity.

H4:

More numerate individuals will show greater logical consistency in numeric open
ended and vague quantifier responses than less numerate individuals.

H5:

More numerate individuals will show greater predictive validity using numeric
open ended responses than less numerate individuals.

H6:

However, more numerate individuals will not show greater predictive validity
using numeric open ended responses than when using vague quantifiers.
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Results
Data Management
After transforming the numeric data to weekly rates, the distribution of these
numeric translations were examined. Visual inspection showed that some responses were
extreme and not plausible (e.g. an event occurring 50000 times a week). Overall, these
extreme responses were few. The data were cut at the 99th percentile of the distribution,
which would in all cases lead to more reasonable responses with a minimum of data cut.
For nine of the numeric translations, the use of the 99th percentile led to cuts of
translations greater than 10. For frequency of questions asked in class, the 99th percentile
was 50. It was 15 for working in class with other students. For discussed ideas outside of
class with others, the 99th percentile was 20. These cut data are used in all following
analyses. Further, in order that the vague quantifier scales be anchored at zero, all of the
vague quantifier responses were scaled from zero (“never”) to three (“very often”).
A potential problem of data missingness arises when attempting to divide the data
along numeracy measures, i.e. SAT math scores. In particular, more than half the data has
missing values on this variable, reducing the overall n to 4761 when using numeracy as a
measure. Still, this provides a reasonably large sample, but results based on numeracy
must be made with this caveat. Levels of numeracy were divided into high- and lowbased, divided along the median of 570 (mean = 565.55). Respondents with SAT math
scores higher than 570 are considered to have high numeracy and those with lower than
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or at 570 are considered to have low numeracy. This leads to 2211 respondents in the
high numeracy division and 2250 respondents in the low numeracy division.9
The active-collaborative learning scale and student-faculty interaction scale were
calculated for both vague quantifier and z-scored numeric responses. These calculations
were done by summing the responses for the vague quantifier scale (with values of 0 to 3
for each response) and separately summing the numeric responses (with values ranging
from 0 to 10 for nine questions, 0 to15 for one question, 0 to 20 for one question, and 0 to
50 for one question, as discussed above). Means for each scale and the standard error
(accounting for clustering, see below) are presented in Table 2.1. Means are given for the
total sample, as well as for high and low numeracy divisions.

Table 2.1
Active-Collaborative Learning Scale (ACLS) and Student –Faculty Interaction Scale
(SFIS) Means
ACLS – Vauge
(s.e.)

ACLS – Numeric
(s.e.)

SFIS – Vauge
(s.e.)

SFIS Numeric
(s.e.)

Low Numeracy

9.82
(0.10)

16.76
(0.44)

6.71
(0.10)

3.51
(0.09)

High Numeracy

9.91
(0.15)

17.96
(0.50)

6.56
(0.14)

3.54
(0.13)

Total Sample

9.96
(0.08)

16.75
(0.28)

6.58
(0.07)

3.46
(0.06)

9

The sample was also divided into four and then three levels of numeracy to test for sensitivity to the
divisions. The divisions were made such that first a quarter of the sample and then near 33% of the sample
belonged to each division. Dividing the sample in these ways changed none of the results and thus a
simpler division of two groups was used, for parsimony and for increased sample sizes, given the large
number of missing cases.
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Effects of Clustering
Given that there may be a clustering effect in the data, since respondents are
selected and grouped within the 127 universities included in the survey, it is important to
check for possible clustering effects in the data. This check is done by estimating the
design effect (deff) for each of the main variables used in this study. The design effect is
an inflationary factor that shows the ratio between the estimated variance controlling for
the complex survey design (i.e. clustering) and the variance calculated assuming simple
random sampling (SRS), which is the default variance estimation in most analyses.
Larger design effects suggest a greater increase in the estimated variance due to the
complex survey design (Kish 1965). However, clustering does not affect calculation of
point estimates, such as means, correlation coefficients and regression coefficients, only
the variance for these estimates.
The design effect is statistic specific, and may be different for different variables
and statistics (Lohr 2010). To examine whether clustering is a possible issue that needs to
be accounted for in the NSSE data, design effects were calculated for the means of the
variables of interests. This includes the 12 vague quantifier responses to the two scales,
the 12 numeric translations for each of these responses, and the three related variables of
interest, grades and the two satisfaction questions, for a total of 27 design effects
estimated. Design effects were estimated based on the Taylor series approximation
variance estimates for the clustered survey design (Kish 1965).
The results show that, overall, clustering is an issue that must be accounted for in
the NSSE. The calculated design effects ranged from 1.104 to 9.267. Only three of the 27
estimated deff were less than 2, with the mean deff being 3.888. This mean deff suggests,
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on average, a near four times increase in the estimated variance due to the clustered
design compared to the simple random sampling assumptions frequently used in analyses.
Given the evident clustering effects on the variance estimation, it would be inappropriate
to use simple random sampling assumptions in variance estimation, and hence hypothesis
testing, for the remaining analyses. Therefore, appropriate estimation procedures are
employed using the SAS system (SAS 2010). Specifically, for means, PROC
SURVEYMEANS will be used, and for regressions, PROC SURVEYLOGISTIC will be
used. Variances will all be estimated using the Taylor series approximation.
Logical Consistency
To examine the relationship between vague quantifier responses and the numeric
translations, means translation at each level of vague quantifier response was examined
for each of the twelve question pairs. Assuming that the vague quantifier and the numeric
translations estimates are measuring the same construct as intended, there should be a
level of concordance between them. This analysis is in essence similar to prior research
examining the numeric translations to responses to vague quantifier scales (Bradburn and
Miles 1979, Nelson-Laird et al. 2006). Tables 2.2–2.13 present the means for the numeric
translations at each level of the responses to the vague quantifier scale. These means were
calculated for the full sample and both divisions of numeracy, with the noted caveat that
this leads to a large reduction in the number of cases due to the missingness in SAT
sccores, although more than 2000 cases remain for each division.
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Table 2.2
Number of Times Asked Question in Class by Vague Quantifier Response
Vague Quantifier Response

Low Numeracy

High Numeracy

Total Sample

Never

1.47a
(n = 58)

1.96a
(n = 39)

1.52a
(n = 240)

Sometimes

3.99b
(n = 763)

3.75b
(n = 631)

3.66b
(n = 3113)

Often

9.77c
(n = 865)

10.47c
(n = 722)

9.56c
(n = 3620)

Very Often

17.40d
(n = 756)

18.47d
(n = 754)

16.87d
(n = 3405)

Means are numeric translations of vague quantifier response. Different superscript letters indicate
significant differences of means within columns at p<0.05 level.

Table 2.3
Number of Times Made a Class Presentation by Vague Quantifier Response
Vague Quantifier Response

Low Numeracy

High Numeracy

Total Sample

Never

0.16a
(n = 160)

0.12a
(n = 170)

0.16a
(n = 755)

Sometimes

0.39b
(n = 1015)

0.33b
(n = 1027)

0.38b
(n = 4287)

Often

0.72c
(n = 817)

0.57c
(n = 711)

0.65c
(n = 3448)

Very Often

0.99d
(n = 407)

0.74d
(n = 233)

0.93d
(n = 1748)

Means are numeric translations of vague quantifier response. Different superscript letters indicate
significant differences of means within columns at p<0.05 level.
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Table 2.4
Number of Times Worked With Other Students During Class by Vague Quantifier
Response
Vague Quantifier Response

Low Numeracy

High Numeracy

Total Sample

Never

0.23a
(n = 245)

0.13a
(n = 267)

0.21a
(n = 1011)

Sometimes

0.94b
(n = 1129)

0.80b
(n = 1109)

0.88b
(n = 4783)

Often

1.99c
(n = 722)

1.87c
(n = 562)

1.90c
(n = 3103)

Very Often

2.52d
(n = 280)

3.15d
(n = 179)

2.94d
(n = 1251)

Means are numeric translations of vague quantifier response. Different superscript letters indicate
significant differences of means within columns at p<0.05 level.

Table 2.5
Number of Times Worked With Other Students Outside Class by Vague Quantifier
Response
Vague Quantifier Response

Low Numeracy

High Numeracy

Total Sample

Never

0.14a
(n = 177)

0.17a
(n = 118)

0.13a
(n = 789)

Sometimes

0.73b
(n = 963)

0.65b
(n = 836)

0.68b
(n = 3959)

Often

1.54c
(n = 800)

1.66c
(n = 716)

1.56c
(n = 3103)

Very Often

2.29d
(n = 407)

3.01d
(n = 420)

2.65d
(n = 1912)

Means are numeric translations of vague quantifier response. Different superscript letters indicate
significant differences of means within columns at p<0.05 level.
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Table 2.6
Number of Times Tutored or Taught Other Students by Vague Quantifier Response
Vague Quantifier Response

Low Numeracy

High Numeracy

Total Sample

Never

0.04a
(n = 1144)

0.02a
(n = 791)

0.04a
(n = 4516)

Sometimes

0.72b
(n = 823)

0.66b
(n = 781)

0.68b
(n = 3580)

Often

1.64c
(n = 234)

1.91c
(n = 316)

1.85c
(n = 1172)

Very Often

2.92d
(n = 136)

3.12d
(n = 189)

3.25d
(n = 721)

Means are numeric translations of vague quantifier response. Different superscript letters indicate
significant differences of means within columns at p<0.05 level.

Table 2.7
Number of Times Participated in a Community-Based Project by Vague Quantifier
Response
Vague Quantifier Response

Low Numeracy

High Numeracy

Total Sample

Never

0.06a
(n = 1231)

0.04a
(n = 1274)

0.05a
(n = 5633)

Sometimes

0.39b
(n = 713)

0.34b
(n = 542)

0.38b
(n = 2852)

Often

1.05c
(n = 252)

1.11c
(n = 180)

0.99c
(n = 1014)

Very Often

1.46c
(n = 132)

1.64c
(n = 93)

1.60d
(n = 489)

Means are numeric translations of vague quantifier response. Different superscript letters indicate
significant differences of means within columns at p<0.05 level.
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Table 2.8
Number of Times Discussed Ideas from Classes with Others Outside of Class by Vague
Quantifier Response
Vague Quantifier Response

Low Numeracy

High Numeracy

Total Sample

Never

0.20a
(n = 127)

0.28a
(n = 87)

0.20a
(n = 471)

Sometimes

1.37b
(n = 800)

1.08b
(n = 635)

1.23b
(n = 3276)

Often

3.13c
(n = 796)

3.22c
(n = 794)

3.08c
(n = 3543)

Very Often

5.05d
(n = 488)

5.64d
(n = 475)

5.29d
(n = 2206)

Means are numeric translations of vague quantifier response. Different superscript letters indicate
significant differences of means within columns at p<0.05 level.

Table 2.9
Number of Times Discussed Grades or Assignments with an Instructor by Vague
Quantifier Response
Vague Quantifier Response

Low Numeracy

High Numeracy

Total Sample

Never

0.06a
(n = 127)

0.12a
(n = 139)

0.10a
(n = 547)

Sometimes

0.40b
(n = 870)

0.37b
(n = 905)

0.37b
(n = 3912)

Often

0.89c
(n = 758)

0.96c
(n = 644)

0.90c
(n = 3264)

Very Often

1.25d
(n = 552)

1.34d
(n = 389)

1.36d
(n = 2180)

Means are numeric translations of vague quantifier response. Different superscript letters indicate
significant differences of means within columns at p<0.05 level.
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Table 2.10
Number of Times Talked About Career Plans with a Faculty Member or Advisor by
Vague Quantifier Response
Vague Quantifier Response

Low Numeracy

High Numeracy

Total Sample

Never

0.03a
(n = 339)

0.04a
(n = 389)

0.04a
(n = 1775)

Sometimes

0.25b
(n = 1008)

0.23b
(n = 955)

0.22b
(n = 4382)

Often

0.54c
(n = 548)

0.56c
(n = 447)

0.56c
(n = 2335)

Very Often

1.01d
(n = 351)

1.13d
(n = 281)

0.99d
(n = 1392)

Means are numeric translations of vague quantifier response. Different superscript letters indicate
significant differences of means within columns at p<0.05 level.

Table 2.11
Number of Times Received Prompt Feedback from Faculty on Academic Performance by
Vague Quantifier Response
Vague Quantifier Response

Low Numeracy

High Numeracy

Total Sample

Never

0.08a
(n = 89)

0.10a
(n = 78)

0.12a
(n = 432)

Sometimes

0.66b
(n = 740)

0.64b
(n = 671)

0.64b
(n = 3223)

Often

1.45c
(n = 1011)

1.51c
(n = 947)

1.47c
(n = 4351)

Very Often

1.99d
(n = 414)

2.19d
(n = 338)

2.07d
(n = 1667)

Means are numeric translations of vague quantifier response. Different superscript letters indicate
significant differences of means within columns at p<0.05 level.
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Table 2.12
Number of Times Worked with Faculty Members on Activities Other Than Coursework by
Vague Quantifier Response
Vague Quantifier Response

Low Numeracy

High Numeracy

Total Sample

Never

0.04a
(n = 1089)

0.02a
(n = 865)

0.04a
(n = 4733)

Sometimes

0.44b
(n = 683)

0.42b
(n = 715)

0.39b
(n = 3029)

Often

1.08c
(n = 303)

1.21c
(n = 283)

1.13c
(n = 1230)

Very Often

1.72d
(n = 176)

2.26d
(n = 165)

1.98d
(n = 668)

Means are numeric translations of vague quantifier response. Different superscript letters indicate
significant differences of means within columns at p<0.05 level.

Table 2.13
Number of Times Discussed Ideas from Classes with Faculty Members Outside of Class
by Vague Quantifier Response
Vague Quantifier Response

Low Numeracy

High Numeracy

Total Sample

Never

0.13a
(n = 761)

0.10a
(n = 634)

0.13a
(n = 3209)

Sometimes

0.73b
(n = 4345)

0.63b
(n = 984)

0.67b
(n = 4345)

Often

1.44c
(n = 378)

1.59c
(n = 290)

1.53c
(n = 1473)

Very Often

2.22d
(n = 197)

2.23d
(n = 139)

2.21d
(n = 738)

Means are numeric translations of vague quantifier response. Different superscript letters indicate
significant differences of means within columns at p<0.05 level.
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Several findings are evident based on the data presented in these tables. First,
vague quantifiers evidently mean different things in response to different questions and
topics. For example, using the total sample, the translated meaning for the response of
“very often” ranges from a mean of 0.93 times a week for number of times a presentation
was made in class to a mean of 16.87 times a week for asked a question in class.
Similarly, the translation of “never” ranged from a mean 0.04 times a week talking with
faculty members about career plans to a mean 1.52 times a week for asked a question in
class. These differences in meaning are found across all divisions of the sample. This
finding is consistent with other studies, which have also found different numeric
meanings for vague quantifiers across different behaviors (Bradburn and Miles 1979).
The second important finding is that, overall, there appears to be a great deal of
logical consistency, in the total sample and in both the high and low numeracy divisions.
For all questions and across all divisions of the sample, the mean numeric translations for
each level of the vague quantifier are ordered in a consistent and expected manner. That
is the translation for “never” is the smallest number of times per week, followed by
“sometimes”, “often” and “very often”, in that order. For nearly all questions and
divisions of the sample, the mean translations are all significantly different from one
another, further strengthening the finding of logical consistency.
Only two instances of means were not significantly different from one another.
For both the low numeracy and high numeracy divisions, the mean translations for
“often” and “very often” are not significantly different from one another for the number
of times participated in a community-based project. This lack of significance is likely
partly due to small numbers of respondents giving each of these responses, but other
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questions have similar distribution of respondents with significant differences still found.
Further, the difference just barely fails to reach statistical significance at the p<0.05 level;
at p<.10 the means are significantly different. In both cases, the mean differences are in
the expected direction, with “very often” larger than “often”. Overall, these two instances
do not contradict the pattern of logical consistency between vague quantifier and numeric
responses.
The only possible exception to the argument of logical consistency between the
two measures is that for all questions, the mean translation of never is significantly
different from zero at the p<0.05 level. Although in some cases, the mean approaches
zero, being as low as 0.04 in several instances for the total sample and those in the low
numeracy division and as low as 0.02 for the high numeracy division in a couple of
instances, these are still significantly different from zero. Further, for all three divisions,
never means more than one for number of times asked a question in class (total sample =
1.52; low numeracy = 1.47; high numeracy = 1.96).
However, this result is countered by the fact that for most of the questions, the
large majority of respondents who said “never” to the question gave a numeric translation
of zero. The only exception is for asked a question in class, where still the plurality
(33.75% in the total sample, 36.21% in the low numeracy division, 38.46% in the high
numeracy division) gave zero as the numeric translation for “never”. For the remainder of
the questions, the percentage giving zero as the translation of “never” ranged from 68.4593.49% for the total sample, 68.93-91.87% for the low numeracy division, and 72.2895.20% for the high numeracy division. This finding of large majorities for most
questions translating “never” as zero is additional support that overall, responses to vague
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quantifiers and numeric responses are logically consistent with one another, at least for
this population and set of behaviors.
These findings relate directly to two of the proposed hypotheses, one of which
receives support and one that does not. First, with the direct translation between
measures, there appears to be strong logical consistency, which lends support to
Hypothesis 2. However, there is no apparent difference in this high level of logical
consistency between measures when examining different numeracy levels, which is the
expectation based on Hypothesis 4.
Predictive Validity
Predictive validity has been shown to be an important aspect of the measurement
properties of frequency questions in past research (Chang and Krosnick 2003, Lu et al.
2008). This type of validity can be measured through the relationship between the
measures of interest and theoretically related variables. In this case, the measures of
interest are the active-collaborative learning and student-faculty interaction scales, which
are summations of the twelve questions presented above (Carini et al. 2006, Nelson-Laird
2008). Seven are used in the active-collaborative scale and five in the student-faculty
interaction scale (see Appendix 4). Since the twelve questions are asked using both vague
quantifier scales and z-scored numeric translations, four total scales are available for use;
two for vague quantifier scales and two for z-scored numeric translations.
The theoretically related variables, as noted in Carini et al. (2006), are grades,
measured on an eight-point scale, and two satisfaction questions using four point scales
(see Appendix 4). Given the ranked ordering of the data, Spearman’s rho is the
appropriate correlation coefficient to employ. The correlations of the two vague
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quantifier and two numeric scales with these three measures are presented in Tables 2.142.19, with the correlations of the theoretically related variables and the activecollaborative learning scales presented first, followed by those with the student-faculty
interaction scales. Along with the correlations for the total sample, the correlations found
in the high and low numeracy divisions are also presented. In addition, correlations were
transformed to Fisher z-scores in order to examine significant differences. Due to the
clustering effects, this may not be the most appropriate manner for testing for significant
differences; however, no other method is currently known, and this test gives a possible
indication of significant differences. In any case, the point estimates for the correlation
coefficients are not affected by the clustering, and are interpretable in terms of size and
direction.
The results presented in these tables point in a single direction, being that vague
quantifier responses have higher levels of predictive validity than when using numeric
open ended responses. In every case except one, for every theoretically related variable
for each of the divisions of the sample (high and low numeracy, total sample) the point
estimates for the correlations are larger for vague quantifier responses than for numeric
responses. The one exception occurred in the high numeracy division for the ACLS
correlation with same college preference, where the numeric scale was slightly larger at
the third place after the decimal, 0.164 to 0.163. Further, for the total sample, every one
of these differences are statistically significant at the p<.05 level using the Fisher z-score
transformation. Although the correlations as whole are not large, the importance follows
from the comparison between the two different measures. In addition, similarly small
correlations were found in Carini et al (2006), so these small correlations are expected.
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Table 2.14
Correlation of Active-Collaborative Learning Scales with Grades
Low Numeracy

High Numeracy

Total Sample

ACLS – Vague

0.18a

0.14a

0.18a

ACLS – Numeric

0.12a

0.06b

0.10b

ACLS = Active-Collaborative Learning Scale
Different superscript letters indicate significant differences of correlations within columns at p<0.05 level.

Table 2.15
Correlation of Active-Collaborative Learning Scales with College Experience Rating
Low Numeracy

High Numeracy

Total Sample

ACLS – Vague

0.26a

0.23a

0.23a

ACLS – Numeric

0.15b

0.17b

0.17b

ACLS = Active-Collaborative Learning Scale
Different superscript letters indicate significant differences of correlations within columns at p<0.05 level.

Table 2.16
Correlation of Active-Collaborative Learning Scales with Same College Preference
Low Numeracy

High Numeracy

Total Sample

ACLS – Vague

0.19a

0.16a

0.16a

ACLS – Numeric

0.15a

0.16a

0.13b

ACLS = Active-Collaborative Learning Scale
Different superscript letters indicate significant differences of correlations within columns at p<0.05 level.
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Table 2.17
Correlation of Student-Faculty Interaction Scales with Grades
Low Numeracy

High Numeracy

Total Sample

SFIS – Vague

0.16a

0.15a

0.14a

SFIS – Numeric

0.11a

0.11a

0.10b

SFIS = Student Faculty Interaction Scale
Different superscript letters indicate significant differences of correlations within columns at p < 0.05 level.

Table 2.18
Correlation of Student-Faculty Interaction Scales with College Experience Rating
Low Numeracy

High Numeracy

Total Sample

SFIS – Vague

0.28a

0.29a

0.27a

SFIS – Numeric

0.18b

0.19b

0.19b

SFIS = Student Faculty Interaction Scale
Different superscript letters indicate significant differences of correlations within columns at p < 0.05 level.

Table 2.19
Correlation of Student-Faculty Interaction with Same College Preference
Low Numeracy

High Numeracy

Total Sample

SFIS – Vague

0.19a

0.21a

0.19a

SFIS – Numeric

0.17a

0.16a

0.15b

SFIS = Student Faculty Interaction Scale
Different superscript letters indicate significant differences of correlations within columns at p < 0.05 level.
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In regards to the divisions of high and low numeracy, the pattern is similar to that
of the total sample, with the correlation estimates, while overall being relatively small, all
being higher in both divisions for vague quantifier responses in every comparison.
However, not every difference is significant at the p<0.05 level using the Fisher z-score
transformation. This lack of significance occurred between the active-collaborative
learning scales correlations with grades and student-faculty interaction scales correlations
with grades and same college preference for the low numeracy division. For the high
numeracy division, there were no significant differences for active-collaborative learning
scales correlations with same college preference and student-faculty interaction scales
correlations with grades and same college preference for the low numeracy division.
Beyond these findings, there are no discernible differences between high and low
numeracy divisions. In some cases, the correlations are higher among those with high
numeracy; in others the correlations are higher among those with lower numeracy. The
lack of difference between the two divisions holds when looking at either scale
difference. In only one instance was there a significant difference across divisions, with
the correlation for the active collaborative learning scale using numeric response being
higher in the low numeracy division than the higher numeracy division. It appears that
numeracy, like for logical consistency, did not generally have an impact on predictive
validity, at least using correlation coefficients as a measure.
More support is evident for the proposed hypotheses on predictive validity than is
evident for the tests for logical consistency. First, Hypothesis 1 (and 1a) was clearly
supported. Scales using vague quantifiers showed higher levels of predictive validity,
with higher correlations in every case and every division between all theoretically related
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variables and vague quantifier scales compared to scales using numeric responses.
Similarly, Hypothesis 6 is supported by the correlations in the above tables. Like the total
sample and low numeracy division, high numeracy individuals also showed higher levels
of predictive validity when using vague quantifier responses than when using numeric
responses.
However, some hypotheses were not supported. Those with high numeracy did
not show higher levels of predictive validity compared to those with lower numeracy,
counter to Hypothesis 3. In fact, the one case where there was a significant difference
between the two divisions, there was a higher correlation among the lower numeracy
division. Hypothesis 5 is also not supported, as the higher numeracy division did not have
higher correlations when using numeric responses than those in the lower numeracy
division. Again, the one instance of a significant difference was in the opposite direction
of the prediction, with the lower numeracy division having a higher correlation using
numeric responses. The overall picture shows little difference between high and low
numeracy divisions, contrary to these two hypotheses.
Another way to test the predictive validity of the vague quantifier and numeric
responses scales is to use regressions predicting the theoretically related variables, while
including important control variables. Since the purpose is to compare models in regards
to which scale best predicts the theoretically related variables in order to further assess
the predictive validity, not all possible control variables predicting these outcomes are
required. The control variables selected, based on those used in Nelson-Laird et al.
(2008), are class standing (i.e. freshman, senior, or other), gender, full-time attendance
status, and age (categorized as 19 and younger, 20-23, 24-29 and 30 and older).
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The purpose of these regression models is to identify which scales increase model
fit and predictive capability. Since all of the outcome variables (grades and two
satisfaction questions) are ordinal-level variables, ordered logistic regressions were used
to take into account the clustering effect of respondents within universities. Therefore,
separate models for each of the scales predicting each of the three related variables are
compared using the criterion of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC) (Agresti 2002). Since the AIC and BIC are related to the
sample size, all models are restricted to include only cases where data is available for all
risk measures to ensure comparability. Another useful indicator for model fit, the area
under the Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curve, a measure of diagnostic
accuracy, could not be estimated since this requires binary outcomes. A base model was
also estimated for each of the three outcome variables, including only the demographic
variables to show improvement in the models based on the inclusion of the various
scales. The AIC and BIC for each of the three outcome variables, for each of the three
divisions of the sample (low numeracy, high numeracy, and total sample) are presented in
Tables 2.20-2.25.
The results mirror those of the correlation analyses, with the models employing
the vague quantifier versions of the scales performing better than either the base model or
the model using the numeric versions of the scales, as indicated by the lower AIC and
BIC scores. These findings hold true in all cases for both the active-collaborative learning
scale and for the student-faculty learning scale and when examining the AIC and BIC.
The models are restricted to the same sample and include all of the same control
variables, only differing in which version of the scale (numeric or vague quantifier
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version) are used. Therefore, the differences in the AIC and BIC can be solely attributed
to the differential predictive validity for each version of the scales. As such, it appears
that vague quantifiers have higher levels of predictive validity than numeric scales. This
finding holds across all levels of numeracy, as those with both higher and lower levels of
numeracy show higher levels of predictive validity using vague quantifier scales than
when using numeric scales. Again, this is true for all outcome variables, for both the
active-collaborative learning scale and for the student-faculty learning scale, and when
using either the AIC or BIC.
Table 2.20
Logistic Regression Indicators of ACLS on Grades
Low Numeracy
(n = 2133)

High Numeracy
(n = 1915)

Total Sample
(n = 9119)

AIC

BIC

AIC

BIC

AIC

BIC

Base

7840.73

7920.04

6532.96

6610.76

32665.89

32765.54

ACLS – Vague

7788.05

7873.03

6510.69

6594.05

32432.30

32539.07

ACLS – Numeric

7827.24

7912.22

6531.06

6614.42

32623.00

32729.78

Table 2.21
Logistic Regression Indicators of ACLS on College Experience Rating
Low Numeracy
(n = 2136)

High Numeracy
(n = 1915)

Total Sample
(n = 9124)

AIC

BIC

AIC

BIC

AIC

BIC

Base

4318.85

4375.52

3795.91

3851.48

18402.35

18473.53

ACLS – Vague

4191.79

4254.13

3662.75

3723.88

17836.73

17915.04

ACLS – Numeric

4286.22

4348.56

3772.62

3833.75

18244.01

18322.32
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Table 2.22
Logistic Regression Indicators of ACLS on Same College Preference
Low Numeracy
(n = 2136)

High Numeracy
(n = 1914)

Total Sample
(n = 9123)

AIC

BIC

AIC

BIC

AIC

BIC

Base

5026.31

5082.98

4319.69

4375.26

20689.32

20760.51

ACLS – Vague

4953.59

5015.92

4243.79

4304.91

20404.25

20483.25

ACLS – Numeric

4992.60

5054.93

4294.22

4355.35

20590.64

20668.95

Table 2.23
Logistic Regression Indicators of SFIS on Grades
Low Numeracy
(n = 2199)

High Numeracy
(n = 1986)

Total Sample
(n = 9439)

AIC

BIC

AIC

BIC

AIC

BIC

Base

8092.80

8172.54

6751.94

6830.26

33711.35

33811.48

SFIS – Vague

8052.60

8136.04

6720.71

6804.62

33548.39

33655.68

SFIS – Numeric

8068.59

8154.03

6744.54

6828.45

33664.79

33722.08

Table 2.24
Logistic Regression Indicators of SFIS on College Experience Rating
Low Numeracy
(n = 2203)

High Numeracy
(n = 1987)

Total Sample
(n = 9474)

AIC

BIC

AIC

BIC

AIC

BIC

Base

4453.07

4510.05

3956.48

4012.43

19056.29

19127.82

SFIS – Vague

4295.67

4415.15

3761.60

3823.14

18321.07

18399.76

SFIS – Numeric

4417.89

4480.56

3929.97

3991.50

18888.83

18967.51
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Table 2.25
Logistic Regression Indicators of SFIS on Same College Preference
Low Numeracy
(n = 2203)

High Numeracy
(n = 1986)

Total Sample
(n = 9474)

AIC

BIC

AIC

BIC

AIC

BIC

Base

5166.31

5223.29

4491.82

4547.76

21380.83

21452.37

SFIS – Vague

5092.11

5154.79

4377.42

4438.96

20988.55

21067.23

SFIS – Numeric

5132.47

5195.14

4461.42

4522.96

21260.15

21338.72

Like the correlation analyses, these results also lend support to some of the
hypotheses, while not supporting others. First, these results support Hypothesis 1 (and 1a)
in that vague quantifier scales show higher level of predictive validity than numeric
scales. Given that this higher level of predictive validity is found across all divisions of
the sample, for all models using the different scales, for all measures of model fit, this
hypothesis is strongly supported. In conjunction with the correlations above, it is
suggested that this hypothesis may be confirmed.
In addition, Hypothesis 6 is also supported, as it is in the correlation analyses.
Specifically, even among those with higher levels of numeracy, vague quantifier scales
outperformed its numeric counterparts in terms of predictive validity. Like with the total
sample and those with lower numeracy, those with higher numeracy show higher levels
of predictive validity using vague quantifier scales than with numeric scales for all
models, scales, and criteria.
Hypotheses 3 and 5 are not directly testable using the AIC and BIC. The AIC and
BIC are sample specific, and therefore only comparable within, not across, samples. Still,
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the results are suggestive. Similar patterns emerge for both numeracy divisions across all
models and scales, for both the AIC and BIC. This similarity is suggestive of similar
predictive validity for each numeracy division. This is bolstered by the findings of the
correlation analysis which more directly show no differences between the two divisions
in terms of predictive validity. In combination, this further strengthens the claim that
Hypotheses 3 and 5 are not supported, i.e. that there are no differences between high and
low numeracy divisions in terms of predictive validity.
Finally, the estimated coefficients and odds ratios for the different scales in
predicting the three dependent variables controlling for demographics are presented in
Tables 2.26-2.31. The standard errors reported reflect the clustered sample design using
the Taylor series approximation. As in other tables, the divisions for low and high
numeracy are presented along with that of the total sample.
All of the coefficients are significant, and all coefficients are in the expected
direction, with increases in the scale being associated with increases in the three
dependent variables. That is, increases in both the active-collaborative learning scale and
student-faculty interaction scale, regardless of scale type (vague or numeric), leads to
increases in the predicted grades, satisfaction with college experience and the stated
preference for the same college.

129
Table 2.26
Scale Coefficients and Odds Ratios of ACLS on Grades
Low Numeracy
(n = 2133)

High Numeracy
(n = 1915)

Total Sample
(n = 9119)

Coefficient

Odds Ratio

Coefficient

Odds Ratio

Coefficient

Odds Ratio

ACLS - Vague

0.085*
(0.011)

1.089

0.064*
(0.017)

1.066

0.087*
(0.007)

1.091

ACLS – Numeric

0.045*
(0.011)

1.045

0.026*
(0.016)

1.026

0.037*
(0.006)

1.038

*p < 0.05

Table 2.27
Scale Coefficients and Odds Ratios of ACLS on College Experience Rating
Low Numeracy
(n = 2136)

High Numeracy
(n = 1915)

Total Sample
(n = 9124)

Coefficient

Odds Ratio

Coefficient

Odds Ratio

Coefficient

Odds Ratio

ACLS - Vague

0.148*
(0.013)

1.159

0.167*
(0.014)

1.181

0.151*
(0.006)

1.163

ACLS – Numeric

0.073*
(0.010)

1.075

0.072*
(0.013)

1.074

0.078*
(0.007)

1.081

*p < 0.05
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Table 2.28
Scale Coefficients and Odds Ratios of ACLS on Same College Preference
Low Numeracy
(n = 2136)

High Numeracy
(n = 1914)

Total Sample
(n = 9123)

Coefficient

Odds Ratio

Coefficient

Odds Ratio

Coefficient

Odds Ratio

ACLS - Vague

0.107*
(0.011)

1.113

0.121*
(0.014)

1.129

0.103*
(0.007)

1.109

ACLS – Numeric

0.071*
(0.012)

1.073

0.072*
(0.014)

1.017

0.060*
(0.007)

1.061

*p < 0.05

Table 2.29
Scale Coefficients and Odds Ratios of SFIS on Grades
Low Numeracy
(n = 2199)

High Numeracy
(n = 1986)

Total Sample
(n = 9439)

Coefficient

Odds Ratio

Coefficient

Odds Ratio

Coefficient

Odds Ratio

SFIS - Vague

0.079*
(0.011)

1.082

0.077*
(0.014)

1.080

0.077*
(0.006)

1.080

SFIS – Numeric

0.064*
(0.014)

1.066

0.039*
(0.013)

1.040

0.041*
(0.006)

1.042

*p < 0.05
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Table 2.30
Scale Coefficients and Odds Ratios of SFIS on College Experience Rating
Low Numeracy
(n = 2203)

High Numeracy
(n = 1987)

Total Sample
(n = 9474)

Coefficient

Odds Ratio

Coefficient

Odds Ratio

Coefficient

Odds Ratio

SFIS - Vague

0.173*
(0.014)

1.189

0.216*
(0.014)

1.241

0.186*
(0.008)

1.224

SFIS – Numeric

0.081*
(0.017)

1.085

0.078*
(0.018)

1.081

0.075*
(0.007)

1.094

*p < 0.05

Table 2.31
Scale Coefficients and Odds Ratios of SFIS on Same College Preference
Low Numeracy
(n = 2203)

High Numeracy
(n = 1986)

Total Sample
(n = 9474)

Coefficient

Odds Ratio

Coefficient

Odds Ratio

Coefficient

Odds Ratio

SFIS - Vague

0.114*
(0.014)

1.121

0.158*
(0.013)

1.171

0.131*
(0.008)

1.158

SFIS – Numeric

0.079*
(0.015)

1.082

0.082*
(0.018)

1.086

0.087*
(0.009)

1.091

*p < 0.05

In addition, all of the coefficients and odds ratios are larger for the vague
quantifier versions of the scales than the numeric versions in every comparison. The
larger estimates are also reflected in larger standardized coefficients (not shown) for the
vague quantifier version of the scales in every comparison. Taken together, this
difference in effect size suggests that changes along the vague quantifier scales have
more influence in the predicted outcomes of grades, satisfaction with college experience,
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and the stated preference for the same college than do numeric versions of the same
scales. This finding further supports the position that vague quantifiers display higher
levels of predictive validity than numeric responses. However, there are no discernible
differences across division in the sample suggestive of differential effects of numeracy.
Discussions and conclusions
This study examined vague quantifier and numeric open-ended responses in terms
of the logical consistency between the two responses and in terms of the comparative
predictive validity of the two measures. Overall, the results show that respondents were
logically consistent between vague quantifier and numeric open ended responses. Values
for numeric responses increased along increases in the vague quantifier scale, with each
scale point producing statistically significant larger numeric translations.
Further, although none of the means for “never” on the vague quantifier scale
equaled zero, the plurality (and frequently majority) of respondents translated “never” to
mean zero in every case as well, further indicating strong logical consistency, being
consistent semantically as well as in ordering. There were no important differences
between numeracy divisions, suggesting that in this case, numeracy did not have an
impact on logical consistency.
This study also examined the comparative predictive validity, which is important
in determining which measure has better measurement properties (Chang and Krosnick
2003). No study to date has examined the comparative predictive validity of these two
types of measures for frequency estimation. The closest to examining this was Lu et al
(2008) which compared vague quantifier and numeric scales, finding little differences
between the two. Unlike that study, this research finds significant differences between
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response formats. Specifically, scales using vague quantifier responses displayed higher
levels of predictive validity than those using numeric open ended responses.
This higher level of predictive validity held regardless of which scale was being
inspected (i.e. active-collaborative learning scale or student-faculty interaction scale). It
also did not matter which outcome variable (i.e. grades, satisfaction with college
experience, stated preference to for the same college) these scales were correlated with or
predicting. Numeracy level also had no impact; for both low and high numeracy
divisions, vague quantifier versions of the scales also performed better in every instance.
Again, this suggests, that at least in this sample, numeracy does not impact whether
vague quantifier or numeric responses perform better in terms of predictive validity. For
all divisions of the sample, it appears that vague quantifiers have better measurement
properties.
As indicated by the findings of no differences between levels of numeracy,
several of the hypotheses were not confirmed. Specifically those hypotheses regarding
differential effects for logical consistency and predictive validity across numeracy levels
were not supported. However, the most important hypothesis overall was supported.
Using different measures, such as correlations and regressions, the results suggest that the
vague quantifier measure outperforms numeric open ended measures in terms of
predictive validity for frequency estimation (Hypotheses 1 and 1a). The higher predictive
validity is also indicative of potentially lower measurement error for the vague quantifier
scale. Also, there was the expected logical consistency between vague quantifiers and the
direct numeric translations (Hypothesis 2). Based on these results, it is suggested that
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greater use of vague quantifiers are used in frequency estimation surveys, especially if the
goal is to increase the predictive validity of responses.
Another important finding of this study, although not necessarily related to the
use of vague quantifier of numeric responses, is the clustering effects found. There were
generally large clustering effects (design effects) found for all of the twenty-seven
questions of main interest used in this study. Overall, the mean design effect approached
4 (mean = 3.888), indicating a near four-fold increase in variance due to clustering
compared to the usual simple random sampling assumptions. To find clustering was
somewhat unexpected, for several reasons. First, the data received is a 20 percent random
subsample of the entire data set, which was expected to reduce any observed clustering.
Second, a university is not necessarily a homogenous place. Although it may be more
homogenous than an entire city, it is generally expected that there is diversity in many
colleges, which should limit the possible clustering.
Finally, and most unexpectedly, is that the survey is conducted via the web.
Although clustering effects can occur in web surveys, clustering effects are most
frequently thought of occurring in face to face surveys (Lohr 2010). The expectation for
greater clustering in face to face surveys is in part due to the effect of the interviewer,
which is absent in web surveys. The finding of this study of large design effects in a web
survey indicates the importance of examining for possible clustering in surveys
regardless of the mode used or the presence or absence of interviewers. This finding also
suggests that other analyses that have used the NSSE data that have not used analyses to
account for clustering may have found results that are not actually supported by the data,
if correct analyses were employed.
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Although this study took appropriate steps to estimate variances correctly, there
are some possible limitations to this research. First is the measure used for numeracy,
SAT Math scores. This measure had a large number of missing cases, dropping the
overall number of respondents by more than half when examining numeracy. Further, it
may be that SAT Math scores are not reflective of numeracy in a direct way. Different
divisions of SAT Math scores into various levels of numeracy did not alter results, which
eventually led to the simple two divisions used in the current study. In all division of the
sample (two, three, or four ways) the results were the same: there were no substantive
differences between levels of numeracy in regards to logical consistency or predictive
validity. Although this may be due to a real lack of differential effect of numeracy, an
alternative explanation could be that the lack of differences is because SAT Math scores
are not directly reflective of numeracy.
Another limitation is the use of Fisher’s z-score transformation to test for
statistical differences for correlations. As noted, special techniques are needed to
correctly estimate variances for point estimates for use in hypothesis testing when using
clustered data. However, at the moment, it is not clear how to transform correlations to zscores to test for differences taking into account clustered data. Therefore, the choices
were to not use any hypothesis tests or use one with some limitation. The latter was
selected as an attempt to examine differences statistically with the acknowledgement of
the limitation.
A final limitation worth noting is the limited population examined in this study.
All respondents were college students, meaning that, for the most part, the respondents
were of a certain age range. The use of this population limits the potential generalizability
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somewhat. It may be that college respondents are different than the remainder of the
population in key regards in use of numeric and vague quantifier responses. For example,
the higher level of education compared to other portions of the population may lead to
increased logical consistency. It may also be that college students, for whatever reason,
are more likely to think in terms of vague quantifiers than others in the population. Even
if this is unlikely, it is impossible to tell given this dataset.
Further research on this topic is warranted. First, steps should be taken to
overcome the limitations discussed above. Better measures of numeracy could be used to
examine differences (see Study 1). A method to transform correlations to z-scores taking
into account the complex survey design should be studied. Finally, this type study could
be conducted on a larger cross-section of the population to increase generalizability and
examine potentially important differences in the population, such as age differences (see
Study 3).
In addition to these three, further research could focus on other areas. Besides
predictive validity, other aspects of the measurement properties could be examined, such
as accuracy (e.g. Study 1). Although different studies have examined these various
aspects of measurement properties and measurement error, it is possible to examine them
all in one study in a unified manner. Current limitations in data do not allow for
examination of all measurement properties at once, and further data collection may create
a study so this is possible. Additionally, this study only examined the predictive validity
in the domain of frequency estimation. It is possible that there are different response
option effects when examining different topic areas, such as subjective probabilities (see
Study 3).
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Finally it may be worthwhile to examine mode differences in regards to logical
consistency and predictive validity. This survey was conducted on the web, but different
responses may occur in different modes. Although it is not clear that this would be the
case, it may be worth examining. Related to the possible difference in response across
modes, more studies should examine the possible clustering that may occur in web (or
mail) surveys, and when this clustering may occur. For example, it may only occur with
specialized samples conducted within institutions, such as was the case with the current
survey. However, as of now, this appears to be an open question.
Study 3
Data and Methods
Data for the third study, regarding measurement of subjective probabilities, comes
from the Annenberg Perceptions of Tobacco Risk 2 surveys. The Annenberg Perceptions
of Tobacco Risk 2 surveys were conducted in the fall of 1999 and winter of 2000 using
two national samples in the United States selected through random digit dialing (RDD).
The first sample consisted of youths ages 14 – 22, with the second consisting of adults
ages 23 and older. After households were selected at random, a screener at initial contact
ascertained if at least one household member fell in the age range for the active sample.
Parental notification and acceptance were required for minor respondents under the age
of 16. The survey instruments were nearly identical for each sample; the differences
between the surveys consisted of a few additional questions for minors not relevant for
the adult sample (e.g. “Do you live with your parents?”). The final sample size for the
youth sample is 2002, while the sample size for adults is 1504 (for a combined sample
size of 3506). The response rate is reported to be 51% (Jamieson and Romer 2001).
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Several questions were asked regarding the perceived risk of smoking. These
questions were asked near the beginning of the survey, following short sections on
demographic information, a think aloud item about smoking and health, and questions
about smoking history. Respondents were then asked a quantitative risk assessment in the
standard format: “Now I would like you to imagine 100 cigarette smokers, both men and
women, who smoked cigarettes for their entire adult lives. How many of these 100 people
do you think will die from lung cancer?” (A complete list of questions used in for this
study can be found in Appendix 5). Although this question asks about how many will die
from lung cancer as opposed to how many will develop lung cancer, findings suggest
respondents perceive that developing lung cancer is nearly synonymous to dying (Viscusi
2002). That is, there is not a fine discrimination by respondents between asking about
“die from lung cancer” and “get lung cancer”. This is supported by the fact that the fiveyear survival rate for lung cancer is only 15% (Jemal et al. 2009). This measure is
considered the absolute risk measure for smokers.
This question was followed by a similar one except instead of asking about
smokers, it queried about non-smokers. Responses were for how many non-smokers out
of 100 would die from lung cancer. This item is the absolute measure for non-smokers.
This question is structured in the same manner as the standard subjective probability
question on smoking risk, and therefore likely activates similar cognitive processes.
Further, this question allows for computation of the risk difference and the relative risk
estimates. Asking the respondent for the risk difference or relative risk between smokers
and non-smokers directly would likely be too cognitively difficult (Krosnick 2001).
Decomposing the question allows for more cognitively simple tasks in each question
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which can be combined later to obtain the desired measures. This method has been found
effective in previous research (Krosnick 2001).
The risk difference measure used is calculated as the difference between the
absolute risk measure for smokers and the absolute risk measure for non-smokers. The
relative risk measure is estimated by dividing the absolute risk measure of smokers by the
absolute risk measure for non-smokers. A problem that arises is for those respondents
that respond with a zero to the absolute risk measure for non-smokers. To overcome the
potential for a zero in the denominator of the estimate a small amount is added (0.5) to
these responses to allow for estimable relative risks, consistent with practices in similar
research (Krosnick 2001).
The question asking for perceived risk of smoking using a vague quantifier
response scale followed shortly after the numeric scale questions. This question was
phrased as follows: “In your opinion, would smoking everyday be very risky for your
health, somewhat risky, a little risky or not at all risky for your health?” Unlike Studies 1
and 2, there was not a direct numeric translation of the vague quantifier question. As
such, it may be that there will be less logical consistency between the two measures than
was observed in those studies. This expectation is due to the fact that since respondents
were not directly asked to translate the vague quantity, the link between the two is not
explicit, and therefore consistency may not materialize in a manner similar to prior
studies. Since the respondent was not asked about and did not have to think about what
the vague quantity meant in numeric terms, consistency may be lessened.
However, the central research question is which of the above four measures
capture perceived risk best: absolute risk to smokers, risk difference between smokers
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and non-smokers, relative risk between smokers and non-smokers, or risk on a vague
quantifier scale. Therefore, techniques for examining the measurement properties and
potential validity of these questions are employed. Since the concern is relative
performance in measuring risk perceptions and the ability of these measures to predict
outcome behaviors (i.e., smoking), the goal is not to necessarily ascertain whether
smoking risks are over- or underestimated or the causes of risk perception. Previous
research has indicated that youth and adults may perceive risk differently, with youth
seeing risk more objectively and adults in a vaguer, intuitive sense (Reyna and Farley
2006). However, adults can be expected to have greater numeric ability compared to
youths. As such, analyses examine not only the combined data but also the data for the
adult and youth samples separately. In addition, as a proxy for numeracy, level of
education is used, which is a variable collected in the survey. Although education may
not be a direct measure of numeracy such as numeracy tests or standardized tests scores
in mathematics, education is related to numeracy, with lower levels of education related
to lower levels of numeracy (Galesic and Garcia-Retamero 2010). Given the lack of other
measures of numeracy, education appears to be the most appropriate proxy measure. As
in Galesic and Garcia-Retamero (2010), high education is defined as having at least some
college education, with low education being defined as having a high school degree or
less education.
The theoretically related variable of interest for use in assessing predictive
validity is smoking status, that is, whether the respondent is a smoker or non-smoker.
Being a smoker is defined as those responding that they smoked one or more cigarettes
per day, otherwise respondents are defined as non-smokers. Generally, risk beliefs should
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be related to risk behaviors (Slovic 1987, Diefenbach et al. 1993). Those with higher
levels of risk perceived are generally less likely to partake in that behavior. Regarding
smoking risk perceptions specifically, other research has related numeric measures of
perceived risk to smoking status (Viscusi 1990, 2002, Krosnick 2002). Like other risk
research, the findings suggest that higher levels of perceived risks of smoking are related
to lower smoking incidence.
Hypotheses
Given that Studies 2 and 3 both are similar, with Study 2 examining frequency
estimation and Study 3 examining subjective probabilities, hypotheses 1 through 4 are the
same for both, with the remaining hypotheses being study specific.
H1:

In general, vague quantifiers will show higher levels of predictive validity with
theoretically related variables compared to numeric open ended responses.

H1a:

There will be higher correlations and better model fit for when using variables
measured by vague quantifiers compared to numeric open ended responses.

H2:

When there is an indirect numeric translation of vague quantifiers, there should not
be a logical consistency between numeric and vague quantifier measures.

H3:

In general, more numerate individuals will provide responses showing greater
predictive validity.

H4:

More numerate individuals will show greater logical consistency in numeric open
ended and vague quantifier responses than less numerate individuals.

H5:

Younger respondents will show lower levels of predictive validity than adults.

H6:

Younger respondents will show lower levels of logical consistency than adults.
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H7:

More educated (numerate) individuals will show greater predictive validity using
numeric open ended responses than less numerate individuals.

H8:

However, more educated (numerate) individuals will not show greater predictive
validity using numeric open ended responses than when using vague quantifiers.

H9:

Younger respondents will show higher levels of predictive validity when
responding with numeric open ended responses than adults using numeric open
ended responses.

H10:

Younger respondents will show higher levels of predictive validity when
responding with numeric open ended responses than when responding with vague
quantifier responses.

Results
Measures of Risk
The estimates of central tendency for the risk measures for the adult, youth, and
combined samples are included in Table 3.1. The means and standard errors are presented
for the numeric measures and the proportion of those saying that smoking everyday
would be “very risky” on the vague quantifier scale. The means for the three of the
numeric risk estimates of absolute risk to smokers, risk difference, and relative risk, if
taken at face value, indicate overestimation of risk. Like previous findings, for all
samples, the perceived absolute risk of smoking is significantly larger than the actual risk
of 6 - 13 in 100 (Viscusi 2002; Viscusi and Hakes 2008). Using this same criterion, the
risk difference also suggests overestimation of the risks of smoking, although for youths
the mean difference is significantly greater than for adults, and significantly greater for
lower educated than higher educated. According to data from the 1989 United States’
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Surgeon General’s report on smoking and health, the actual relative risk of smokers to
non-smokers for lung cancer is about 13:1 (Krosnick 2001). The relative risk mean for
adults is nearly exactly this estimate, with higher educated having close to this estimate.
For the youths and those with lower education, however, the relative risk is
overestimated.10 This overestimation inflates the mean of the combined sample. The
means of the absolute risk of lung cancer for non-smokers is actually the most
overestimated (relatively), as the lung cancer death rate in non-smokers is less than 0.02
per 100 (Thun et al. 2006). The proportion saying that smoking is “very risky” is quite
high for all samples, with over 80% of the samples responding this way. This response,
too, suggests that perceived risk in smoking is great.
Table 3.1
Risk Measure Tendencies
Absolute Risk
(Smokers)

Absolute Risk
(Non-smokers)

Risk
Difference

Relative Risk

Saying
“Very Risky”

Youth (14-22)
(s.e.)

60.39
(0.56)

13.45
(0.40)

46.84
(0.64)

30.43
(1.21)

0.81

Adult (23+)
(s.e.)

48.47
(0.73)

15.18
(0.43)

33.21
(0.72)

13.10
(0.86)

0.83

Low Educ.
(s.e.)

58.19
(0.59)

14.59
(0.41)

43.50
(0.66)

28.89
(1.19)

0.82

High Educ.
(s.e.)

51.09
(0.72)

13.51
(0.41)

37.56
(0.71)

14.32
(0.89)

0.82

Combined
(s.e.)

55.42
(0.46)

14.17
(0.29)

41.19
(0.49)

23.25
(0.81)

0.82

10

Relative risk estimates are larger than would seem by the means for absolute risk to smokers and
nonsmokers due to the large skew in the data, with a large number of respondents who gave zero to
absolute risk to nonsmokers also giving large estimates to absolute risks to smokers. For example, for the
total sample, 446 respondents gave zero responses to the absolute risk to nonsmokers question, but had a
mean of 63.41 for absolute risk to smokers.
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Logical Consistency
To ascertain the relationship between the vague quantifiers and the numeric
values, means were calculated for each of the numeric risk values at each level of the
vague quantifier scale. Assuming that the vague quantifier and the numeric risk estimates
are measuring the same construct, there should be a level of concordance between them.
Table 3.2 presents the means for the standard absolute risk to smokers measure at each
level of the responses to the vague quantifier scale for each of the samples.11 Absolute
risk for smokers is the numeric measure most often used in risk perception studies, so this
is the comparison of central concern. This analysis is similar to research attempting to
identify the numeric values of vague quantifiers (Budescu and Wallsten 1985, Clarke et
al. 1992, Lichtenstein and Newman 1967). However, unlike those studies, there was not
an explicit request for a numerical translation of the vague quantifier selected by the
respondent. As expected, the highest means for all samples are among those saying
smoking is “very risky”. All means are significantly greater than those at each of the next
two levels down the scale at the p<.05 level. However, among adults and across both
education levels, the mean for those saying smoking is “very risky” is not significantly
different from those saying smoking is “not at all risky”. Further, for adults, the cell mean
for “not at all risky” is significantly larger than those giving either of the next two higher
risk responses on the quantifier scale. For those with higher education, the cell mean for

11

Since means are based on cases where both measures are not missing, the total means are based on
somewhat smaller numbers than those in Table 1, resulting in minor differences in means across
tables.
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“not at all risky” is significantly larger than the mean for those saying “a little risky” and
not significantly different from those “somewhat risky”. Finally, for both the youth and
lower educated, as well as the combined sample, the cell means of the lower three
responses on the scale are not significantly different from one another in any instance. As
an additional test, in order to ensure that small cell size did not affect results, the final
two categories of the vague quantifier scale were combined and all analyses conducted on
the full scale were also conducted on the collapsed scale. No substantive findings
changed by using the collapsed scale.

Table 3.2
Absolute Risk Means by Vague Quantifier Response
Vague
Quantifier
Response

Youth
(14-22)

Adult
(23+)

Low Educ.

High Educ.

Combined

Very Risky

61.86a
(n = 1637)

51.52a
(n = 1153)

60.38a
(n = 1662)

53.29a
(n = 1093)

57.58a
(n = 2790)

Somewhat
Risky

54.42b
(n = 252)

35.00b
(n = 194)

48.46b
(n = 260)

42.19b
(n = 182)

45.97b
(n = 446)

A Little Risky

49.81b
(n = 59)

28.24b
(n = 45)

45.22b
(n = 76)

26.78c
(n = 27)

40.48b
(n = 104)

Not At All
Risky

52.08b
(n = 26)

42.79a
(n = 19)

53.00a,b
(n = 28)

42.69a, b
(n = 16)

48.16b
(n = 45)

60.42
(n = 1974)

48.39
(n = 1411)

58.19
(n = 2042)

51.09
(n = 1318)

55.41
(n = 3385)

Total

Means are estimated lung cancer fatalities out of 100 smokers. Different superscript letters indicate
significant differences of means within columns at p<0.05 level.

In all samples, it appears that a large inconsistency occurs among those saying
that smoking is “not at all risky”. For the first three points on the scale, there appears to
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be a decreasing estimate of absolute risk, even if this decrease is not significant. At the
last response level, however, the mean increases for every division of the sample. This is
at least partly due to the small number of people selecting this response on the vague
quantifier scale. Smaller number of responses for the middle two categories (“somewhat
risky” and “a little risky”) may also help explain the lack of significant differences
between them, as the absolute risk measure displays high levels of variance. Still, there is
a significant decline between the middle two categories for those with higher education.
Similar patterns of linear decline in the means of the risk difference and relative risk was
found across the first three response categories of the vague quantifier scale, with the last
response option showing higher means (not shown).
These patterns of the means of the absolute risk measure across the responses to
the vague quantifier scale lack the consistency desired to suggest that both are measuring
risk perceptions in an equivalent manner. First, as indicated, the means do not always
fluctuate in the expected manner. Further, and of potentially more importance, is that if
one accepted the numeric values as accurate, then at all response levels, the risk of
smoking is greatly overestimated. Those saying that smoking is only “a little risky” or
“not at all risky” still vastly overestimate the risks, as do people saying smoking is “very
risky”. Semantically, this does not seem consistent. To say smoking is only “a little
risky” or “not at all risky”, and that the risk is numerically similar to those saying “very
risky”, with all having vast numeric overestimates of risk suggests problems in
understanding of the scales. This inconsistency occurs across all sample divisions,
suggesting that all respondents have difficulty with one or both of the response options.
Given the lack of numeracy among the general population (e.g. Peters et al. 2007) and the
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wide use and expressed preference for responding with vague quantifiers, it seems
possible the absolute risk measure is problematic.
To that end, it is important to examine the pattern for those with lower and higher
levels of education, which are proxies for numeracy. Of all the sample divisions, only the
division of higher educated respondents show statistically significant declines over the
first three response options, with other divisions showing no difference between the
middle response options. This finding suggests that, at least in some small way, increased
numeracy does increase the logical consistency between vague quantifier and numeric
absolute risk measures. However, it should be noted that as with other divisions in the
sample, the cell mean for final response option for “not at all risky” is not significantly
different or greater than other response options indicating greater risk. Additionally, as
with all other divisions of the sample, higher educated respondents also give absolute risk
estimates suggesting vast overestimation of the risk at all levels of response on the vague
quantifier scale, further indicating discordance in responses.
Based on Table 3.1, the above results indicate that overall there appears to be a
logical discordance between vague quantifier and absolute risk responses. The fact that
there is discordance between the two suggest support for Hypothesis 2, stating that there
should be discordance when the translation from vague quantifiers to numeric responses
is not done directly. However, this discordance may also be due to the way the questions
were also asked. The numeric question asked about anyone’s risk for lung cancer,
whereas the vague quantifier scale asked about health risk to oneself. Hence, not only
were the apparent objectives of the questions different with regard to the persons who are
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susceptible to risks, but also with regard to whether risk is targeted to a specific health
condition or to health more broadly.
Not all of the hypotheses regarding logical discordance between vague quantifier
and numeric absolute risk measures are supported, however. Given the pattern of cell
means, lower and higher educated respondents show similar problems. For both, the cell
mean for final response option for “not at all risky” is significantly not different or
greater than other response options indicating greater risk. Further, both sets of
respondents also give absolute risk estimates suggesting vast overestimation of the risk at
all levels of response on the vague quantifier scale, further indicating discordance in
responses. However, higher educated respondents did show significant declines over the
first three response options, with lower educated showing no difference between the
middle response options. This suggests partial support for Hypothesis 4, as more
educated respondents may be showing some level of greater concordance in responses
than lower educated, but overall, there is still a high level of discordance even for higher
educated respondents.
Finally, there is little support for Hypothesis 6. Both youth and adult samples
show a similar pattern. The only difference is that, among adults, those saying “not at all
risky” are significantly greater than the middle response but not different from the “very
risky” response. Conversely, for youth, the last response is not statistically different from
the middle responses and is significantly smaller than the “very risky” response. Further,
adults give smaller absolute risk estimates at each level of the vague quantifier response
than youth, but both still show levels of overestimation at each level of response. Given
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the similar pattern and overall level of discordance in both youth and adults, it is not
possible to say that either show less logical discordance than the other.
Predictive Validity
Past research suggests that the efficacy of these measures is indicated by the
relationship to an outcome behavior of interest (Diefenbach, Weinstein, and O’Reilly
1993; Windschitl and Wells 1996). In this case the behavioral outcome of interest is
smoking, with higher risk perceptions observed with lower incidence of smoking.
Smoking is defined in the current context as those respondents saying they smoke at least
one cigarette a day. Using this definition, the proportion of smokers in the youth sample
is 0.191 and 0.184 in the adult sample. For the low education division, the proportion of
smokers is 0.199 and for the high education division it is 0.171. Overall, for the full
sample the proportion of daily smokers is 0.188. In order to further assess the utility of
these varying numeric (measured on the 0-100 open format) and vague quantifier
(measured on a 1-4 ordinal scale) measures, each measure was correlated with smoking
status, dichotomized as smoker/non-smoker (smoker = 1). Point bi-serial correlations
were estimated using the numeric risk estimates and a rank bi-serial correlation was
estimated between the vague quantifier scale and smoking status. Correlations were
transformed to their Fisher Z-scores in order to test for significant differences. Results are
presented in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3
Correlation of Risk Measures with Smoking Status
Youth
(14-22)

Adult
(23+)

Low Educ.

High Educ.

Combined

Absolute Risk

-0.08a

-0.17a

-0.15a

-0.08a

-0.12a

Risk
Difference

-0.09a

-0.22a

-0.15a

-0.11b

-0.14a

Relative Risk

-0.08a

-0.04#,b

-0.10a

0.004#,a

-0.07b

Vague
Quantifier

-0.19b

-0.35c

-0.21b

-0.23c

-0.27c

Different superscripts indicate significant differences of correlations within columns at p<0.05 level.
#indicates correlation not significantly different from zero at p<0.05 level

Nearly all correlations are in the expected direction, with higher scores on a
measure related to lower smoking incidence. The one exception is for the correlation of
smoking status and relative risk in the higher educated sample, and this is not
significantly different from zero. Overall, the adult sample’s correlations between the risk
measures and smoking status are higher than for the youths. Only the relative risk
measure in the adult sample has a correlation with smoking status not significantly
different from zero. Similarly, the correlations tend to be somewhat higher for low
education than for high education, excepting the correlation with the vague quantifier
measure. Importantly, although all the measures generally show a relationship to the
behavior of interest, the relationship is significantly stronger for the vague quantifier
scale in every division of the sample. This finding is consistent with prior research
(Windschitl and Wells 1996). This consistency with previous studies further indicates
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that the vague quantifier scale may have better predictive validity and preferred in
measuring smoking risk perceptions.
The findings in Table 3.3 provide support for some of the proposed hypotheses
and against others. First, the data provide strong support for Hypotheses 1 and 1a. The
correlations for all divisions of the sample are stronger for vague quantifier measures
than for any of the numeric measures. These stronger correlations suggests greater
predictive validity for vague quantifier measures compared to numeric open ended
responses. However, Hypothesis 3 is not supported. Contrary to the expectation, the more
numerate sample did not show higher levels of predictive validity. Rather, those in the
higher educated sample tended to have smaller correlations with smoking status than did
those in the lower education division. Still, only one of the differences is statistically
significant, with the correlation between smoking and the relative risk measure
significantly greater in the lower educated sample (p<0.05). Regardless, the pattern is
contrary to Hypothesis 3.
Similarly, Hypothesis 7 is not supported. More educated respondents did not
show higher levels of predictive validity when using numeric measures than less
numerate individuals. In fact, the trend tends to be somewhat opposite this expectation, as
noted above. Hypothesis 8 is supported based on the data in Table 3.3, however. More
numerate individuals did not show higher correlations (predictive validity) using numeric
measures than vague quantifiers. Like all other divisions, more educated respondents
showed higher correlations using vague quantifier measures compared to numeric open
ended measures.
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Hypothesis 5 is also generally supported by the correlations in Table 3.3. Younger
respondents did provide lower correlations in all instances, except between smoking and
the relative risk measure. For this correlation with relative risk, the difference between
youth and adult samples was not significant (p = 0.20). For the remaining correlations, all
of the correlations were larger for the adult sample than the youth sample at the p<.05
level. These findings all suggest greater predictive validity generally among the adult
sample compared to the youth sample.
The remaining hypotheses concerning the predictive validity in the youth and
adults samples are not supported. The youth sample did not display higher correlations
than adults when responding using numeric open ended measures (Hypothesis 9), as
might be expected by the argument by Reyna and Farley (2006) that youths perceive risk
in terms of the objective measures as opposed to adults, who are argued to see risks in a
vague, fuzzy gist manner. Rather, higher correlations were generally found for the
numeric measures in the adult sample, with two of the three larger at statistically
significant levels. The lone remaining measure, for relative risk, was not significantly
different in the two samples. Finally, Hypothesis 10 is not supported. Contrary to this
hypothesis, the youth sample, like all other divisions, had higher correlations for the
vague quantifier measure than for the other numeric measures.
As another test to further gauge the predictive validity of the various risk
perception measures, logistic regressions were conducted predicting smoking status,
including several important control variables. Since the purpose is to compare models to
ascertain which risk perception measure is best in modelling smoking behavior in order
to further assess the predictive validities, not all possible control variables predicting
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smoking are required. The variables used are race, age, and education. Specifically, white
respondents were compared to all others, as whites have been found to hold distinctive
perceptions of risks compared to other races (Finucane et al. 2000). Education was
measured as six increasing categories of educational achievement, beginning with eighthgrade education and ending with completion of a college degree or higher. For
comparisons across low and high educated samples, only race and age are used as control
variables, as it does not make sense to include an education variable.
Since the purpose is to identify which measure of risk perception increases model
fit and predictive capability, separate models for each of the risk measures are compared
using the criterion of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC) (Agresti 2002). Since the AIC and BIC are influenced by the sample size,
all models are restricted to include only cases where data is available for all risk measures
to increase comparability. In addition, the AIC and BIC both penalize for model
complexity, as more included variables increase AIC and BIC values. Given the skewed
nature of the vague quantifier scale, indicators were created for each of the response
options, leaving the indicator for “not at all risky” out of the model as the baseline
category. By including dichotomous indicators for three of the response categories on the
vague quantifier scale, there are two more parameters in the vague quantifier scale
models than those models with numeric measures, giving a slight initial edge to the
numeric risk perception models in terms of calculation of the AIC and BIC. Lower AIC
and BIC are considered to be better model fits. As an additional indicator for model fit,
the area under the Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curve, a measure of diagnostic
accuracy, was estimated. Higher ROC is indicative of better model fit. A base model was
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also estimated, which includes only the demographic variables to show improvement
based on the measures of risk perception. The AIC, BIC, and area under the ROC curve
are presented in Tables 3.4-3.6.

Table 3.4
Logistic Regression Models Fit Indicators by Age
Youth (n = 1923)

AIC

BIC

Base

1666.81

1689.05

Absolute Risk

1662.76

Risk Difference

Adult (n = 1366)

Area Under ROC
Curve (s.e.)

Area Under ROC
Curve (s.e.)

AIC

BIC

0.726
(0.015)

1274.93

1220.24

0.683
(0.019)

1690.57

0.728
(0.015)

1149.26

1175.36

0.725
(0.018)

1660.88

1688.69

0.729
(0.015)

1135.63

1161.73

0.739
(0.018)

Relative Risk

1666.48

1694.29

0.728
(0.015)

1197.46

1223.56

0.686
(0.019)

Vague Quantifier

1615.92

1654.86

0.756
(0.014)

1102.02

1138.56

0.758
(0.017)

155
Table 3.5
Logistic Regression Models Fit Indicators by Education (Numeracy)
Low Educ. (n = 1994)

AIC

BIC

Base

1938.14

1954.93

Absolute Risk

1902.53

Risk Difference

Area Under ROC
Curve (s.e.)

High Educ. (n = 1295)
Area Under ROC
Curve (s.e.)

AIC

BIC

0.644
(0.016)

1130.10

1145.60

0.614
(0.020)

1924.92

0.630
(0.016)

1118.30

1138.96

0.633
(0.020)

1892.53

1914.92

0.665
(0.016)

1106.60

1127.26

0.650
(0.020)

Relative Risk

1923.12

1945.51

0.623
(0.015)

1132.01

1152.67

0.616
(0.020)

Vague Quantifier

1831.53

1865.11

0.704
(0.015)

1073.31

1104.30

0.694
(0.020)

Table 3.6
Logistic Regression Models Fit Indicators by Total Sample
Combined Total (n = 3289)
AIC

BIC

Area Under ROC Curve (s.e.)

Base

3092.64

3117.03

0.548
(0.012)

Absolute Risk

3042.95

3073.44

0.623
(0.012)

Risk Difference

3017.10

3047.60

0.644
(0.012)

Relative Risk

3078.75

3109.24

0.586
(0.012)

Vague Quantifier

2922.50

2965.19

0.657
(0.013)
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The results are consistent and clear across all samples. By all criteria, the models
using the vague quantifier scale fit better than those using numeric risk estimates. Even
with the penalty for the additional parameters, the AIC and BIC are smallest for models
using the vague quantifier scale. Further, although the area under the ROC curves for the
various models are similar, it is always greatest for the model using the vague quantifier
scale. This confirms the findings from the correlation analysis while including controls
related to risk perception. For almost all samples, relative risk performed worst on all
criteria, with higher BIC than the base model in adult and youth samples, as well for the
higher educated sample. Risk difference performed slightly better than did the absolute
risk measure, especially in the youth sample, where the BIC for the absolute risk model is
larger than the base model. It appears that while the standard measure of absolute risk is
related to smoking status, the vague quantifier and risk difference measures model the
smoking decision better.
These results also provide additional evidence regarding the hypotheses about
predictive validity in combination with the correlation results. Again, most clearly,
Hypotheses 1 and 1a are supported by the results of the logistic regression models, with
all model diagnostics suggesting greater predictive validity for the vague quantifier
measure compared to all of the numeric open ended response formats, regardless of the
sample division. Based on the AIC, BIC, and ROC, it is also clear that Hypothesis 8 is
supported, as numeric measures did not display more predictive validity than the vague
quantifier measure for more educated respondents. Further, Hypothesis 10 is not
supported based on all of the model diagnostics. Like all other sample divisions, youth
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responses using the vague quantifier scale shows higher predictive validity compared to
numeric measures, contrary to expectations. These findings all conform to the findings of
the correlation analyses presented above.
For hypotheses comparing differences across samples, it is not possible to use the
AIC and BIC as these assume that the models all come from the exact same sample for
comparative usage. However, the ROC does provide some evidence in regards to these
hypotheses. There is little support for Hypothesis 3, as the area under the ROC is not
consistently greater for low or high educated respondent models, and no difference is
significant at the p<.05 standard. Similarly, Hypothesis 7 is not supported, as the area
under the ROC curve is not always higher for numeric measures among more educated
respondents compared to less educated, and there are no significant differences. In
combination with the results from the correlation analyses, the results suggest little
support for Hypotheses 3 or 7, and more educated (numerate) respondents did not display
higher predictive validity in any of their responses.
There is also little support for Hypothesis 5 based on the ROC from these models.
The ROC is similar between the adult and youth samples, sometimes higher for one,
sometimes for the other, but never significantly different. Still, Hypothesis 5 is supported
based on the findings in Table 3.3, and given the nonsignificant differences in the ROC
analyses for the logistic models, it suggested that there is general support for this
hypothesis. Based on these models, there is some support for Hypothesis 9. For two of
the three numeric measures, youth responses led to models with higher areas under the
ROC curve. However, these differences were not significant, and for the third numeric
measure, risk difference, it was higher for adults. In combination with the lack of support
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in the correlation analyses, it suggests that youth do not give responses with higher
predictive validity using numeric measures than do adults.
The estimated coefficients and odds ratios for the risk measures controlling for
demographics are presented in Tables 3.7-3.9. Among the numeric risk measures, the risk
difference measure produced a greater effect than either than the absolute risk or relative
risk measures (which was also reflected in the standardized coefficients, not shown).
Looking across samples at each measure shows that the youth sample has smaller
estimated coefficients and odds ratios closer to one than the adult sample. This attenuates
the effects found in full sample data, leading to effects in between the youth and adult
samples. For the vague quantifier measure, none of the included category coefficients
included in the youth model are significant. However, chi-square tests for the joint effect
of all three indicators are highly significant in all five samples (for youth,  2  54.65 ,
for adults,  2  104.65 , for lower educated sample,  2  118.07 , for higher educated
sample,  2  66.78 for combined sample,  2  185.90 , all df = 3, p<.0001). This
significance, in addition to the greater fit statistics for this model compared to others,
suggests the efficacy of the vague quantifier scale.
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Table 3.7
Estimated Coefficients of Risk Measures in Logistic Regression Models Predicting
Smoking by Age
Youth (n = 1923)

Adult (n = 1366)

Coefficient

(s.e.)

Odds Ratio

Absolute Risk

-0.006*

(0.002)

0.994

Risk Difference

-0.006

(0.002)

Relative Risk

-0.002

Coefficient

(s.e.)

Odds Ratio

-0.021*

(0.003)

0.980

0.994

-0.025*

(0.003)

0.976

(0.001)

0.998

-0.005

(0.003)

0.995

-0.113

(0.593)

0.893

-1.379*

(0.537)

0.252

Somewhat Risky

1.042

(0.606)

2.835

0.133

(0.551)

1.142

A Little Risky

0.965

(0.661)

2.625

0.955

(0.620)

2.599

Vague Quantifier
Very Risky

*p < 0.05

Table 3.8
Estimated Coefficients of Risk Measures in Logistic Regression Models Predicting
Smoking By Education (Numeracy)
Low Educ. (n = 1994)

High Educ. (n = 1295)

Coefficient

(s.e.)

Odds Ratio

Coefficient

(s.e.)

Odds Ratio

Absolute Risk

-0.012*

(0.002)

0.988

-0.013*

(0.003)

0.987

Risk Difference

-0.013*

(0.002)

0.987

-0.016*

(0.003)

0.984

Relative Risk

-0.005

(0.001)

0.995

-0.001

(0.002)

0.999

-0.216

(0.562)

0.806

-1.493*

(0.543)

0.225

Somewhat Risky

1.108

(0.573)

3.028

-0.209

(0.560)

0.811

A Little Risky

1.386*

(0.609)

3.998

0.329

(0.668)

1.389

Vague Quantifier
Very Risky

*p < 0.05
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Table 3.9
Estimated Coefficients of Risk Measures in Logistic Regression Models Predicting
Smoking By Education (Numeracy)
Combined Total (n = 3289)
Coefficient

(s.e.)

Odds Ratio

Absolute Risk

-0.013*

(0.002)

0.987

Risk Difference

-0.015*

(0.002

0.985

Relative Risk

-0.005*

(0.001)

0.998

-0.749*

(0.371)

0.473

Somewhat Risky

0.614

(0.380)

1.848

A Little Risky

0.962*

(0.420)

2.618

Vague Quantifier
Very Risky

*p < 0.05

Finally, models were tested adding each of the numeric measures of risk
perception to the vague quantifier model (not shown). Although vague quantifiers better
predict smoking status, it may be that numeric risk may still be important in decision
making in addition to that of vaguely quantified risk. Using the AIC and BIC as criteria
for model improvement, adding the numeric measures consistently improved model fit
for absolute and risk difference measures in the adult sample, for risk difference in the
higher educated division, and for all numeric risk measures for the lower educated sample
(not shown). By adding these to the vague quantifier model, both the AIC and BIC
decreased. In these models, the numeric risk estimate is significant and in the expected
direction (greater perceived risk decreasing smoking likelihood), while not changing the
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direction or significance of the other indicators in Table 3.5. These findings suggests the
possible efficacy of asking both numeric and vague quantifier measures for many
respondents, including, contrary to expectation, lower educated samples. Also somewhat
contrary to expectation, for the youth samples, adding any numeric risk measure to the
vague quantifier model led to increases in the AIC and BIC. The lone exception was
when the risk difference measure was added, which decreased the AIC from 1615.92 to
1614.63. The BIC for this model, however, increased from 1654.86 to 1659.12.
Discussion and conclusions
How perceptions are measured is important in risk evaluation and for survey
methodology generally. The differences in potential risk perception measures have been
largely overlooked. One measure is often selected for a survey without tests of
comparative validity. In the case of smoking risk perceptions, research has long been
divided on how well people understand the hazards from smoking. These divisions have
frequently focused on the results of the standard question asking for a numeric estimate
of absolute risk of smoking. However, using national surveys of youths and adults, the
current research shows that the standard question of absolute risk does not perform as
well as other risk measures. Given the potential issues with this question, such as the
numeracy of respondents and individuals’ potentially representing risk in a “fuzzy”
manner (e.g. Reyna 2004), this may not be surprising. Similarly, other numeric measures
did not relate to smoking behavior as well as more qualitative estimates. The means of
these numeric measures of risk did not conform to a pattern expected given the verbal
representations of risk respondents gave in other parts of the survey. To say smoking is
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“not at all risky” on one measure, yet apparently vastly overestimate the risk on the
standard absolute risk measure does not seem coherent.
Since people naturally speak in vague quantifiers and often prefer to express
themselves in this way, it may not be surprising that the vague quantifier measure
performed better than numeric measures. Indeed, higher predictive validity was found for
a measure using a vague quantifier scale, consistent with other findings (Windschitl and
Wells 1996). The vague quantifier scale was more highly correlated with smoking
behavior and led to better fitting predictive models; this was true for all divisions of the
sample. This finding suggests that all age groups report risks in similar ways, possibly
contrary to prior theory (e.g. Reyna and Farley 2006). Like adults, youth smoking
behavior shows a greater relationship with vague, rather than numeric, risk estimates.
Understanding how youth perceive smoking risk is of particular importance given that
many smokers begin at young ages (Escobedo et al. 1990). Additionally, higher
correlations and better model fit were similarly found for the vague quantifier scale in
both higher and lower education groups. This suggests, contrary to expectations, that
numeracy did not have a substantive impact on measurement of subjective probabilities,
at least in terms of impact on numeric and vague quantifier measures.
The results of the current study also mirror those found by Kahneman et al.
(1993) in a study of contingent valuation. Like that study, this study found that qualitative
measures of attitude were psychometrically superior to numeric estimates, at least in
predicting decisions. Further, both studies suggest that numeric estimates may be
expressions of similar attitudes as those on the qualitative scale. Rather than being
considered true values of numeric risk (or willingness to pay), these numeric estimates
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may be simply expressions of attitude on an arbitrary scale (similar to the suggestion of
Borland (1997)).
Although several of the hypotheses were not confirmed regarding the effects of
age or numeracy, the most clearly important hypothesis in terms of its importance for
survey methodology was supported. That is, by all measures and tests, the results suggest
that the vague quantifier measure outperforms numeric open ended measures for
subjective probabilities (Hypotheses 1 and 1a). These results therefore are suggestive of
lower measurement error, an important component of Total Survey Error (Groves 1989),
for the vague quantifier scale. As such, the current results point to greater use of vague
quantifier scales compared to numeric open ended response options in designing surveys,
at least when asking questions about subjective probabilities and decision making studies.
There are several limitations to the current research. The first is the use of
education as a measure of numeracy. Although correlated with numeracy, as indicated in
Galesic and Garcia-Retamero (2010), education is not a direct measure of numeracy. The
fact that this is not a direct measure may contribute to the lack of findings of differences
across these divisions. Although other studies have also found no difference between
levels of numeracy in regards to logical consistency and predictive validity using
different measures of numeracy, it is possible that different results may have occurred
with a different numeracy measure.
A second limitation is different wording for the numeric and vague quantifier
questions. Unlike other studies, which use direct translation of vague quantifier to
numeric meaning, this study used two related questions using the two scale formats.
However, the question wordings were different between the two, and different question
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wording may have an impact on how people respond, even if the target opinion is the
same (Schuman and Presser 1981). Importantly, in this case the targets asked about in the
question are also different, which may increase the chances of non-comparability. In the
numeric questions, the question is asking about a hypothetical 100 smokers, whereas the
vague quantifier question is asking about the respondent. The effect of the difference
between asking about self or others has been found previously (Schwarz and Bienias
1990). Further, one question asked about lung cancer risk and the other asked about
health generally. The differences in questions used in this study may explain the
difference in logical consistency and predictive validity. It must be stated that these
differences make the potential for comparison between the two measures somewhat
limited. However, for predictive validity at least, similar results were found when using
the same question, with respondents simply translating vague quantifiers into numeric
responses (Study 2). This similarity in results suggests that the differences in questions
may not have a large effect in the current findings, however, the difference must be
noted.
These findings indicate areas for further research. First, research should examine
what impact data collection mode has on responses to perceived risk measures. The
current data were collected using telephone surveys, and as indicated by the trend of
absolute risk measures, differences may be observed using other modes, such as face-toface or self-administered questionnaires. Second, although vague quantifiers are more
related to smoking behavior than numeric measures, the best formulation of the vague
quantifier scale should be identified in terms of wording and number of scale options.
Not only may the question change, but also the number of categories. The current
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research uses a scale with four response options. More options, either even or odd
numbered, may be preferable. Third, it is important to see if these findings hold for other
areas of risk perception. This study focused on smoking, but this may not hold for other
types of risks. Finally, it should be examined whether it is possible to analyze responses
to vague quantifier scales to better discriminate individuals’ level of perceived of risk,
possibly using latent models. Regardless, numeric estimates of risk from surveys, at least
in the case of smoking, should be used with the understanding that these do not predict
behaviors of interest as well as qualitative scales. The fact that this holds among youth
samples is additionally important as most smoking decisions are made in younger years.
Summary
When asking about quantitative information in surveys, there are a number of
ways to provide response options to respondents. Three main response options have been
developed and used in requesting quantitative information from respondents: numeric
open ended, numeric scales, or vague quantifier scales (Tourangeau et al. 2000). This
dissertation has focused on two of these, numeric open ended and vague quantifier scale
responses. Numeric scales were not examined because these have been shown to have
potentially biasing properties (Schwarz et al. 1985).
Vague quantifier scales are often argued against by many survey researchers,
suggesting instead that numeric open ended responses be used (Beyth-Marom 1982,
Schaeffer 1991, Tourangeau et al. 2000). This suggestion for avoidance is for several
reasons. First, these scales provide response options that are, as the name suggests,
inherently vague. Due to this, there is often a large variation in the numeric translation
assigned to vague quantifiers (e.g. Wallsten et al. 1985). Further, the scales also have
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relative meaning, such as where on the scale a respondent believes they are in
comparison to similar others (Schaeffer 1991). Additionally, vague quantifiers have
different meanings for different targets (Windschitl and Wells 1996). For example, “a
lot” of risk from smoking may be different from “a lot” of risk from arsenic.
However, although many have argued against the use of vague quantifiers, there
are also reasons that these scales may be preferable to numeric open ended responses.
First, it is not clear that respondents are able to think about quantitative information in an
appropriate manner. Studies have shown that overall there is a lack of numeracy (numeric
literacy) in the population (e.g. Galesic and Garcia-Retamero 2010). Second, theories
such as “fuzzy-trace” and other dual-process theories suggest that people frequently rely
on vague, intuitive representations of numeric information rather than on verbatim
representation of the numbers (Reyna and Brainerd 2008). Third, other research has
shown that the relationship between subjective beliefs and behaviors are stronger when
using vague quantifier scales than numeric responses (Windschitl and Wells 1996).
Finally, and of particular importance, is that it has been argued that it is more cognitively
burdensome to ask about numeric information than vague quantifiers (Bradburn and
Miles 1979).
Even though there are arguments that have been put forth for and (mainly) against
the use of vague quantifiers, there is a lack of studies that have compared the validity of
numeric open ended and vague quantifier responses. This dissertation aimed to fill these
gaps with the main objective being examination of which response format has better
measurement properties for questions requesting numeric data, specifically, which has the
least measurement error. This main objective was achieved through a set of four refined
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objectives. First, was to assess the accuracy of the different response formats and
compare this accuracy to see which, if either, performed better. Second, and similarly,
was to assess and compare the predictive validity of the different response formats. Third,
was to examine the logical consistency between the measures, numeric open ended and
vague quantifiers, which is related to the face validity of the measures. Fourth, and
finally, was to study under what circumstances these measures differed on these aspects
of accuracy, predictive validity, and logical consistency.
These objectives were achieved through three studies, each of which examined
different aspects of these objectives. The first of these studies (Study 1) used a new and
unique data set, created using an experimental method. This experiment produced data
that allowed for the examination of accuracy of the different response forms, numeric
open ended and vague quantifiers. This data was generated as the actual frequency of
events was controlled and known by the experimenter, and respondents were then asked
about how frequently the event (word appearance) occurred by either numeric open
ended or vague quantifier responses. This data addresses the first objective on differential
accuracy.
Respondents who answered the frequency questions using vague quantifiers also
had to provide translations of the scale at the end of the experiment. That is, for each of
the six scale points, a numeric translation of meaning was given. Not only did this allow
for examination of accuracy of the responses by placing a value for each of the vague
quantifier scale points, this translation also allowed for the examination of logical
consistency of numeric and vague quantifier meanings, i.e. the third objective.
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In addition, the experiment presented respondents word lists along with a context
word. This context word allowed for the examination of differences in context memory
and its effect on response accuracy, in conjunction with response form. In one of the
experimental conditions, each target word was presented with the same context word at
each presentation; for the other condition, a different context word was presented with
each target word. The manipulating of context memory replicated the experiment
conducted by Brown (1995). Further, this experiment collected data on numeracy from
all respondents, using a scale previously used (Galesic and Garcia-Retamero 2010). By
including the manipulation of context memory and the measure of numeracy, the fourth
objective was also satisfied, whereby it was possible to examine the circumstances that
the two response forms of interest differed in regards to accuracy. The numeracy measure
also allowed for examination of any effect on logical consistency, again part of the fourth
objective.
Studies 2 and 3 both examined the predictive validity of the different response
measures as the main outcome, that is, the second objective. Examination of predictive
validity requires relating the measure(s) of interest to a theoretically related variable.
Both used preexisting data sets that contained both numeric open ended and vague
quantifier responses on the same or related questions. This also allowed for examination
of logical consistency (objective three) between the two measures. Both data sets also
contained theoretically related variables that had been studied previously, although not in
a comparative manner as done here. The difference between these two studies is the
domain of the question asked; Study 2 examined the area of behavioral frequency, while
Study 3 examined the area of subjective probabilities.
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Additionally, both Studies 2 and 3 estimated the effect of numeracy on predictive
validity, although the measures used were not as direct as that used in Study 1. Study 2
used SAT Math scores, while Study 3 used education as a proxy (Galesic and GarciaRetamero 2010). Study 3 also examined the effect of age on predictive validity of the
different response forms, numeric open ended and vague quantifiers. Theory such as
fuzzy-trace theory suggests that youth and adults perceive risks in different ways, which
may affect the validity of the different response forms (Reyna and Farley 2006) across
age groups. Specifically, youth perceive risk in a more objective, numerical manner, with
adults perceiving risk in a fuzzy, vague way. By examining the differences in numeracy
in Studies 2 and 3 and age in Study 3, the fourth objective was also met.
Overall, the findings from these studies provide a generally consistent view that
vague quantifiers should not be avoided, contrary to many practitioners’ warnings. Study
1 showed that in general, vague quantifiers perform as well as, and in some cases, better
than numeric open ended responses in regards to accuracy. Studies 2 and 3 are more
definitive; by all analyses vague quantifiers outperform numeric open ended responses,
with higher levels of predictive validity in all instances. That is, all three studies find that
vague quantifiers are not worse than numeric open ended responses, and in many cases,
clearly provide higher levels of validity, which is a goal of any survey question.
Further, Studies 1 and 2 show that there is a high level of logical consistency
between numeric open ended and vague quantifier responses. This logical consistency
suggests that respondents use both response forms in a coherent way. Studies 1 and 2
therefore show potential face validity for both measures. This concordance was expected
given that there was a direct translation between numeric and vague quantifier measures.
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However, Study 3 found discordance between the two response forms. This discordance
may be due to the fact that unlike in other studies, a direct translation of vague quantifiers
to numeric responses was not requested. Rather, the means of numeric open ended
responses were examined at the corresponding level of a separate vague quantifier
response question.
Finally these studies examined the circumstances where these findings may differ.
In regards to accuracy, there tended to be an effect for numeracy, but the effect was not
always in a consistent direction. Numeracy sometimes increased accuracy, depending on
response form and context memory, and others, decreased accuracy in a relative manner.
For example, for numeric open ended responses and different context, greater numeracy
tends to reduce error. However, for the same context and numeric open ended responses,
greater numeracy appears to be related to greater error. Although generally, vague
quantifier responses were as accurate as or more accurate than numeric open ended
responses, numeracy at times affected this level of relative accuracy. Similarly, context
memory sometimes affected vague quantifier responses in a similarly inconsistent way,
with the end result being the same or greater accuracy generally, with some exceptions,
but there was no consistent effect observed. Indeed, the overall effect of context memory
found in Brown (1995) was not replicated here, suggesting potential revisiting of the
effect of context memory.
In regards to predictive validity and logical consistency, however, there was no
such variation across different conditions. Regardless of level of numeracy, in both
Studies 2 and 3, predictive validity was higher for vague quantifier responses in every
analysis. Similarly, in Study 3, there was no difference across ages, with predictive
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validity higher for vague quantifier responses again. Results were also the same for
logical consistency, with the findings of all studies replicated across all levels of
numeracy, and in Study 3, age.
Given that in many of the analyses results were consistent across levels of
numeracy and other factors, such as age, suggest that vague quantifiers are more suitable
for all respondents than numeric open ended responses. At least this statement is clearly
true if the desire is to increase predictive validity. Although numeracy had an impact on
accuracy, vague quantifier responses generally performed at least as well, if not better,
than numeric open ended responses. Context memory appeared to have less of an impact
on accuracy, although context did impact accuracy through interactions with response
form and numeracy. Again, these findings suggests that while conditions do exists that
may differentially effect the relative accuracy of the different response forms, in almost
all conditions vague quantifiers perform as well or better than numeric open ended
responses. In combination with the findings on lack of effect of conditions on predictive
validity, findings suggest the use of vague quantifiers for all respondents.
These findings and the relative cognitive ease of response using vague quantifiers
suggest that there should be more usage of these in surveys. One way to accomplish this,
while achieving more “precise” data many researchers desire, is to adopt the methods
used in Study 1 and advocated by Bradburn and Miles (1979). A series of questions can
be asked using vague quantifier responses, and at the end of the survey, respondents can
be asked for their numeric translations of each of the scale points. Therefore, numeric
information is provided, shown here to be done in a logically consistent manner, but only
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had to be done once. The cognitive burden is reduced, and the benefits of using vague
quantifiers found in this dissertation are maintained.
Finally, consideration is merited as to why the common view for avoidance of
vague quantifiers has arisen and numeric estimates preferred. First are all of the issues
that were pointed out previously that have been found in studies. These issues include
that vague quantifiers are inherently vague, have large variation in the numeric
translation assigned to vague quantifiers, and that there is relative meaning, both relative
to similar other people and relative to other target events.
Another possible explanation is that of researcher influence (Windschitl and
Wells 1996). First, researchers tend to be relatively numerate individuals, able to think
about and understand numbers better than the general public. Second, researchers may
prefer numeric data. Numeric data is thought to be more accurate than vague quantities, is
more amenable to the types of analyses that researchers prefer, and can be presented with
more certainty of meaning than vague quantifiers, e.g. whether people over- or
underestimate risks. Finally, specifically in the case of smoking risk perceptions, one
explanation for this preference is the establishment of the absolute risk measure over
time. This question was first used by industry research as far back as 1964 and asked
several times thereafter (see Table 1). Industry data were then used in published risk
perception literature, further establishing it as the standard measure (e.g. Viscusi 1990).
However, none of these reasons actually mean that people have accurate
representations of numeric information or that this is the best way to measure beliefs in
surveys. Instead, this dissertation shows that more accurate and valid representations can
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be conveyed through more qualitative response options. That is, vague quantifier
response options can successfully be used in surveys asking about a variety of topics.
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Questions about Smoking Risks Used in Literature Review
Gallup Poll, November 1949 (n = 1500):
 Do you think smoking is harmful or not? Yes: 60%, No: 33%, No Opinion: 7%
Gallup Poll Jan. 1954 (n = 1500):
 Have you heard or read anything recently that cigarette smoking may be a cause of
cancer of the lung? Yes, have heard or read: 83%, No, have not: 17%
 What is your own opinion—do you think cigarette smoking is one of the causes of
lung cancer, or not? Yes: 41%, No: 31%, No opinion: 28%
Gallup Poll Jun. 1954 (n = 1435):
 Have you heard or read anything recently to the effect that cigarette smoking may be
a cause of cancer of the lung? Yes, have heard or read: 90%, No, have not: 10%
 What is your own opinion—do you think cigarette smoking is one of the causes of
lung cancer, or not? Yes: 42% No: 30%, No opinion: 28%
Gallup Poll Jun. 1981 (n = 1535):
 Do you think that cigarette smoking is or is not one of the causes of lung cancer? Is:
83%, Is not: 10%, Don’t Know: 7%
Risk Perception Measures used in Table 1:
Roper, 1964:
 According to the report, a person who smokes a pack or more a day has about ten
times as great a chance of getting lung cancer as a non-smoker, but what does that
mean to you in terms of the likelihood of the pack a day smoker getting lung cancer?
Out of 100 pack a day smokers how many would you say would get lung cancer – 5
out of 100, 25 out of 100, 50, 75, 95 out of 100, or how many?
Roper, 1977, 1980:
 Out of every one hundred people who have been cigarette smokers, how many would
you estimate get lung cancer at some time in their lives?
Viscusi, 1985:
 Among 100 smokers, how many of them do you think will get lung cancer because
they smoke?
Viscusi, 1991:
 Among 100 smokers, how many of them do you think will die from lung cancer
because they smoke?
Sutton, 1995:
 On average, out of 1000 20 year olds in Britain who smoke cigarettes regularly and
who carry on smoking,..how many do you think will be killed by smoking before the
age of 70?
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Viscusi, 1997:
 Among 100 smokers, how many of them do you think will develop lung cancer
because they smoke?
Viscusi, 1998:
 Out of 100 smokers, how many do you think will die from lung cancer because they
smoke?
Annenberg 2, 1999:
 Now I would like you to imagine 100 cigarette smokers, both men and women, who
smoked cigarettes for their entire adult lives. How many of these 100 people do you
think will die from lung cancer?
Krosnick, 2000:
 Next, I'd like to turn to a different topic: what you personally think about the effect of
cigarette smoking on people's health. I'm going to read these next two questions very
slowly to let you think about each part of them, and I can repeat each question as
many times as you like before you answer, so you can be sure they are clear to you.
First, if we were to randomly choose one thousand American adults who never
smoked cigarettes at all during their lives, how many of those one thousand people do
you think would get lung cancer sometime during their lives?
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Target words and Exemplars for use in Study 1
1. Weapon
1) Gun
2) Knife
3) Sword
4) Bat
5) Bomb
6) Fist
7) Rifle
8) Arrow
9) Rope
10) Mace
11) Ax
12) Grenade
13) Missile
14) Club
15) Spear
16) Bazooka
2. Fruit
1) Apple
2) Orange
3) Banana
4) Grape
5) Pear
6) Strawberry
7) Peach
8) Kiwi
9) Pineapple
10) Watermelon
11) Raspberry
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12) Plum
13) Grapefruit
14) Mango
15) Lemon
16) Cherry
3. City
1) New York
2) Los Angeles
3) Denver
4) Miami
5) Paris
6) London
7) Toronto
8) Moscow
9) Charlotte
10) Dallas
11) Orlando
12) Houston
13) Seattle
14) Boston
15) Chicago
16) Baltimore
4. State
1) Oregon
2) California
3) Kansas
4) Ohio
5) Texas
6) Maryland
7) Utah
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8) Iowa
9) Missouri
10) Oklahoma
11) Michigan
12) Georgia
13) Florida
14) Colorado
15) Idaho
16) Nevada
5. Country
1) United States
2) Canada
3) Mexico
4) France
5) Russia
6) Germany
7) Iraq
8) Chile
9) Japan
10) China
11) Spain
12) Italy
13) Brazil
14) Iran
15) India
16) Peru
6. Instrument
1) Drum
2) Guitar
3) Flute

197
4) Piano
5) Trumpet
6) Clarinet
7) Saxophone
8) Violin
9) Trombone
10) Tuba
11) Oboe
12) Harp
13) Cello
14) Organ
15) Cymbal
16) Banjo
7. Job
1) Doctor
2) Teacher
3) Lawyer
4) Nurse
5) Fireman
6) Professor
7) Accountant
8) Dentist
9) Psychologist
10) Secretary
11) Manager
12) Cook
13) Policeman
14) Banker
15) Engineer
16) Scientist
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8. Sport
1) Football
2) Basketball
3) Soccer
4) Baseball
5) Hockey
6) Tennis
7) Swimming
8) Golf
9) Volleyball
10) Rugby
11) Lacrosse
12) Running
13) Polo
14) Wrestling
15) Bowling
16) Skiing
9. Clothing
1) Shirt
2) Pants
3) Socks
4) Dress
5) Coat
6) Jeans
7) Gloves
8) Sweatshirt
9) Blouse
10) Undershirt
11) Scarf
12) Underpants
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13) Shorts
14) Bra
15) Skirt
16) Jacket
10. Tool
1) Hammer
2) Nail
3) Saw
4) Screwdriver
5) Drill
6) Wrench
7) Screw
8) Ruler
9) Level
10) Pliers
11) Hoe
12) Shovel
13) Chisel
14) Rake
15) Spade
16) Trowel
11. Bird
1) Eagle
2) Robin
3) Bluejay
4) Parrot
5) Hawk
6) Cardinal
7) Crow
8) Sparrow
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9) Hummingbird
10) Falcon
11) Owl
12) Dove
13) Pigeon
14) Parakeet
15) Duck
16) Chicken
12. Insect
1) Fly
2) Ant
3) Caterpillar
4) Bee
5) Mosquito
6) Beetle
7) Ladybug
8) Grasshopper
9) Butterfly
10) Wasp
11) Roach
12) Moth
13) Gnat
14) Flea
15) Cricket
16) Hornet
13. Animal
1) Dog
2) Cat
3) Lion
4) Horse
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5) Bear
6) Tiger
7) Elephant
8) Cow
9) Deer
10) Mouse
11) Pig
12) Giraffe
13) Rat
14) Rabbit
15) Goat
16) Donkey
14. Fish
1) Salmon
2) Trout
3) Goldfish
4) Bass
5) Catfish
6) Tuna
7) Shark
8) Flounder
9) Swordfish
10) Herring
11) Carp
12) Cod
13) Marlin
14) Piranha
15) Halibut
16) Minnow
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15. Drug
1) Marijuana
2) Cocaine
3) Heroin
4) Ecstasy
5) Alcohol
6) LSD
7) Crack
8) Acid
9) Mushrooms
10) Speed
11) Nicotine
12) Caffeine
13) Opium
14) Morphine
15) Tylenol
16) Aspirin
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Numeracy Test from Galesic and Garcia-Retamero (2010)

1. Imagine that we flip a fair coin 1000 times. What is your best guess about how
many times the coin will come up heads in 1000 flips?
____________ times out of 1000

2. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize are 1%.
What is your best guess about how many people would win a $10.00 prize if
1,000 people each buy a single ticket to BIG BUCKS?
____________ person(s) out of 1000

3. In the Daily Times Sweepstakes, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 1,000. What
percent of tickets to Daily Times Sweepstakes win a car?
____________ % of tickets

4. Imagine that we rolled a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how
many times do you think the die would come up even (2, 4, or 6)?
____________ times out of 1000

5. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease?
1 in 100

1 in 1000

1 in 10
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6. Which of the following represents the biggest risk of getting a disease?
1%

10%

5%

7. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to
get the disease out of 1000?
____________ person(s) out of 1000

8. If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this is the same as having what
percentage chance of getting the disease?
____________ % chance

9. If person A’s chance of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in 10 years and person B’s
risk is double that, what is B’s risk?
____________
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Questions used from the NSSE
Vague quantifier/translation questions (Questions asked in a list, grouped under one
question stem. Question stem appears as it did in the Web survey with those under it
included in that grouping on one page. Not all questions used in translations that were
asked this way. All questions given the response options, in order they appeared on the
page, going left to right: Very Often, Often, Sometimes, Never. See example Web page
below in Figure 2.)

Active and Collaborative Learning Scale
In your experience at your institution during the current school year, about how often
have you…


Asked questions in class or contributed to class discussions



Made a class presentation



Worked with other students on projects during class



Worked with classmates outside of class to prepare class assignments



Tutored or taught other students (paid or voluntary)



Participated in a community-based project (e.g., service learning) as part of a
regular course



Discussed ideas from your readings or classes with others outside of class (students,
family members, co-workers, etc.)
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Student-Faculty Interaction Scale
In your experience at your institution during the current school year, about how often
have you…


Discussed grades or assignments with an instructor



Talked about career plans with a faculty member or advisor



Received prompt written or oral feedback from faculty on your academic
performance



Worked with faculty members on activities other than coursework (committees,
orientation, student life activities, etc.)



Discussed ideas from your readings or classes with faculty members outside of
class

Figure 2. Example Screen of How Vague Quantifier Questions Asked.
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Theoretically Related Variables of Interest
How would you evaluate your entire educational experience at this institution?
Poor
Fair
Good
Excellent

If you could start over again, would you go to the same institution you are now
attending?
Definitely no
Probably no
Probably yes
Definitely yes

What have most of your grades been up to now at this institution?
C- or lower
C
C+
BB
B+
AA
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Questions used from Annenberg 2 Surveys.
Risk Perception Measures


Now I would like you to imagine 100 cigarette smokers, both men and women, who
smoked cigarettes for their entire adult lives. How many of these 100 people do you
think will die from lung cancer?



I just asked you about smokers. Now I would like you to imagine 100 non-smokers,
both men and women, who never smoked and don’t live with smokers. How many
do you think will die from lung cancer?



In your opinion, would smoking everyday be very risky for your health, somewhat
risky, a little risky or not at all risky for your health?

Theoretically Related Variables of Interest
How frequently did you smoke cigarettes in the past 30 days? Just tell me when I get to
the right amount. (Read responses 1-7:)
1

Less than one cigarette a day

2

One to five a day

3

Six to ten a day

4

Eleven to fourteen a day

5

Fifteen to nineteen a day

6

Twenty a day

7

More than twenty a day

8

(Don’t know)

9

(Refused)

The above variable will be recoded to be such that anyone smoking one or more
cigarettes a day is considered a smoker.

